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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The Arctic environment provides a distinctive livelihood to the inhabitants of the 
Arctic. The inhabitants of the region including various groups of indigenous peoples 
have found their way of life in the traditional Arctic environment, however 
increasing climate change has emerged as a big threat to this environment and early 
summers, late winters and an increased melting of ice and permafrost are reported as 
common phenomena. Arctic climate change and its consequences not only affect the 
Arctic people, flora and fauna, but are also of influence to the rest of the world.  
 
There is no single definition of the Arctic. Generally the Arctic is known as the 
northernmost part of the globe which retains extreme climatic and geographical 
phenomena: extreme cold, snow and ice, permafrost, sunless days and mid-night 
Suns. However, it has not been possible to reach an agreed definition of the 
southernmost boundary of the Arctic due to different criteria being considered by 
natural and social scientists. Presently there are three main criteria1:  
                                                 
1 Some other proposals are those of warm-cold water, pack ice, and solar energy incident. The warm-
cold principle considers a southern boundary where cold waters meet warm waters from further 
south. However, such an arctic convergence is defeated by land. According to the pack ice principle, 
the southern limit of pack ice is recognised as the southern boundary which has its limit due to 
seasonal changes, in particular when unpredictable annual variation occurs. Moreover, it is difficult to 
interpolate the position of the pack ice edge across land masses since the Arctic Ocean is virtually 
surrounded by land. The Solar energy incident principle, proposed from the 1960’s, defines the arctic 
southern boundary where the incident energy is less than 15kcal/cm2/year. However, it seems 
difficult to locate the Arctic boundary based upon sun energy incidents, as these are not an easily 
recognisable unit or feature. See Sale, (2008), p. 17. 
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a. Tree Line Principle 
b. Isotherm   Principle 
c. Latitude Principle 
 
The Tree Line Principle refers to the southern boundary of the Arctic as the 
northernmost border line where trees grow. In fact, it is not merely a line but a band 
of trees several kilometres wide.  Crossing the width of the band, the trees become 
smaller and grow at a further spacing and finally they reach a point where the trees 
disappear.2 This is the starting point of the tundra3 and is considered as an important 
boundary in terms of animal distributions and in separating the Arctic Inuit peoples 
from the forest Indians of North America.4 
  
The Isotherm Principle indicates the southernmost location where the mean 
temperature of the warmest month of the year is below ten degrees Celsius (10°C). 
The isotherm boundary is closely aligned to the tree-line and has been adopted as a 
useful measure of the border between the Arctic and the sub-Arctic regions although 
                                                 
2 The ground underneath the band is permanently frozen with just a thin layer of unfrozen soil on top. 
Only dwarf trees with short roots survive on top of the permafrost. Icy winds, lack of moisture, very 
thin layer of soil prevent trees from growing at further north of the tree line.  Kalman, (1988)), pp. 6-
7.  If the tree line is considered to form as the southern boundary of the Arctic, then it includes 
western and northern Alaska, a wedge of northern Canada (which progressively widens towards the 
east), the whole of Greenland, and a thin strip of the Russian Federation which also widens to the 
east. Sugden, (1982), p. 18. 
3 Tundra is a barren land with no trees or tall plants. 
4 Sugden, (1982)2, pp. 17-18. 
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there is disagreement among scientists about the standard temperature.5 Moreover, it 
is difficult to define the Arctic by strictly following isotherm principle. 6  
 
In general, the Latitude Principle considers the southern border as the ring line on 
the globe drawn at 66°34′03″ (or 66.567°) North latitude, where at all points north 
the Sun is visible throughout the day at mid-summer and invisible at mid-winter.7  
This ring is known as the Arctic Circle, yet, it may not be considered as the only 
southern border of the Arctic subject to the general Arctic characteristics of climatic 
significance and with an implication for either people or Arctic wildlife.8 For 
instance, the part of Norwegian territory (main land) located to the north of the 
Arctic Circle does not have the characteristics of an Arctic climate, due to warming 
by the Gulf Stream.9    Alternatively, there are some other areas located further 
                                                 
5 For instance, Morten Vahl, a Danish scientist, suggested that 10°C should be replaced by the 
temperature V, where V< 9.5° - (K/30), with V and K the mean temperature of the warmest and 
coldest months of the year; whereas, Otto Nordenskjöld, a Swedish scientist, suggested with V< 9.5° 
- (K/10). Sale, (2008), p. 19. 
6 For instance, James Bay in North America does not fall into the Arctic when considering the 
southern border as a 10°C isotherm line. However, it is important to include James Bay in the Arctic 
from the Polar Bear context. The Pribilof Islands, the Aleutian Island chain, the Commander Islands, 
the Kamchatka peninsula and north-eastern coast of the Sea of Okhotsk are usually considered as 
within the Arctic, however the isotherm border does not include them.  
7  Nuttall and  Callaghan, ( 2000), p. xxix; Sale, (2008), pp. 15-21. 
8 Baird has described the Arctic as “a semi-frozen sea surrounded by tundra lands several million 
square miles in extent” and as one part of the Polar Regions whose general characteristics are cold, 
ice and the paucity of vegetation. He defines the Arctic in high latitude with truly polar 
characteristics: long winter and short cool summer, low precipitation, permafrost, frozen lakes and 
sea and an absence of trees. See Baird, (1964), pp. 1-10. While, Armstrong, Roger and Rowley 
argued for Circumpolar North as a true abbreviation of Arctic and sub-Arctic. See, Armstrong et al., 
(1978). Sale has described the Arctic as an area of ice and snow where polar bears are hunted by 
native peoples who live in igloos. Sale, (2008), p. 15. 
9 See also  Baird, (1964), p. 2. More specifically, Longyearbyen is a town with hotels and shops along 
with an airport operating flights throughout the year, located on Spitsbergen Island at 78°N. At the 
same latitude in North America and Eurasia, in areas that do not receive any warming effect from the 
North Atlantic Drift, the land is unavoidably uninhabitable. Sale, (2008), p. 16. 
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below the Arctic Circle which have Arctic characteristics.10  Some Arctic states 
 
define their Arctic area based on different latitudes. 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Projected Arctic 
southern boundary form 
different viewpoints along 
with Arctic and Subarctic. 
[Courtesy of Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP) 
website, 
< http://www.amap.no/ 
AboutAMAP/ 
GeoCov.htm>]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For reasons mainly concerning the location of jurisdictional or administrative 
boundaries and the availability of data; variation is apparent with respect to the 
specified Arctic area, covered in reports prepared by different groups. 
 
 
 
 
10 For instance, in the Canadian Arctic, it seems reasonable to adopt 60°N as the southern boundary 
of the region. This convention separates the three northern territories from the southern provinces, 
although Nunavik (or northern Quebec) and Labrador, are areas that have arctic character and this 
extends to even below 60°N.  In contrast, when applying the same convention to Fennoscandia (the 
combination of Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Kola Peninsula and that land immediately south of 
the White Sea in Russia), this would demarcate a region running as far south as Oslo and Helsinki, an 
outcome that makes little sense to those who think about Arctic issues in the Nordic countries. Arctic 
Human Development Report, ( 2004), p. 17. 
11 Canada includes the drainage area of the Yukon Territory, all lands north of 60°N latitude and the 
coastal zone areas of Hudson Bay and James Bay; while, Denmark specified the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland be treated as lying within the Arctic. Finland defines the territory as being north of the 
Arctic Circle. Iceland has defined the whole territory of Iceland as lying within the Arctic area. 
Norway determines 62°N as the southern border line of the Arctic in Norwegian territory. Sweden 
accepted the Arctic Circle as the southern borderline of the Arctic area, although it does not have any 
formal delimitation of the Arctic. The Russian Federation determines its Arctic areas as the ‘On 
Zoning of North Russia’, a law drafted by the Russian Federation. Arctic Council Arctic Offshore Oil 
and Gas Guideline ( 2009), pp. 77-78 (the part: Annex A – Definition of the Arctic). 
 5 
For instance, there is dissimilarity between AMAP-Arctic12 and AHDR-Arctic13, 
although, both are issued under the auspices of the Arctic Council.  
  
 
It may be possible to use biophysical criteria to determine the extent of the Arctic as 
a region. Aside from the fact that this approach has little to recommend in cultural, 
economic, or political terms, it seems that there is much to be said for bounding the 
Arctic in a manner that is broadly compatible with the studies of other Arctic issues, 
rather than adopting yet another approach to determining the extent of the region.  
                                                 
12 See Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report, (1997), p. 6; Arctic 
Pollution 2002: Persistent Organic Pollutants, Heavy Metals, Radioactivity, Human Health, Changing 
Pathways, (2002), p. 3. 
13 The AHDR Arctic includes Alaska, Canada North of 60°N together with northern Quebec and 
Labrador, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, the northernmost counties of Norway, Sweden and 
Finland along with a large part of Russia: the Murmansk Oblast, the Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taimyr, 
and Chukotka autonomus okrugs, Vorkuta City in the Komi Republic, Norilsk and Igarka in 
Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose boundaries lie closest to the Arctic 
Circle. Arctic Human Development Report, (2004), p. 18. 
 
Fig 2. Projected Arctic southern 
boundary form the viewpoint of 
the Arctic Circle, AMAP-Arctic 
and AHDR-Arctic. [Courtesy of 
Stofnun Vilhjálms Stefánssonar 
(SVS) website, <                                                   
<www.svs.is/AHDR/AHDR%20
chapters/English%20version/AH
DR_chp%201.pdf> page 18].  
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The Arctic Circle has been considered in this manner. In Arctic wide political 
cooperation, states that possess areas of territorial sovereignty above the Arctic 
Circle consider themselves as Arctic states and are given membership of the Arctic 
Council (AC), the only inter-governmental Arctic-wide cooperation. It therefore 
includes Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark-Greenland, Iceland, Canada, Russia 
and the USA (in respect of Alaska). This encompasses an area of over 40 million 
square kilometres (or about 8% of the earth’s surface), which is a sizable domain by 
any standards,14 yet the human residents of this vast area number only about 4 
million, of whom almost half are located within the Russian Federation.15 This 
political consideration presents with the further problem of determining what 
specific parts of these states to include in a region designated as the Arctic.16 
 
Thus, searching for an agreed definition of the Arctic seems complicated in many 
respects. David Sugden has advocated for a flexible boundary for the Polar Regions 
as some described boundaries seem appropriate for some purposes and other 
boundaries for others.17 One solution is to recognise the Arctic from the cultural, 
economic and political viewpoint of the inhabitants of the region, rather than 
considering only the biophysical criteria. The region is fairly dissimilar to more 
familiar regions of the world18, in that it consists mainly of portions of nation states 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 18. 
15 Ibid. 
16 For a detailed treatment see Nuttall and Callaghan, (2000), pp. 1-160. 
17  Sugden, (1982), p. 17. 
18 E.g., South-East Asia, the Middle East, or South America. 
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whose political centres of value lie, for the most part,19 far to the south.20 That being 
said however, some Arctic regions have achieved a level of power to deal with their 
own issues to some extent.21  
 
Climate is an important element of the environment and commonly “weather 
averaged”22. The overall concept of “weather” is clear (the state of the atmosphere 
of a specific place at specific time with respect to its temperature, relative humidity, 
wind pattern, precipitation and cloud)23  and implies the integrated circumstances of 
those phenomena. However, it arises with an attached multiplicity and its operating 
system, causes of change and the actions that surmount the change are subject to 
deep technical discourse. So, scientists often face difficulty when they deal with the 
longer term measurements of climate, for it involves the calculation of weather 
patterns of places, with all their attached variables. 
  
Modern science is capable of forecasting weather with a high degree of accuracy, 
however, different definitions of weather exist. According to the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO), then reason for this is: The scope of what 
“weather” encompasses differs widely from country to country, language to 
language, and discipline to discipline; it seems appropriate to regard “weather” as 
including all those physical (and to some extent chemical) processes and phenomena 
that are manifest in the atmosphere; measured on time scales that range from 
                                                 
19 The exception is Iceland does fall into north-south debate in terms of political value.   
20 Arctic Human Development Report, (2004), p. 17. 
21 E.g., Iqaluit shares power with Ottawa and Greenland Home-rule government shares with 
Copenhagen. 
22 Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p. 96. 
23 Guidelines on Capacity Building Strategies in Public Weather Services, (2007), p. 11. 
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seconds, up to days and weeks, weather is also considered on longer time scales 
which extend into the past and future and traditionally thought of as “climate”;  it is 
also worth noting that in recent years, the concept of “weather” has been expanded 
to embrace the variability of the ionosphere and the space environment on “weather” 
time scales, under the title of “space weather”.24 The timeframe used in scheming 
the weather grade of specific places also varies when the average results that 
represent the “climate” of that place are considered. There is opinion that climate 
might be represented over more or less ten years,25 whilst the classical time period 
considered is 30 years.26  
 
Nature has its own system to operate the universe including planets such as the 
Earth. In fact, the universe is a vast area in comparison to that of the Earth and 
nature imparts a strong force, in regulating the earth’s climatic system. The World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)27 has stated in its report 
that: 
 
“From space, we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and 
edifice, but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery and soils. Humanity’s inability 
to fit its activities into that pattern is changing planetary systems fundamentally.” 28  
                                                 
24 Ibid., p. 5. 
25  Archer, ( 2007), pp. 1, 54-59. 
26 Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p. 96. 
27 The United Nations General Assembly formed the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) in 1983 (known as the Brundtland Commission by the name of its chair, Gro 
Harlem Brundtland ) to address the deterioration  of the human environment and its natural resources. 
UNGA Resolution 38/161, (1983), sec.3. The General Assembly recognised environmental 
degradation as a global problem and the common concern of all nations (sec.8). 
28  World Commission on Environment and Development, (1987), p. 308. 
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Air temperature, pressure and humidity, water, water-current and vapour are the 
main variable influences on weather conditions.29 Climate, in a wider sense, is the 
state of those components, including a statistical description which shows their 
measurement and arrangement in a way that is integrated, complex and 
interdependent. Different methods30 are used by climate scientists to prove their 
hypothesis and they also achieve different results. It is impossible for natural 
scientists to carry out a fully-controlled experiment on the planet as a whole31  and 
there is no collection of similar planets on which scientists can experiment by 
assigning treatments, comparing responses, assessing causal relations, so this makes 
things difficult from an experimental perspective.32 Moreover, the climate system as 
a whole is too complex to achieve a complete understanding by only those 
investigations of a single discipline of science.33  
 
                                                 
29  Lemke, (2006), p. 37. 
30 Observation and physical modelling are the main sources of data regarding climate change. 
Climate scientists collect data establishing meteorological observing stations and via remote sensing. 
They apply radiosondes (using balloons) and rocketsondes methods in measuring air temperature 
beyond the surface. Satellite observation is a comparatively developed form. Wide numbers of 
research centres have developed their own climate models: Hadley Centre (U.K.), Canadian Climate 
Centre (Canada), National Centre for Atmospheric Research (U.S.A.), The Geophysical Fluid 
Dynamics Laboratory (USA), Max Planck Institute for Meteorology (Germany).  However, those 
models show discrepancies and even controversies. Andrew R Solow has presented the controversies 
found in climate models. For instance, with respect to the behaviour of clouds, see Solow, (2003), pp. 
423-424. 
31 Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p. 98.  
32  Berliner, (2003), p. 431. 
33 Nychka, (2000), p. 975. Dough Nychka has described the difficulties in measuring climate change. 
He has explained inter alia the General Circulation Model (GCM). The GCM is an adaptation of the 
primordial equations to a spatial grid and separate steps in time. Long-term changes cannot be 
estimated without a large scale of modelling which is a huge task and involves the efforts of many 
scientists. The Community Climate Model maintains a spatial grid which collects information from 
8000 (approximately) points in every 20 minutes. It has formed grid boxes, each of which are 300 km 
x 300 km (28° x 28°), however, there are some components involved that are smaller than this box 
size and have strong convection events associated with climate change, for example a thunderstorm.    
 10 
In due course, scientists have found a more credible approach – to synthesize the 
results of a number of peer-reviewed publications and previous and recent 
researches, which may provide real information or the closest thing to it. An 
example of this is the practice of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). The IPCC can be evaluated (even if it is not itself formally a part of the 
climate change regime) as the standard source of information among scientific 
agencies engaged in climate change. The reason for this is that the parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (which is 
the founding instrument in the climate change regime under international law), have 
come to rely on the IPCC’s findings regarding climate change to inform their 
activities. Unless otherwise indicated, this study uses the fourth assessment report of 
the IPCC (hereinafter “AR4”) as the most recent and authentic source. 34 
 
1.2 Global Warming 
 
The Sun continuously disperses energy and the Earth absorbs that energy which in-
turn warms the surface. A portion of the energy from the earth spreads over the 
planet by means of atmospheric and oceanic circulation, while some of the solar 
radiation is reflected back into space from the earth35 and its atmosphere. However, 
                                                 
34  Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2007). 
35 The Earth is almost (though not fully) considered as a blackbody – in that it cannot absorb all the 
light/heat fallen onto it and some portion is reflected back into space. The heat carried through the 
reflected light of the Sun will bounce back into space with the reflected light. That part of total 
incoming visible light of a planet, that is reflected back to space is called albedo of the planet. In fact, 
the albedo shows the reflecting capacity of certain planet. This varies from planet to planet, as they 
have different amount of ice, snow and clouds surrounding each of them. These three components are 
very reflective to light and are likely to raise the albedo measurement of a planet. For instance, the 
Venus albedo is 0.70 yet that of Mars is 0.15. This is because there is a thick cloud layer of sulphuric 
acid in the Venus atmosphere whilst Mars lacks this degree of cloud in its atmosphere. The average 
of earth’s albedo is 0.30 which moves back and forth with the changing amount of its cloudiness and 
ice-covered areas. The incoming force of solar energy from the average distance to the Earth is 
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main portion of the reflected radiation cannot pass through the atmosphere. There 
are some gases (primarily carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O)) which are transparent only to short-wave radiation.
36 Those gases as well as 
water vapour and aerosols37 block outgoing long-wave radiation, which leads to an 
increase in surface radiation.38 This results in increased temperatures on the earth’s 
surface and in its lower atmosphere.39 Natural science has named this warming 
process the “greenhouse effect”.40     
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
1350Wm-2. If its albedo (α) is 0.30, then the intensity of solar energy absorbed by the Earth per 
square metre is calculated as, 1350 Wm-2(1- α) = 1050 Wm-2. See Archer, (2007), p. 20. 
36 The scientific convention is that hot sources always radiate heat. The hotter the source is, the faster 
it radiates. The faster radiation takes place through short waves. The opposite finding is that less hot 
sources radiate slower and slower radiation takes place through long waves. The Sun is a hotter 
source than the Earth – the Sun’s radiated heat to the Earth comes through shorter waves than those 
Earth radiates to space. Thus the lengths of heat radiation waves vary, dependant on the source. 
Another characteristic of atmospheric gasses is molecular vibration: in this, molecules move fast and 
create different sizes of waves which vary from gas to gas and in different temperatures. Infrared 
light (IR) is a  longer wave-length light than the visible light which is emitted from objects at room 
temperature and can easily pass that spectrum where the wave length is around 1000 cycles/cm. This 
band is called the atmospheric window.  Any other light can pass through a gas when the vibration 
frequency of the light is similar to that of the gas. However, CO2 works as blackbody by absorbing 
the light radiated from the earth surface and radiating its own light to the atmosphere at about 
700cycles/cm. Ibid., p. 33. 
37 Primarily sulphate, organic carbon, black carbon, nitrate and dust.  
38 Another complexity comes from band saturation theory. It means every molecule has limited 
capacity to protect intensity of light. For instance, CO2 work as blackbody when its vibration is 
between 600 and 800cycles/cm. It can protect light the best at 220K temperatures, which is more or 
less as cold as the atmosphere gets. Increasing the amount of CO2 to the atmosphere cannot make the 
light’s intensity lower. From such a view, the growing amount of CO2 in the atmosphere has only a 
limited capacity in absorbing the Earth radiated light to the atmosphere change and an additional 
quantity of the gas cannot alter that limitation. However, it is important to know the degree of band 
saturation of all greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, in order to predict or observe: whether any vast 
climate change appears before reaching the saturated level. Archer, (2007), pp. 34-35. 
39 Arnell, (1996), p. 3. 
40 Berliner, (2003), p. 430. Those gases are known as greenhouse gases (GHG); so named because 
they are likely to act as the panes of glass in a greenhouse. See also Arnell,(1996), pp. 13-21. 
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1.3 Climate Change 
 
The UNFCCC has provided the most authentic legal definition of climate change by 
modifying the definition of climate change given by the IPCC. The IPCC has 
defined climate change as: “any change in climate over time whether due to natural 
variability or as a result of human activity”.41  UNFCCC has modified the definition 
taking into account only the aspect of human activity, because the changes caused 
by natural variability cannot be controlled by human intervention. As such, states 
have established a climate change regime aiming to combat climate change by 
managing those human activities which are deemed significant to it. According to 
the UNFCCC: 
“ ‘Climate change’ means a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and 
which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time 
periods”.42  
 
Each environment has its own system that maintains its climate and has balanced 
components with respect to its climate, however human activities (along with other 
phenomena) can have a negative influence on the balanced components. Svante 
Arrhenius, a Swedish scientist, argued first in 1896, that there exists a physical limit 
in the atmosphere to the amount of emissions it can absorb without suffering serious 
damage,43 and that crossing that limit results in global climate change.44 Nowadays, 
                                                 
41Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p. 2 (note 1). 
42 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992. 
43 Arrhenius, (1896), pp. 237-276. 
44 Rodhe et al., (1997), pp. 2-5. 
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scientists have constructed a detailed carbon flux model which is capable of 
measuring the amount of carbon stored and exchanged between the atmosphere, the 
ocean, the terrestrial reservoir and the geological reservoir.45  There is however, still 
uncertainty and this prevails in climate change prediction due to its links to factors 
such as industrialisation, population growth and urbanisation. These factors lead to 
increased fossil fuel burning and deforestation are responsible for the increase of 
CO2 in the atmosphere.
46 In light of this, it is impossible to assess the exact figure of 
future expansions in those factors for certain time scales. 
 
Currently, climate scientists have found that the increased concentration of 
greenhouse gases is mainly responsible for global warming which in-turn causes 
climate change. This is consistent with related indicators such as snow and ice 
melting, sea-levels rising, physical and biological changes in regional levels.47 
Nevertheless, all these changes result in further changes to the overall climatic 
system.   Again, the carbon cycle works globally rather than nationally, i.e., 
emissions from one part of the world can impact upon the climate of other regions. It 
does not follow however that emission management in a specific region can curb the 
climate change in that region; but that it requires emission control inputs from other 
parts of the world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Stripple, ( 2007), pp. 140-141. 
46 Berliner, (2003), p. 430. 
47 AR4 (Synthesis Report), pp. 30-36. 
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1.4 Human Activity and Climate Change 
 
It was once unclear whether human activities interfered with the climate system or 
how those activities impacted both positively and negatively on a global scale.  
Scholars provided arguments in support as well as against those human efforts 
regarding climate change, however, there are still further difficulties entailed which 
can be addressed in two points: Firstly, the influence of human activities on the 
climate system is a small consideration when compared to the vast powers of natural 
sources which also are seen to contribute to the problem. These may include the 
seasonal changes of a region around the year, the temperature difference between the 
equator and the poles, or perhaps the night and day-time variations seen within the 
same day in certain places. Secondly, there are some elements which play both a 
positive and negative role in climate change. Water acts in different ways in global 
warming, representing commonly as water-vapour, cloud and rainfall. Water vapour 
acts like a greenhouse gas, in that it blocks the emitted radiation from Earth to space 
and also reflects solar radiation back into space. Cloud formations seem to be more 
reflective to incoming solar radiation, whilst at the same time acting as barricades to 
the Earth’s natural  radiation to space. Rainfall freshens the air by cleaning away 
floating aerosols which would otherwise have acted in both a warming (by 
protecting long wave radiation emitted from the Earth) and cooling (by reflecting 
solar radiation back to space) capacity, in the regulation of atmospheric temperature. 
 
 There are other natural phenomena that can also have an impact on the climate. El 
Niño events, volcanic eruptions and sunspots are three examples. There is a 
tendency for a large surface area of the oceans to become predictably warmer, every 
three to five years. This persists for up to a year or more and is known as an El Niño 
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event. 48  However, the temperature of the ocean surface influences the rainfall 
patterns that in-turn may lead to floods and droughts.49 A sunspot is a region on the 
Sun’s surface that is marked by a lower temperature than its surroundings and is 
visible as a dark spot. Sunspots have intense magnetic activity, which form areas of 
reduced surface temperature, and have a vast influence over the temperature 
variation in different places at the same time. 50  Extending this example further, a 
drought may even contribute to a forest fire which could then be responsible for a 
massive smog blanket over the earth.51  
 
 
Volcanoes release massive quantities of dust and gases into the upper atmosphere 
including sulphur dioxide (SO2). This is transformed into sulphuric acid (H2SO4) 
and sulphate particles, following a chemical reaction with the Sun’s energy. These 
particles can remain present for several years (until they fall into the lower 
atmosphere and are washed out by rainfall). Whilst present in the atmosphere, they 
can cut out some solar radiation which in-turn cools the lower atmosphere and hence 
affects the observed climate. 52  
                                                 
48  Houghton, (2009), p. 7. For a detailed description on variety of El Niño events, see Couiper-
Johndton, (2000). 
49 By example, an El Niño event occurred in 1982-83 that increased up to7°C, the temperature in a 
large part of the Pacific Ocean. It brought exceptional floods to central USA and the Andes as well as 
unusual droughts to Australia and Africa. Another El Niño took place in 1997-98, causing 
exceptional floods in China and the Indian Subcontinent and also drought in Indonesia.  See  
Houghton, (2009), pp. 7-11. 
50 For a general treatment about sunspots, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), 
pp. 188-195 (Chapter 2.7). 
51 The 1997-98 El Niño precipitated an extensive forest fire that created an unusual blanket of thick 
smog that was experienced over 1000 miles away from the fires source. Ibid., p. 9. 
52 Ibid., p. 10.  Example: a volcano erupted in Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines on 12 June 1991, 
which injected about 20 million tons of sulphur dioxide and huge amount of dust into the 
stratosphere. It caused spectacular sunsets around the world for many months following the eruption, 
 16 
 
 
In the course of time, scientific innovations have proved that global warming is the 
main cause of climate change and this is primarily related to the levels of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. However, human activities are 
responsible for these concentrations being ever-increasing.53 2007 was the first time 
that the IPCC confirmed that human activities contribute largely to climate change.54 
  
                                                                                                                                         
however the global average temperature decreased by about 0.25°C for the following two years and 
unusual weather patterns were also experienced in some parts of the world during 1991-92 (e.g., 
unusual cold in the Middle East and a notably mild winter in Western Europe).  
53 AR4 (Synthesis Report), p. 37. It reads: “Human activities result in emissions of four long-lived 
GHGs: CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and halocarbons (a group of gases containing 
fluorine, chlorine or bromine). Atmospheric concentrations of GHGs increase when emissions are 
larger than removal processes. Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O have 
increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial 
values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of years”. [Original emphasis]. 
54 Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p.3 reads: “… very high confidence that 
the global average net effect of human activities since1750 has been one of warming…” This 
Summary for the Policymakers also contains: “Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 … The 
global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use 
change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture”.  Ibid., p. 2. 
Fig.3. Projected natural and human 
contribution to the climatic system and 
their linkages. 
[ Courtesy of the IPCC website, 
<www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf>, page 26]. 
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1.5 Climate Change Regime 
 
As climate scientists have revealed, increasing human activities raise greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere and this is mainly responsible for climate change.55  
One possible way to mitigate climate change is to control the greenhouse gas 
emissions from human activities. Addressing climate change by single party (actors) 
approaches cannot be successful.56 For this reason, states have established a climate 
change regime57 and try to manage their individual greenhouse gas emission in the 
light of scientific findings.58  
 
State sovereignty is an important consideration to make, with respect to establishing 
a climate change regime. Sovereign states (except for the European Union in respect 
of most multilateral environmental agreements) can only be members of an 
international regime although the contribution of non-state actors is also significant 
                                                 
55 For instance, the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, the application of fertilizers and particular 
types of agricultural production cause greenhouse gases. Water vapour (a greenhouse gas), does 
increase with temperature and tends to reinforce the effect of the other greenhouse gases. See  Arnell, 
(1996), pp. 3, 13-21. 
56 Hilpert et al., ( 2007), pp. 15-17. 
57 Scholars in international law and international relations are in different positions to define the term 
“regime”. Stephen Krasner, an international relations scholar, has defined “regime” as “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. He has explained “principles” as 
beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude; “norms” as standards of behaviour related to rights and 
obligations; “rules” as specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; “decision-making 
procedures” as prevailing practices in making and implementing collective choice.  Krasner, (1982), 
p. 186. While, international lawyers nowadays use the term as “to refer to the rules, regulations and 
institutions relevant to a particular subject area. Yamin and Depledge, ( 2004), pp. 6-7. 
58  Stripple, (2007), pp. 140-146. See Agarwal and Narain, (2003). 
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in establishing a regime or to continue the activities under a regime.59 As Oran 
Young states:   
 
“In formal terms, the members of international regimes are always sovereign states, 
though the parties carrying out the actions governed by international regimes are 
often private entities (for example, fishing companies, banks, or private airlines)”.60 
 
The concept of state sovereignty is a sign of the freedom of any states to participate 
(or not) in specific regimes. However, there are other regimes in which only certain 
states are entitled to participate or there exist different categories of member states 
participation.61 In fact, a state is unlikely to become involved in a regime where it 
may conflict with its own interests.62 A motivator for building regimes is that they 
become a way of facilitating specific agreements, by way of coordinating decisions 
among the actors involved and creating a setting for joint decision making.63 If an 
issue emerges which involves the common interests or concerns of all the participant 
states, then membership of a regime that is collaboratively dealing with the issue 
may be viewed as beneficial.64 Climate change is a common concern of humankind 
and the adoption of a climate change regime encourages all states to participate. 
                                                 
59 Charnovitz, (2006), pp. 348-372.  
60 Oran R Young, (1982), p. 277 (277-297). 
61 For instance, the Antarctica Treaty System permits states subject to their capability in conduction 
research in Antarctica to be parties to it; there are also different categories of membership – members 
and consultative members –   only the consultative members can participate in policy related decision 
making other than all the members. Presently, there are 46 members among whom 28 can participate 
in decision making meetings.  See Antarctic Treaty 1959.    
62 Arthur A Stein, (1982), pp. 299-324. 
63 Nilsson, ( 2007), p. 17. There have to be political entrepreneurs for the establishment of a regime 
who find potential profit in organising such collaboration.  Keohane, (1982), pp. 325-355. 
64 Conca, (2004), pp. 71-81.  
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Moreover, the issue is of such a nature that the participation of all states65 of the 
regime is not only fundamental but also essential to ensure their contribution to the 
overall process. As previously mentioned, the impact of climate change is not 
restricted to an individual state’s geo-political border. This participatory 
responsibility in a climate change regime has opened up a debate on state 
sovereignty.   
 
To address the climate change issue under an international legal framework is really 
challenging.66 The setting of an effective global standard for state behaviour is 
required for an efficient climate change regime,67 however these may impose certain 
limitations to a state’s autonomy in determining their development activities which 
are mainly responsible for climate change.  Keohane and Levy do not envisage that 
the type of regime building involved in addressing climate change is a threat to state 
sovereignty. They argue for “collective state-based problem solving” 68 , whilst 
Birnie refers to the concept of “responsible sovereignty”.69  
 
Scholars have recognised the roles of non-state actors in global concerns.70These 
non-state actors (e.g. environmental NGO’s) perform significant roles by keeping 
                                                 
65 It can be explained also as a responsibility to participate climate change regime. As Birnie and 
Boyle explain ‘global environmental responsibility’ in four subsections: (i) the environment as a 
common concern; (ii) erga omnes status of global environmental responsibility; (iii) common but 
differentiated responsibility;  (iv) the precautionary approach and global environmental 
responsibility. See Birnie and Boyle, (2002), pp. 97-104. 
66 Richardson, (1992), pp. 166-179.   
67 Conca, (2004), p. 72.  
68 Levy et al., (1993), pp. 415-417.  
69 Birnie, (1992), p. 84 (note1). 
70 Levy et al., (1993), p. 420. 
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states in a central position (as problem solvers) whilst addressing global problems 
which may weaken the concept of state sovereignty.71 However, it is somewhat 
impossible for states to limit climate change and its resultant effects, without the 
involvement of other entities (e.g., international organisations, NGOs and 
companies). Thus, narrowed autonomy and the increasing influence of non-state 
actors in the decision-making process are two concerns associated with state 
sovereignty, in regard to the climate change regime. It cannot be denied though, that 
the issue of climate change is a common concern for all states and refusal of 
responsibility in combating the issue by even single state, affects the entire climate 
change regime in achieving its goal. That said however, the numbers of non-state 
actors involved, may strengthen a state’s position in addressing the new global 
challenges they face.  Taking these facts into account and to promote problem 
solving, a soft-law approach has been adopted within the climate change regime.   
 
 In the course of time, climate scientists have discovered the main causes of climate 
change. There is though a lack of consensus among them and this is caused to some 
extent, due to the extraordinary complexity of the topic.72 Scientific assessments 
have proved that global warming is the main cause of climate change (primarily 
related to greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere). Human activities 
however, are deemed mainly responsible for these increased concentrations.73  The 
scientific assessments which have influenced policy makers in addressing climate 
                                                 
71 See Conca, (2004), pp. 72-79. Lapidoth has set a list as presupposition of sovereignty: equality 
among states, non-intervention, exclusive territorial jurisdiction, the presumption of state 
competence, restriction on binding adjudication without consent, exclusive rights to wield violence 
and an embeddedness of international law in the free will of states. Lapidoth, (1992), pp. 325-346. 
Jackson  has argued for the need to understand sovereignty from the view points of “fact” and 
“norm”. Jackson, (1990), pp. 50-78. Joel Migdal has pointed out of the notion of state capacity as the 
penetration of civil society, the regulation of social relations, the extraction of resources from civil 
society and the use of those resources for defined state purpose. Migdal, (1988). 
72  Figdor and Cassady, (2006), p. 6. 
73 AR4 (Synthesis Report), p. 37.  
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have consequently generated a climate change regime which is currently at a nascent 
level due to a lack of consensus among member states.  The main challenge faced by 
this regime is the participation of all states and also the inclusion of other actors.  
 
A global turning point in regards to the emergence of an international environmental 
perspective can be seen when an Intergovernmental Conference for Rational Use 
and Conservation of Biosphere was held under the auspices of UNESCO in 1968.74 
Later on, the General Assembly of the United Nations authorised the Human 
Environmental Conference to be held in 1972, to establish an authority that could 
handle global environmental issues. This conference was held in Stockholm and 
formed the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) to promote 
international and regional cooperation in the field of environmental protection. The 
General Assembly agreed with the Governing Council of the UNEP, that the 
programme should attach importance to the problem of global climate change.75 It 
also recommended the UNEP to work jointly with the WMO and the International 
Council of Scientific Unions, so as to establish an effective world climate 
programme.76 In 1988, the United Nations General Assembly recognised the 
consequences of climate change impact on the economic and social environment, 
and consequently endorsed the establishment of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). 77 This was established in the same year by the UNEP and the 
WMO.78 The IPCC started research on global climate change as well as its impact 
                                                 
74 See  Doelle, ( 2005), pp. 23-67. 
75 UNGA Resolution 42/184, (1987). 
76 Ibid. 
77 UNGA Resolution 43/53, ( 1988), sec. 5. 
78 The IPCC incorporated climate scientists, economists, sociologists, biologists, health scientists etc; 
However, the IPCC does not conduct basic research; it analyzes the pre review data (which comes 
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on environmental and socio-economic issues. In 1989 the General Assembly 
identified adverse effects of climate change such as sea-level rise79 and stressed the 
need for a new international regime to deal with climate change.80 The first report of 
the IPCC was published in 1990 which pointed out that rising emissions of 
greenhouse gases warm the surface of the Earth, and warned that human activity was 
leading to increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2), although 
at the time, there were still many uncertainties.81   
 
Following these General Assembly resolutions with respect to the preparation of a 
plan to face incoming climate change problems, an Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC) was 
established in December in 1990 as a single negotiating process.82 The negotiation 
process of INC/FCCC could be viewed as complex because of its connection with 
the different economic interests of many states, as well as with human activities. The 
use of energy was the main focus of the negotiating process,83 whilst issues 
including transportation, industry, agriculture, and forestry were also considered. 
However, many states have different opinions on how best to limit global climate 
                                                                                                                                         
from researches of other prominent scientists of many parts of the world) and prepares relevant 
information for the policy of governments. 
79 UNGA Resolution 44/206,  (1989). 
80 UNGA Resolution 44/207, ( 1989). 
81 The IPCC First Assessment Report consists of an overview, the Policymaker Summaries of the 
three IPCC Working Groups (concerned with assessment respectively of the science, impacts and 
response strategies), the IPCC Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries and 
the three reports of the Working Groups. The report indicated that if the emission of greenhouse 
gases are not controlled, the temperature of the atmosphere would rise 0.3 degree Celsius per decade; 
increasing temperature would melt the ice from Polar Regions with resulting raise in sea level of 20 
centimetres by 2030 and 65 centimetres by the end of 21st century. It also indicated emissions would 
require more than a 60% reduction, if the standard natural climate were to be regained. See the IPCC 
Overview.     
82 UNGA Resolution 45/212, (1990). 
83 Because the burning of fossil fuel is the main cause of creating carbon dioxide. 
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change. The least developed and developing countries were in position to assert their 
rights against those who were more developed since developed countries are mostly 
responsible for the emission of the major part of greenhouse gases. The small island 
and costal low-lying states became concerned with rising sea levels whilst the oil 
producing states held concerns that any reduction of fossil fuel productions would 
harm their national economies. The developed countries agreed to support those less 
developed countries in their aims however they were not convinced of the new 
financial mechanism, by which these various aims could be achieved. As such, the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established in 1991 to serve this purpose. 
 
The overall climate change regime includes (amongst others): The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)84, The Kyoto Protocol,85 
The Marrakesh Accords and The Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration,86 although 
there are some further international agreements relating to climate change.87 
                                                 
84 The UNFCCC. The UN General Assembly recommended member states to start negotiation to 
establish a convention regulating anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission in 1991. The negotiation 
began in February 1991 and resulted to the adoption of the UNFCCC which was signed at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. 
85 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The protocol 
was opened for signature on 16 March 1998.  It took seven years to obtain the required agreement for 
ratification (more than 55% of the total GHG emitting states) to enter into force.  
86 Marrakesh Accords and Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, (2001). 
87 The parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 adopted the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 (which came into force in 
1989). This serves as a model in several respects (e.g., compliance procedure) and helps phase out 
ozone-depleting substances, that also potent GHGs.  The United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification 1994 (which came into force in 1996) may benefit from the forestry activities 
promoted under the climate change regime that helps combat desertification. The Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) has agreed to operate the financial mechanism of the climate change 
regime. The EU Landfill Directive leads to a reduction in methane emissions which supports the 
climate change regime. The EU Renewable Energy Directive results in increased use of non-GHG 
emitting energy sources which helps in implementing the Kyoto Protocol. The EU GHG monitoring 
process responds to international reporting and monitoring requirements, outlined under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The EU Burden Sharing Agreement facilitates agreement on strengthened targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol and helps implementation of the Kyoto Protocol by strengthening the enforcement 
within the EU.  The EU Regulation and Directive on Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases triggers a 
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International law however, permits certain international bodies or states within 
certain regional agreements, to carry out activities that can be seen as inconsistent 
with the regime.88 Moreover, there are certain international legal instruments which 
play both positive and negative roles with respect to the pursuance of a climate 
change regime.89 
 
The UNFCCC was adopted on the 9th May 1992. 154 states and the European 
Community signed the convention at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development (The Earth Summit). The convention entered into force on the 21st 
March 1994, 90 days after its fiftieth ratification. Until 2011 the number of state 
parties of the UNFCCC was 194.  However, the fact is that this UN climate change 
convention is in a promising state and there is debate with the stated main aim of the 
UNFCCC, to promote the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system”.90 The debate mainly relates to the implementation process and 
                                                                                                                                         
reduction of fluorinated GHG emissions, whilst the EU Emission Trading Directive is expected to 
result in reductions in GHG emissions. 
88 EC Directive on Car Emission Standards requires cars to be equipped with a catalytic converter 
which leads to protect air from sulphate emissions. However, sulphate helps in cooling the 
atmosphere and thus implementation of the Directive results in an increasing air temperature as well 
as an increased greenhouse effect. The Convention on Biological Diversity may suffer from the 
establishment of mono-cultural tree plantations induced by the climate change regime. International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) both have their 
separate economic and transportation agendas as well as an interest to expand their own area, which 
can lead to the increased production of GHGs. Thus the climate change regime asks both 
organisations to act on GHG emission from their respective fields (international aviation and 
international shipping). Although the World Bank has greened its policies in response to climate 
change regime, many of its development projects destroy trees and wetlands which cannot be 
evaluated as friendly to the climate change regime. For a general treatise, see Oberthur, ( London, 
2006), pp. 53-77. 
89 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 1971 
(Ramsar Convention) may either benefit from the additional resources for wetland management or 
alternatively suffer from the conversion of wetlands for purposes of carbon sequestration, induced by 
the climate change regime.  
90 The UNFCCC, (1992), art. 2. It is the long term objective of the Convention. However, it is not 
clear in this Article about the point where anthropogenic greenhouse gas levels can be counted as 
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in particular, how to achieve the targets of greenhouse gas emission control at a 
national level. For instance, the UNFCCC included a political commitment from 
industrialised states to cut their emissions to the 1990 levels, recorded by each state 
during the 1990s.91 However, this commitment was phrased in such a manner, as not 
to impose binding obligations under the terms of international law.92 Moreover, the 
convention has not considered those emissions of greenhouse gases, as controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987.93 
 
One of the main challenges for the climate change regime is to manage states with 
different positions in terms of financial strength and technological capability as well 
as their vulnerability to climate change. The inclusion of terms such as “equity”, 
“common but differentiate responsibilities” and “respective capabilities” in the 
UNFCCC as principles of achieving the goal of the convention can be seen as a 
realistic move toward addressing climate change. 94 It also includes “precautionary 
measures”95 and “sustainable development”96 which are somewhat difficult to define 
                                                                                                                                         
dangerous. Many questions, inter alia  the point would consider as dangerous, way of distributing 
impacts be taken account, meaning of a target for a global quantity and way of responsibility 
attainment be apportioned and enforced, etc. remain unsolved. These difficult questions lead policy 
makers and others whether a near term policy need to be guided by Article 2.  For a detailed 
treatment see Oppenheimer and Petsonk, (2005), pp. 195-226. 
91 The  UNFCCC (1992), art. 4.2 (b); Spence et al., (2008), p. 144. Altogether industrialised 
countries reduced their emissions by 3% between 1990 and 2000 but this is largely due to the “hot 
air” phenomenon. The emissions of highly industrialised countries raised by 8% over the same 
period: 5% in New Zealand, 11% in Japan, 14% in the United States, 18 % in Australia, and 20% in 
Canada. 
92 It does not mean that the soft-commitment cannot be successful with respect to the UNFCCC. For 
instance, seven member states from the EU performed the commitment: Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany (mainly because of “hot air” in East Germany), Luxemburg, Sweden and the UK. For exact 
figure of emission reduction of respective states, see Annual European Community Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory 1990–2000 and Inventory Report 2002 (Technical report No.75/2002), p. 16 (Table 5). 
93 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, ( 1989). 
94 art. 3(1). 
95 art. 3(3). 
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and adhere to as governed by any legally binding instruments. It has inserted a 
clause of “sustainable economic growth”97 for all the parties that also poses an 
immense challenge because many of those actions suggested by climate change 
scientists are subject to the national economic development of individual states. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and came into force in 2005. It sets 
commitments for developed states, with the first commitment period being 2008-
2012 and an idea that future commitment periods will follow. However, the 
emission reduction target set forth in 1997 under the Kyoto Protocol does not 
include developing states (in general) or the United States (due to its non-ratification 
of the Protocol). Thus, one may see the Kyoto Protocol as “a wake-up call, a 
preliminary step - complex but important”.98  Disagreements also prevailed among 
the states that have ratified the protocol and this has served to make the protocol 
uncertain.   For instance, during its first commitment period, the protocol could not 
impose any binding obligations to the highest greenhouse gas emitter (China), so the 
regime lacks a means to impose strong enough legally binding obligations on 
signatories and this stands as a threat to its stable future. 
 
After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, several negotiations ensued so as to 
develop its operational details although they were not elaborated on the specifics 
until 2001. After more than four years of negotiation, the Parties agreed at COP 
7 (2001 in Marrakesh) to a comprehensive set of COP decisions enabling the 
                                                                                                                                         
96 art. 3(4). 
97 art. 3(5). 
98  Sands, ( 2005), p. 91. 
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practical implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.99 Those rules are now applied. The 
Kyoto Protocol is currently being implemented and approaching the end of the first 
core commitment period (2008-2012),100 however, there is no clear development 
concerning the running of its second commitment period.  
 
There are number of proposals for an effective climate change regime. Most of these 
have a preference to be UN-based, although a wide fragmented regime based mainly 
on regional and sectored arrangements may be seen to be emerging.101 In 2007, the 
parties of UNFCCC agreed to a roadmap that set obligations after 2012 (The Bali 
Agreement). This roadmap consists of a main convention pathway (considering all 
those issues related to the building of the new climate regime) and also the Kyoto 
track (which considers all those issues related to the future implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol).102 There was much hope of concluding a set of agreements on the 
post Kyoto 2012 regime in Copenhagen 2009, during the COP 15. Unfortunately, 
the parties could not reach any final agreements other than a controversial document 
– The Copenhagen Accord,103 which according to Barak Obama, the US president, 
is a “first step” towards a new era of international action. 
                                                 
99 Online: <http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf> (accessed 9 November). 
100 See Biermann  et al., ( 2010). 
101 See Kuik et al., (2008), pp. 317-336. 
102 For a detailed treatment of understanding climate negotiate process, see Spence et al., (2008), pp. 
142-153. 
103 The Copenhagen Accord was negotiated by only a few states, while, another small group among 
the parties objected to it. Brazil, China, India, South Africa and the United States of America 
prepared the document and submitted it to the COP having the intention that as the document would 
made formulated within the COP, it would and become operational as its own decision.  However, 
Bolivia, Pakistan, Tuvalu and Venezuela objected to the document by indicating the non-involvement 
of mainstream parties during the negation of the document. They rather observed that the Accord 
settled down by only individual five states outside the UNFCCC, which did not serve for the interests 
of other member states, including themselves. However, as most of the parties had already left the 
meeting hall, this caused a strange situation for the COP dealing with the Accord. Then the COP 
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The negotiation process is still under way. Following a number of recent meetings, 
an intercessional meeting of the Ad hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative 
Action (AWG-LCA) (considering all issues related to the building of the new 
climate regime)  and a meeting of the Ad hoc Working Group  on Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KP) (which considers all issues related to the future implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol), were held in Panama.104 The main discussions under the Long 
Term Cooperative Action relate to the mitigation presented by developing countries 
and developed countries which are not willing to join a second commitment period 
of the Kyoto (US, Japan, Russia, Canada); to adaptation and technology and to the 
financial transfers involved. Under the KP, the discussions relate to both securing a 
second commitment period and improving the functioning of the Protocol. 
 
1.6 The Relevance of the Arctic With Respect to Climate Change  
 
The Arctic has a significant influence on global climate change and vice versa, due 
to its long distance from the Sun and its thin surface atmosphere.105 The Arctic 
reacts faster to climate change when compared to any other parts of the globe and 
the average Arctic temperatures have increased at almost twice the global average 
                                                                                                                                         
Chair decided to ‘take note’ of the Accord other than directly adopting the document although it was 
intended that member states would associate with the document  subsequently by sending their names 
included in a chapeau to the document by the UNFCCC secretariat. It has thus induced quite 
considerable number of states to sign it. 
104 The third part of the sixteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 16) and the third part of the fourteenth session 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 
14), (2011).   
105 The Sun cannot warm the Arctic, which keeps it cool and icy. It gets a higher degree of solar 
radiation due to its thin atmospheric layer, however the ice and snow of the Arctic reflect a good 
amount of sun radiation back to space in terms of whole earth. 
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rate, in the past 100 years.106 Significant roles are played in the Arctic’s climate 
change cycle by the ice and permafrost, so a change in the condition of these 
features has both a direct and indirect impact on climate change.107    
 
The large area of frozen oceanic and ice covered land is an important characteristic 
of the Arctic.108 Ice can reflect the solar radiation that falls on it by up to ninety 
percent,109 back to outer space meaning it does not linger in the earth’s 
atmosphere,110 so the Arctic reflects back a major portion of the total solar radiation 
that falls to Earth. However, the ice covered area in the Arctic is decreasing111 
because of the melting of the ice. That results that a substantial quantity of solar 
radiation that cannot be reflected back and subsequently causes the atmosphere to 
become warmer.  
 
                                                 
106  Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p. 7.  See also AR4 (Synthesis 
Report), p. 30. 
107 For instance, thin ice cannot reflect back solar radiation at the same amount  that thicker ice can; 
growing economic activities cause more greenhouse gas emission ; deforestation and changed crops 
cultivation also impacts on balanced climate. Evidently, the radiation from the Sun also has to travel 
longer to reach the Poles. 
108 The present assessment shows that the averaged snow cover extent (SCE) over the Northern 
Hemisphere (2007) was 24 million square kilometres. However, the SCE varies from time to time – 
in January the ice covered area ranged 45.3 million square kilometers; while, in August it became 2.0 
million square kilometers.  Robinson, (2007). 
109 National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), Online:   
<http://nsidc.org/arcticmet/factors/radiation.html> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
110 However, water absorbs more than eighty percent of the heat added to the climate system. See 
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p. 5. A hypothetical example can be 
helpful to explain the importance of Arctic ice: if there is only one square meter of ice-melting in the 
Arctic, it impacts not only that the one m2 which cannot reflect solar radiation but also causes an 
increase in sea water. In turn, the sea water absorbs more solar radiation and becomes  heated, – 
which causes more further melting. 
111 Since 1978 the annual average Arctic sea ice extent has reduced in size by 2.7 % per decade, with 
larger decreases noted in summer months, recorded as 7.4 % per decade.  AR4 (Synthesis Report), p. 
30. 
 30 
According to the IPCC:  
 
“Average Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the second half of the 20th 
century were very likely higher than during any other 50-year period in the last 500 
years and likely the highest in at least the past 1300 years.”112 
 
Increasing warming is consistent with observed decreases in the extent of snow and 
ice.113 The prediction is that the Arctic late-summer sea ice will disappear almost 
entirely by the latter part of the 21st century,114 in the absence of effective actions 
which limit climate change. 
 
The Arctic has permanently frozen land under its ice, known as permafrost. This 
helps to store reserved CH4 gas inside the earth, which is more influential to global 
warming than any of the other greenhouse gases.115 CO2 however stays in the 
atmosphere much longer period than CH4. The permafrost works in such a way that 
the stored CH4 cannot emerge from the frozen layer of permafrost. Increases in 
temperature will melt the permafrost116  and the stored CH4 will be released to the 
atmosphere, so contributing to an increased greenhouse effect. However, the 
permafrost in the Arctic has been thawing due to temperature increases at the top of 
                                                 
112  AR4 (Synthesis Report), p. 2. 
113 Ibid., p. 30. 
114 Ibid., p. 46. 
115 Bubier et al.,  (1993), p. 2240. It reads:  “Atmospheric methane (CH4), an important green- house 
gas that is ≈ 21 times as radiatively effective as C02…” 
116 The frozen ground has decreased by about 7% in the Northern Hemisphere since 1900, with 
decreases in spring of up to 15%. Temperatures at the top of the permafrost layer have generally 
increased since the 1980s in the Arctic by up to 3°C. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2007), 
p. 30. See Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, (2007), p. 7. 
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the permafrost layer and which lead to changes in the land surface and its drainage 
system.117 The Icecap in Greenland is another area of concern regarding climate 
change. If the Icecap melts then the situation is anticipated to raise the sea level by 
up to seven meters. 118 This raise in sea levels is characteristic of the degradation of 
Arctic glaciers and icecaps in general.119  
 
The scientific projection is that the changes in Arctic snow, ice and frozen ground 
conditions, will increase the number and size of glacial lakes and cause ground 
instability in mountain areas and other permafrost regions, which can lead to 
changes being seen in some Arctic ecosystems.120 There are indirect impacts of ice 
melting in the Arctic Ocean as well – it will open the way for certain human 
activities responsible for the further production of greenhouse gas in the region; 
activities which are either not currently operational or rendered impossible by the 
ice-covered areas. An example may be the opening of a new sea route which will 
increase navigation, fishing, mining exploration and other economic activities which 
also have indirect impacts on climate change.  
 
Climate change has a wide influence on the environment of certain places, for 
example there are many places where plants and animal species (including human 
livelihoods) depend on its climate.  The Arctic is a region that has quite a unique 
                                                 
117 Temperature at the top of the permafrost layer in the Arctic has increased by up to 3°C since the 
1980s. The permafrost base has been thawing at a rate ranging up to 0.04 m yr–1 in Alaska since 
1992 and 0.02 m yr–1 on the Tibetan Plateau since the 1960s. Climate Change 2007: The Physical 
Science Basis, (2007), pp. 317, 339. 
118 AR4 (Synthesis Report), p. 12. 
119 Decreased glaciers and ice caps contributed about 28% to the total sea level rising since 1993. 
Ibid., p. 30. 
120 AR4 (Synthesis Report), p. 2. 
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environment when compared to that of other parts of the globe. This is seen to 
provide a special livelihood to the people of the region, in particular the indigenous 
groups living in the Arctic, yet this is threatened as the environment of the Arctic is 
fragile and more vulnerable to climate change than the environment of other 
regions.121 
 
1.7 Arctic-Wide State Cooperation in Combating Climate Change 
 
As previously discussed, activities detrimental to the climate carried out in one area 
also contribute to climate change in other regions of the globe and no single state or 
region can limit its climate change by controlling only the activities undertaken on 
its own territory. As such, the need for a global effort to combat climate change is 
obvious. It is however, difficult to have all of the contributory states remaining fully 
functional within a broad-spectrum climate change regime that is established under 
international law. The Arctic is extremely vulnerable to climate change, and yet this 
issue tends to be addressed solely through regional arrangements, taken in tandem 
with the international community.122 This approach serves to keep the system 
outside the laws of the treaties or international organisations, since no formal state 
cooperation under international law has been established thus far in the region.123 
 
After the cold war, the eight Arctic states created a permanent cooperative forum: 
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, which as merged with the AC in 
                                                 
121 Ibid., pp. 52, 64-65, and 72. 
122 For a detailed governance system dealing with climate change see Keskitalo, pp. 97-116. 
 
123 Nilsson, (2007), pp. 83-90. In this part the author argues that the cooperation mainly comes from 
the networks of western scientists, the political movements of indigenous peoples in the Arctic and 
from the foreign policy interests of Arctic states. 
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1996. Both groups were adopted via a signed declaration and not by an international 
treaty. The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 which established the AC,124 promotes 
“environmental protection” and “sustainable development” in the Arctic. However, 
in the course of time, climate change has grown to be seen as an important issue 
under the consideration of the AC. Climate change has posed new challenges to the 
AC’s activities, although it has its own schemes and policy in dealing with the issue. 
The Council provides important information to the policy-makers and other actors 
so as to limit climate change and address its impacts on the Arctic ecosystems and 
its residents.  
 
There are other permanent cooperation forums in the Arctic, e.g., the Barents 
cooperation and the Northern Forum (NF). The Barents cooperation was established 
in 1993 aiming to promote sustainable economic and social development in the 
Barents region on two platforms – the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the 
Barents Regional Council (BRC). The Working Group on Environment (WGE), 
formed under the BEAC, and Regional Working Group on Environment, formed 
under the BRC, deal with climate change alongside other bodies. The NF was 
formally established in 1991 and represented by a number of regional governments 
from nine states, including three from Asia. The NF has mandated the “harsh 
climate and vulnerable ecosystem” as one of its six priority-concerns and runs a 
project under its environment programme entitled “Climate Change in the North”. 
However, these two forums are at either the sub-Arctic or sub-governmental level, 
and this study does not intend to cover their activities in the field of climate change.  
 
                                                 
124 In fact, it was nothing quite a new cooperation but a natural outgrowth progression from its 
forerunner the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) established in 1991. 
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In 2008, five costal states125 (also members of the AC), established a framework to 
address the increasing maritime activities in the Arctic Ocean that have resulted 
mainly from climate change and ice melting.126 This scheme excludes three Arctic 
Council members from the aspects associated with Arctic Ocean management. It can 
be seen as posing a challenge for the AC although the five coastal states promise to 
continue their participation in the activities of the AC.127  
 
The challenges faced by the region require better governance with a proper 
mechanism for addressing those challenges as illustrated in the Arctic Human 
Development Report: 
 
“Arctic societies have a well-deserved reputation for resilience in the face of change. 
But today they are facing an unprecedented combination of rapid and stressful 
changes involving environmental processes (e.g. the impacts of climate change), 
cultural developments (e.g. the erosion of indigenous languages), economic changes 
(e.g. the emergence of narrowly based mixed economies), industrial developments 
(e.g. the growing role of multinational corporations engaged in the extraction of 
natural resources), and political changes (e.g. the devolution of political 
authority).”128 
 
 
                                                 
125 Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russian Federation and United States of America. 
126 The Ilulissat Declaration, (2008). 
127 Ibid., it reads: “The five costal states of the Arctic Ocean will continue to contribute actively to the 
work of the Arctic Council and other relevant international fora.”  
128 Arctic Human Development Report, (2004), p. 10.  
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2. APPROACH OF THE THESIS  
 
The general aim of the study is to analyse the present structure and modes of 
operation of the Arctic Council to determine whether it faces any problems in 
addressing climate change issues.129 For this purpose, it is essential to study the 
Arctic Council’s history and its present modes of operation to observe how the 
Council’s climate policy started and how it is pursued at a local and international 
scale. The study will also examine the development of other Arctic international 
cooperative forums,130 as part of a general pattern of increasing soft-law cooperation 
adopted in the Arctic, and the reasons behind the creation of such bodies in the 
Arctic. However, the main goal of the thesis is to examine the weaknesses and 
strengths of the Arctic Council as a form of soft-law cooperation and to put forward 
                                                 
129 The AC began dealing with the issue of climate change within two years of its creation and 
incorporated the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) as an action programme by the year 
2000. The AMAP and CAFF, two working groups of the AC, documented that the rising temperature 
of the Arctic over several decades has disturbed the flora and fauna of the region. Climate researchers 
have found changes in the temperature of the air, ocean and atmosphere; changes in ice distribution 
and thickness; ozone depletion; etc. yet have failed to reach consensus regarding the cause of those 
changes. The aims of the ACIA were to gather knowledge on climate change and ultraviolet radiation 
and provide authentic information to the governments and people of the Arctic states. See the 
Roundtable Discussion on Arctic Climate Impact Assessment at the Second Ministerial Meeting of 
the Arctic Council [Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council (On file with 
the author)]. The temperature in the Arctic is projected as rising 7 degrees centigrade within a 
century;  the present scenario of the amount of UV radiation per person in the Arctic is 30 percent 
higher than before; the infrastructure damage due to the thawing of permafrost in Siberia is projected 
at up to 90 percent; the abundance of sea lions has declined up to 80 percent over the last few decades 
in the seas adjacent to Chukotka, Alaska, and the Western Canadian Arctic;  shrimp harvesting in the 
North would decline up to 70 percent; in summertime, the maximum northward retreat of ice is 
projected as increasing from the present 150-200 kilometers to 500-800 kilometers during this 
century; increasing glacial melt and river runoff  will bring more fresh water into the oceans and may 
slow water circulation (which usually carries tropical heat to the Arctic ) and rise  sea levels; 
disturbances of insects and other non-native species may cause new diseases for Arctic populations 
and fauna; For details, see ACIA Synthesis  Report, (2004).  
130 The Barents cooperation has established regional cooperation in the northernmost parts of 
Sweden, Norway, Finland and north-west Russia. Online: <www.beac.st> (accessed 9 November 
2011).  The NF established cooperation with different types of regional governments from three 
continents – Asia, Europe and North America – aiming to improve the quality of life of the people 
living in the north and support their sustainable development. Online: <www.northernforum.org> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
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proposals that might strengthen the Council and enable it to mitigate the problem of 
climate change and the consequences caused by it. 
 
State commitments create binding obligations (political, moral or legal) regardless 
of the way in which such commitments are made and irrespective of whether they 
follow the prescribed formalities that are outlined in the law of the treaties. An 
increasing involvement of several states in non-treaty agreements to maintain 
international cooperation has caused extensive discussion131 and concern among 
traditional international lawyers (who recognise only legal obligations created by 
formal international treaties). The normative guidance of such non-treaty agreements 
encourages the respective states to fulfil the commitments they have made. The 
question is whether international law covers only formal agreements or should be 
extended to informal and less formal agreements also, and following this, in what 
manner.   
 
A number of states have been practicing non-treaty agreements for more than three 
decades. Over this period, there has been a growing tendency for states to connect 
themselves to permanent cooperative forums which have not been created by the 
conclusion of formal international treaties. States engaged in such cooperation enjoy 
the freedom to decide on their own activities and courses of action, in a way that 
allows them to keep themselves free of the laws of treaties or international 
organisations.  
 
According to a group of international lawyers, current international law permits 
other actors (e.g., intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, 
                                                 
131 Abbott and Snidal, (2000), pp. 421-456.  See also Young, (2011), pp. 327-334. 
 37 
local communities, and regional governments) to participate in international 
policymaking in international cooperation along with other states.132 
 
 The new structures of international cooperation are treaty bodies; a form of 
intergovernmental cooperation not created by international treaty, levels of sub-
governmental cooperation and non-governmental organisations.133 Of these, treaty 
bodies are created to oversee compliance with a respective treaty, but they do not 
follow either the law of treaty or the law of international organisations, when 
performing their functions. Some scholars opine that treaty bodies are similar to 
other international organisations and should, thus, be governed by the law of those 
organisations.134 They are also of the opinion that the law of treaties could be 
applicable to, for example, the decisions reached in the meetings of these treaty 
bodies.135 This lack of consensus between treaty bodies and international 
organisations has created a tension within international law.136 The same problem is 
faced with respect to intergovernmental cooperation that is created by non-treaty 
agreements. In this context, one might ask whether the entities formed as a product 
of this cooperation should have assigned rights and responsibilities under 
international law; and if so, which principle would determine those rights and 
responsibilities and whether they are comparable to those of international 
                                                 
132 Some international lawyers see international law from a policy-oriented perspective. They allow 
various actors along with states, to participate in the international legal process. According to them, 
various actors in the global community clarify and implement their common interests, in accordance 
with their expectations of international law – a process of decision making.  McDougal and Reisman, 
1981), pp. 355-377. Some others give more emphasis to the contribution of non-state actors. They see 
the motives and activities of sovereign states as being no longer as useful to the legal process, which 
calls for the inclusion of new actors. These may include forms of trans-national cooperation and non-
governmental organisations. Keohane and Nye, (2011), pp. 32-51; Lamy, (2001), pp. 124-141. 
133 Charnovitz, (2006), p. 352.  
134  Gaer, (2007), pp. 109-139. 
135  O’Flaherty and O’Brien, (2007), pp. 141-172. 
 
136 Bowman, (2007), pp. 225-249. 
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organisations. International law currently lacks the established principles which 
would answer these questions.  
 
Inter-governmental cooperation appears in two forms: permanent/non-permanent 
cooperation and cooperation which is limited for either a certain or various purposes. 
States can conduct cooperation with each other in all these manners, however most 
soft-law cooperation is undertaken for limited policy purposes.137 Soft law vis-à-vis 
the other new structures of international cooperation, plays an essential role in inter-
governmental cooperation.  
 
In the old structure of international law, there were two main types of inter-state 
cooperation, involving inter-governmental organisations and international treaties.  
However, establishing an international organisation or concluding a treaty is a 
lengthy process and both are somewhat complex (for example, the constitutional 
directions to the respective government for the ratification of a treaty, or perhaps its 
amendment procedures). In some cases, elastic or ambiguous words are used in the 
founding document of such organisations or within the provisions of a treaty. These 
allow scope for the parties involved, to slow down their compliance or even not to 
perform their obligations. There are also some other reasons that discourage states 
from entering into formal international treaties or participating in inter-governmental 
organisations and these will be explored. 
 
Concluding a non-treaty agreement is comparatively easier for states than more 
formal arrangements, in that it is free from strict formality (e.g., signature and 
ratification) and some international lawyers are of the view that to a certain extent, 
                                                 
137  Thürer, (2000), pp. 452–460.  
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such types of interactions are more effective. However, in the interpretation of 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (which is widely 
seen as codifying the sources of law in international law), such agreements do not 
constitute a source of international law. Differences of opinion also exist, as to 
whether bodies established by non-treaty agreements, are capable of creating 
international responsibilities. Some international lawyers believe that any form of 
commitment by states is binding under international law, regardless of the mode in 
which it is made.138 Recently though, other scholars have expressed doubts 
concerning the continuing use of traditional methods of international lawmaking, at 
this present stage of globalisation.139 Some international law experts have pointed 
out that although the decisions of soft-law bodies are legally non-binding,140 they are 
binding in some other manner;141 an example being non-legal agreements which 
create moral or political obligations. Some scholars also see the soft-law bodies as 
being the preliminary stage of development in the creation of treaties or formal 
organisations.  
 
On balance, soft law has created some challenges between the new and old 
structures of international law. This study will identify those challenges and consider 
the soft-law mechanism in order to better understand it. Investigation will be 
conducted as to what the status of soft-law cooperation should be, which general 
                                                 
138  Brownlie, (998), p. 610; Rosenne, (1989), p. 87; Fawcett, (1953), pp. 381-400.  
139 Charney, (1993), p. 543 (529-551); Bruun, (1993), pp. 216-217; Lillich, (1995-96), pp. 1-8.  
140 According to Schachter, “International lawyers generally agree that an international agreement is 
not legally binding unless the parties intend it to be. Put more formally, a treaty or international 
agreement is said to require an intention by the parties to create legal rights and obligations or to 
establish relations governed by international law. If that intention does not exist, an agreement is 
considered to be without legal effect (sans protée juridique). States are, of course, free to enter into 
such nonbinding agreements, whatever the subject matter of the agreement.”  Schachter, (1977), pp. 
296-97. 
141 See Raustiala, (2005), pp. 591-614; Koivurova, ( 2002), p. 96. 
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principles it should follow, which type(s) of law would be suitable for the 
establishment and steering of such cooperation and how soft law may be governed.  
It is also asked whether soft law could be given more freedom in fulfilling the needs 
of states. To aid these points, a suitable definition of the term “soft law” is also 
necessary. 
 
The Arctic Council is one current and prominent forum, where states have 
maintained a soft-law approach. The structure chosen for the AC has attracted 
interest among scholars of international law, who would like to observe how 
informal forums carry out their work.142 The AC was established with the primary 
goal of promoting environmental protection and sustainable development of the 
Arctic region. The AC has launched a large number of programmes. These involve 
its member states, indigenous peoples’ organisations, non-Arctic states, and 
governmental and non-governmental organisations on international as well as 
regional levels.  
 
As the Arctic Council enters the middle of its second decade, any constructive 
criticism or suggestion may help to further develop its functions and future progress. 
Despite the relatively large body of scholarly writings on the AC, its legal issues 
have received comparatively little attention.143  By trying to examine how the AC 
may best function, this study can help the AC to do more effective work, particularly 
in its most challenging field: climate change. A legally-oriented study of the 
capability of the AC to address climate change and its consequences is anticipated as 
serving the needs of both the Arctic and the global community at large.  
                                                 
142  Bloom, (1999), p. 712. 
143 Koivurova and VanderZwaag, (2007), pp. 121-195. Keskitalo, ( 2004).  Tennberg, (1998);  Archer 
and Serivener, (2000), pp. 601-619;  Nilsson,  (2007);  Bloom, (1999), pp. 712-722. 
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3. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The challenges posed by the differences between the old and new structures of 
international law, with respect to soft-law cooperation, have opened up debates that 
are mainly theoretical in nature. The intent of the study, however, is to keep the 
theoretical analysis limited. The study of soft-law cooperation covers an extensive 
area of international law (e.g., the law of international organisations and law of the 
treaties).  While a better understanding of soft law cooperation could be achieved by 
bringing into play as many soft-law bodies as possible, the study has chosen to limit 
its scope to three soft-law forms of cooperation in the Arctic region: the Arctic 
Council, the Barents cooperation and the Northern Forum. Studying only three soft-
law forms of cooperation may not produce any conclusive results that could be 
generally applicable to all soft-law bodies, since there are variations among soft-law 
forum perspectives (e.g., their formation, mode of operation, and subject matter). 
The study will give special emphasis to the role of the Arctic Council (AC) in 
addressing climate change in the Arctic, although, as a soft-law body, the AC could 
contribute little in terms of mitigating climate change. Moreover, the climate change 
issue is a complex subject due, not only to remaining debates among climate 
scientists, but also to the unstable situation of the international climate change 
regime mainly caused from disagreements between actors involved in the regime. 
Thus, the issue of climate change creates diverse challenges to international 
environmental law. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY   
 
The study mainly follows the documentary analysis method, which examines the 
instruments of and documents produced under the three soft-law forms of 
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cooperation, along with select international agreements formed under the auspices of 
these soft-law forms. However, the study also covers a literature review, including 
the writings of leading scholars. The author has gathered knowledge by participating 
in a number of international seminars and conducting interviews with experts, senior 
government officials and the general public from Arctic states. The survey method 
has been followed in collecting and analysing data, including the use of survey 
reports, both self-conducted and from secondary sources. The study includes the 
publication of four articles in peer reviewed journals and has followed the style 
guidelines prescribed by each of the journal.  
 
5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
 
The thesis is an article based dissertation which includes four articles by the author 
and published in peer reviewed international journals, in addition to two individual 
thesis chapters – introduction and conclusion. Following the introductory chapter 
(Chapter One), Chapter Two includes the article ‘Definitional Constraints 
Regarding Soft Law’144 which explores the conception of soft-law cooperation from 
the viewpoint of international law, including the address of issues such as: what is 
soft-law and its definition, the reasons for soft-law cooperation, distinctive 
characteristics of soft-law cooperation, limitations of soft-law cooperation and so on. 
This chapter briefly describes four different soft-law cooperation forms, to provide a 
general overview on soft-law cooperation: the AC, the BEAC, the NF and South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Main consideration has been 
given however, to those three prevailing in the Arctic, namely: the AC, BEAC and 
the NF. 
                                                 
144 Hasanat, (2007), pp. 8-32. 
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Chapter Three consists of an article titled ‘Towards Model Arctic-Wide 
Environmental Cooperation Combating Climate Change’.145 This article explains the 
evolvement of Arctic-wide cooperation and its functioning system and examines 
Arctic cooperation from the viewpoint of addressing the climate change issue, 
including how the climate change issue entered into the policies of the working-
groups and other institutional parts of the AC. The chapter also analyses the 
achievements of the AC and its main shortcomings in addressing climate change in 
the Arctic. It analyses whether there is a need for reform in the AC system and 
examines a few existing proposals on how to improve the capability of the AC, as 
well as preparing a set of recommendations to achieve a stronger Arctic cooperation 
in general which may effectively addresses climate change and its consequences in 
the Arctic region. 
 
Chapter Four contains an article entitled ‘Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region in the Light of International Law’.146 This analyses cooperation in the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) in an international law context. The chapter 
provides a good understanding of BEAR cooperation system by explaining its two 
components – the BEAC and BRC.  It examines both their operational and 
functional frameworks, including the different entities within the Barents 
cooperation and their interrelationships in maintaining a day-to-day cooperation for 
regional development. It explains the establishing documents and produced 
instruments of the BEAC and BRC and examines whether those have any legal 
value in international law, mainly in creating clear commitments (of members) to 
encounter common concerns. The chapter concludes in a determination of the legal 
                                                 
145 Hasanat, (2009), pp. 122-157. 
146 Hasanat, (2010), pp. 279-309. 
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status of the BEAR under international law, as well as indicating the basic 
differences between the new and old systems of international law with respect to 
their potential to adapt to the new challenges posed by rapid changes occurring in 
Barents Region. 
 
Chapter Five includes the article ‘International Cooperation in the Northern Forum: 
Emerging New Norms in International Law?’,147 which looks to resolve some lines 
of legal inquiry regarding the NF. It examines the evolution of the NF and explains 
its administrative system. It searches for the legal status of the NF based on 
produced documents and its members’ commitments to follow its decisions; along 
with its contribution to the development of international law. The chapter also 
includes observations on how the NF (a unique of international regional co-
operation forum), could be characterised under international law and whether this 
has any influence in creating new norms in international administrative and 
environmental law. 
 
Chapter Six prepares some recommendations to suggest soft-law cooperation as a 
better functioning mechanism (in particular in relation to the AC) to fully address 
the challenges resulting from climate change in the Arctic. The chapter includes how 
selected soft-law bodies manage their individuality in participating in regional 
development and their connections to each other. It also explains the raison d’être of 
a number of soft-law forms of cooperation in the Arctic.  Cumulatively, this chapter 
critically synthesizes all of the above mentioned published articles and examines any 
significant updates since the preparation of those articles, along with any relevant 
additional findings that were not conceived or remained inaccessible to the author 
during those times and which could constitute the outcome of the study.  
                                                 
147 Hasanat, (2011), pp. 1–15.  
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2: DEFINITIONAL CONSTRAINTS REGARDING SOFT LAW 
 
‘Definitional Constraints Regarding Soft Law’ 3 AALCO Quarterly 
Bulletin (2007), pp. 8-32. 
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3: TOWARDS MODEL ARCTIC-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 
‘Towards Model Arctic-Wide Environmental Cooperation Combating 
Climate Change’, 20 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
(2009), pp. 122-157. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
 
III. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 122 
IV. HISTORY OF THE ARCTIC COOPERATION ....................................................................... 124 
1. The Cooperation of the AEPS ................................................................................ 124 
2. Formation of the Arctic Council ............................................................................. 125 
III. FUNCTIONING SYSTEM OF THE COOPERATION ............................................................... 127 
 1. Organizational Framework ....................................................................................... 127 
A. Members ............................................................................................................ 127 
B. Permanent Participants ....................................................................................... 128 
C. Observers ........................................................................................................... 129 
 2. Operational Framework ............................................................................................ 130 
A.   SAOs ................................................................................................................ 130 
B. Working Groups ................................................................................................. 131 
(i) AMAP .......................................................................................................... 131 
 (ii) PAME ........................................................................................................ 133 
 (iii) EPPR ......................................................................................................... 134 
 (iv) CAFF......................................................................................................... 135 
 (v) SDWG ........................................................................................................ 136 
 (vi) ACAP ........................................................................................................ 137 
C. The Secretariat ................................................................................................... 138 
IV. THE ISSUE OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN ARCTIC COOPERATION .......................................... 139 
 73 
2. The Issue of Climate Change under the AEPS ....................................................... 139 
 2. The Issue of Climate Change under the Arctic Council ........................................... 140 
V. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
ARCTIC ................................................................................................................................ 144 
VI. MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF THE COOPERATION IN ADDRESSING ARCTIC CLIMATE 
CHANGE ............................................................................................................................... 147 
10. Soft Law Character ................................................................................................. 147 
11. Lack of Permanent Secretariat ................................................................................ 147 
12. Ineffective Funding Mechanism ............................................................................. 148 
13. Poor Coordination with Respect to Working Groups ............................................. 148 
14. Problems Concerning National Delegates .............................................................. 149 
15. Lack of Realization of Arctic Needs at the National Level .................................... 149 
16. Members’ Lack of Confidence in the Cooperation ................................................ 149 
17. Disagreements among the Members ....................................................................... 150 
18. Other Deficiencies of the Cooperation ................................................................... 150 
VII. PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL COOPERATION ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
ARCTIC ................................................................................................................................ 150 
4. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 150 
5. Reasons of Reforming the Cooperation .................................................................. 151 
6. Existing Proposals Regarding the Reform of the Cooperation ............................... 152 
VIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 155 
 
 
 
Yearbook
of
International Environmental Law
Volume 20
2009
Ole Kristian Fauchald
David Hunter
Wang Xi
Editors-in-Chief
Bharat H. Desai
Jeffrey L. Dunoff
Moira McConnell
Naomi Roht-Arriaza
Gregory Rose
Associate Editors
Daud Hassan
Book Review Editor
Stacy Belden
Assistant Editor
Catherine Banet
Administrative Secretary
1
Towards Model Arctic- Wide Environmental 
Cooperation Combating Climate Change
Md. Waliul Hasanat
I.  I N T RODUC T ION
Arctic- wide inter- governmental cooperation protecting the Arctic envi-
ronment formally began in 1991 with the establishment of the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was later transformed 
into the Arctic Council in 1996. The Arctic states created the Arctic Council 
to provide a mechanism to address the common concerns and challenges 
faced by the Arctic governments and the people of the Arctic with the adop-
tion of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa 
Declaration).1 The main objective of the Arctic Council is to promote envi-
ronmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic. Climate 
change has seriously affected this objective, however, and has become a 
central concern within Arctic- wide cooperation. Therefore, two years after 
its establishment, the Arctic Council began addressing the issue of climate 
change. In general, the council provides important information to policy-
 makers and other actors by conducting a number of projects to mitigate the 
impacts of climate change on the ecosystems and inhabitants of the Arctic. 
The council has also issued a comprehensive policy document regarding 
climate change in the Arctic.
The founding documents of this Arctic- wide cooperation (the Cooperation) 
were soft law in nature rather than internationally concluded treaties, which 
can be seen as the main drawback of the cooperation since soft law instru-
ments may create either voluntary or political commitments rather than 
legally binding obligations under international law.2 Alternatively, it is 
somewhat dif4 cult for the members of the Arctic Council to be bound by any 
legal obligation in the 4 eld of climate change, in particular, because of con-
M icts with their varied national interests. Moreover, imposing legally bind-
ing obligations on the Arctic states is not suf4 cient to address the issue of 
1 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada, 19 September 
1996, Joint Communiqué and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 35 
I.L.M. 1382 (1996) [Ottawa Declaration].
2 Evan T. Bloom, Establishment of the Arctic Council 93 A.J.I.L. 712 at 712 (1999).
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climate change—the involvement of the global community is essential since 
activities conducted elsewhere also have an impact on the Arctic climate.
This Arctic- wide Cooperation encourages non- state actors—in particu-
lar, indigenous peoples in the Arctic—to participate along with states.3 It 
also provides important information and recommendations to state actors 
to protect the sensitive Arctic from adversities created both in the Arctic 
and in the rest of the world.4 In the course of time, the Arctic Council has 
involved a number of states and organizations from outside the region in 
advancing its mandates. The Cooperation has accomplished a number of 
projects related to climate change, and others are ongoing. However, they 
have not always been entirely effective in dealing with the growing chal-
lenges presented by climate change, which raises a number of questions. 
How well do these projects help the inhabitants of the Arctic counter the 
challenges created by climate change in their way of life? To what extent 
is this Cooperation successfully attracting the attention of residents living 
in the non- Arctic parts of the member states? Does the Cooperation have 
any additional value as a regional forum compared with a global climate 
change regime or a system of national activities addressing the issue of cli-
mate change?
There are a few scholarly works that have dealt with this Cooperation,5 
some of which have made recommendations for improving its opera-
tions, although the Arctic states have hesitated in accepting them.6 Two 
decades after the beginning of the Cooperation, it seems timely to con-
duct an extensive evaluation of its success mainly in the 4 eld of climate 
3 Granting ‘permanent participant’ status to the indigenous communities of the region is a 
comparatively new concept in international cooperation.
4 The working groups and subordinate bodies prepare separate reports based on 4 nd-
ings from both scienti4 c research and traditional knowledge and submit them to the Arctic 
Council from time to time.
5 Timo Koivurova and David L. VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect 
and Prospects 40 U.B.C. L.R. 121 (2007); Timo Koivurova, Limits and Possibilities of the 
Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance 45 Polar Record 1 (2009); 
and Monica Tennberg, The Arctic Council: A Study in Governmentality (1998).
6 Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty: Evaluation and a New Proposal 17 
R.E.C.I.E.L. 14(2008); Olav Schram Stokke, Protecting the Arctic Environment: The Interplay 
of Global and Regional Regimes 1 Y.B. Polar L. 349 (2009); D. VanderZwaag, R. Huebert, 
and S. Ferrara, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral 
Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering While the Arctic Marine Environment Totters 30 Denver 
J. Intl L. & Policy 131 (2002); David Leary, Bi- Polar Disorder? Is Bioprospecting an Emerging 
Issue for the Arctic as well as for Antarctica? 17 R.E.C.I.E.L. 41 (2008); Philippe Sands, 
Principles of International Environmental Law, at 731 (2nd edition, 2003); Geir Hønneland 
and Olav Schram Stokke, Introduction, in Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Hønneland, eds., 
International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime, Effectiveness and Northern 
Region Building, at 1 (2007); Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber, Is It Time to Cut the Gordian 
Knot of Polar Sovereignty? 17 R.E.C.I.E.L. 27 (2008); D.R. Rothwell, The Polar Regions and 
the Development of International Law (1996); and H. Corell, Re9 ections on the Possibilities 
and Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime 37 Envt’l Pol’y & L. 321 (2007).
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change. By  examining the relevant existing literature and other sources 
(for example, debates in the meetings of the Arctic Council, discussions in 
international seminars, and interviews), this article analyses the present 
Cooperation in the Arctic, highlights the main shortcomings within the 
Cooperation’s functioning system, and offers a few recommendations for 
how the existing Cooperation could perform better in the area of climate 
change.
The article consists of seven parts. Following an introductory section, 
the second part describes the development of Arctic- wide Cooperation. The 
third section deals with the functioning system of the Cooperation. The fol-
lowing part explains how the Cooperation has addressed the issue of climate 
change, and the 4 fth part analyses the achievement of this Cooperation with 
respect to climate change in the Arctic. The next part discusses its main 
shortcomings in countering climate change in the Arctic. The 4 nal part con-
cludes with a proposal for a model of Arctic- wide Cooperation that effec-
tively addresses climate change in the Arctic.
I I.  H ISTORY OF T H E A RC T IC CO OPER AT ION
During the Cold War, the existence of the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the Arctic, two superpowers at odds with each other, made any coopera-
tive relationship among the Arctic states a complex matter. However, the 
initiative of Finland as well as support from other Arctic states and actors, 
in particular, organizations of indigenous peoples, resulted in the creation 
of the AEPS. At the end of the Cold War, this Cooperation became better 
organized when the Arctic Council was established and took over the activi-
ties of its forerunner, the AEPS. As a result, the development of the coopera-
tion process can be described in two phases: the cooperation of the AEPS 
and the formation of the Arctic Council.
1. The Cooperation of the AEPS
The Arctic environmental protection process began when the secretary gen-
eral of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, spoke in Murmansk in 
October 1987, inter alia, about cooperation for the protection of the Arctic 
environment.7 His idea for cooperation advanced somewhat in 1989 when 
Finland organized a meeting in Rovaniemi with the representatives of the 
eight Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Soviet 
Union, Sweden, and the United States. In 1991, the Arctic states met again 
7 The proposal included a nuclear weapon- free zone in northern Europe, limited naval 
activities in the sea areas adjacent to northern Europe, the utilization of Arctic resources in a 
peaceful manner, scienti4 c research on the Arctic, cooperation among northern countries for 
environmental protection, and openness of the northern sea route to icebreakers for escorted 
passage. For details, see Rothwell, supra note 6 at 229–31.
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in the same place along with other actors (including, in particular, various 
indigenous people’s organizations) and developed the Declaration on the 
Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi Declaration),8 along with 
the AEPS in a single document.9
The ministers of the eight Arctic states committed themselves to the 
implementation of the AEPS and the further expansion of their coopera-
tion. In addition, they committed themselves to a joint action plan that 
would include cooperation on scienti4 c research and the assessment of envi-
ronmental impacts as well as the full implementation of measures to control 
pollution and further considerations for reducing negative impacts on the 
Arctic environment.10 The ministers also committed themselves to imple-
mentation of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the 
Protection of the Marine Environment in the Arctic (PAME), Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (EPPR), and the 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF).11
The objectives of the AEPS led to high expectations (for example, the 
protection of ecosystems, the maintenance of environmental equality, the 
sustainable utilization of natural resources, and respect for traditional 
cultures),12 and they included a monitoring system for the Arctic environ-
ment as well as the elimination of pollution.13 The principles adopted for the 
AEPS seemed goal- oriented (including, for example, international coopera-
tion, mutual cooperation, and indigenous knowledge).14 In fact, the AEPS 
more or less limited its activities to collecting data, research, assessment, 
information exchange, and cooperation. Decisions made at the ministerial 
meetings were weakened by the lack of binding obligations,15 and the expec-
tations for robust response mechanisms and obligatory instruments were 
never met.
2. Formation of the Arctic Council
Canada took the initiative for an international instrument that would be 
legally binding in the Arctic.16 Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney 
8 Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, 14 June 
1991, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/Rovaniemi%20Declaration.pdf> [Rovaniemi 
Declaration].
9 Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1991, and the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy, Rovaniemi, Finland, 14 June 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624 (1991), 
<http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/artic_environment.pdf> [AEPS].
10 Rovaniemi Declaration, supra note 8 at paras. 8–10. 11 Ibid. at paras. 12–15.
12 Timo Koivurova, Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic: A Study of 
International Legal Norms, at 71–2 (2002). 13 AEPS, supra note 9 at s. 2.1.
14 Ibid. at s. 2.2.
15 See Evelyn M. Hurwich, Arctic 5 YbIEL 233 (1994). The second ministerial meeting of 
the AEPS was held in Nuuk, Greenland, in 1993, the third in Inuvik, Canada, in 1996, and the 
fourth and 4 nal meeting in Alta, Norway, in 1997.
16 VanderZwaag, Huebert, and Ferrara, supra note 6 at 154.
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proposed the idea of establishing the Arctic Council in Leningrad in 
November 1989.17 However, US of4 cials were unwilling to support the initia-
tive until the Democrat Bill Clinton became president in 1993. In September 
1994, the United States proclaimed a new policy regarding its involvement 
in Arctic environmental issues. Canada also announced the idea of trans-
forming the AEPS into a legally binding international instrument in the 
same year.18 In February 1995, US President Bill Clinton announced that 
the United States would join with Canada and the other Arctic nations to 
set up an Arctic Council by early 1996.19 However, the United States insisted 
on certain conditions for its participation: the Council would not deal with 
security- related issues, and 4 nancial contributions would be voluntary 
rather than compulsory.20 These issues, along with others, were resolved 
through a long process of negotiation.21
The third ministerial meeting of the AEPS took place in Inuvik, Canada, 
on 15 March 1996, and it decided on the earliest possible creation of the 
Arctic Council.22 Of4 cials from the Arctic states prepared the 4 nal draft of 
the Ottawa Declaration to establish the Arctic Council, and it was adopted 
by the Arctic states along with the Joint Communiqué of the Governments 
of the Arctic Countries on 19 September 1996. The declaration created the 
Arctic Council as a ‘high level forum’ with four main purposes:
to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and inter-1. 
action among the Arctic states involving the inhabitants of the Arctic, in 
particular, indigenous communities, on issues affecting the Arctic, par-
ticularly sustainable development and environmental protection of the 
Arctic;
to continue with the programs of four working groups established under 2. 
the AEPS, which include the AMAP, the CAFF, the PAME, and the 
EPPR;
to adopt terms of reference for a sustainable development program as 3. 
well as its implementation; and
to provide information, encourage education, and call attention to issues 4. 
related to the Arctic.23
17 Alan Sounders, Pondering an Arctic Council 19 Northern Perspectives 1 (1991).
18 Hurwich, supra note 15 at 233.
19 Evelyn M. Hurwich, Arctic 6 YbIEL 298 (1995).
20 VanderZwaag, Huebert, and Ferrara, supra note 6 at 154.
21 Four negotiation meetings were held in June, August, September, and December 1995 
in Ottawa, Copenhagen, Washington, DC, and Toronto respectively aiming to conclude the 
agreement to establish the Arctic Council. See Hurwich, supra note 15 at 302–3.
22 Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development in the 
Arctic, 21 March 1996, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/The%20Inuvik%20Declaration
.pdf> at para. 15 [Inuvik Declaration].
23 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, Article 1.
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In accord with US conditions, matters related to military security were kept 
outside the jurisdiction of the Arctic Council.
The meeting also identi4 ed three initial priorities: to develop the rules of 
procedure for the Arctic Council and the terms of reference for a sustainable 
development program, and to ensure the completion of the transformation 
of the AEPS into the Arctic Council by the next AEPS ministerial meet-
ing.24 At its 4 rst ministerial meeting in 1998, the Arctic Council adopted 
the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure25 and the Terms of Reference for 
a Sustainable Development Program.26 The next 4 ve ministerial meetings 
were held in 2000 in Barrow, Alaska, in the United States, in 2002 in Inari, 
Finland, in 2004 in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 2006 in Salekhard, Russia, and in 
2009 in Tromsø, Norway, respectively.
I I I.  F U NC T ION I NG SYST EM OF T H E CO OPER AT ION
The functioning system of the Cooperation can be explained under two sub-
 sections: the organizational framework and the operational framework.
1. Organizational Framework
For the purposes of this article, the organizational framework means the 
basic working structure of the Cooperation. It points to the entities respon-
sible for the interior functions of the system as well as its various policy-
 making functions. The Cooperation comprises three different entities in its 
main body. They are members, permanent participants, and observers. The 
establishing instrument of the Arctic Council speci4 es the members and the 
criteria for permanent participants and observers.27
A. Members
The eight Arctic states are members of the Arctic Council: namely Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and 
the United States.28 The members are the same as those that participated in 
the AEPS cooperation. The presumption is that membership in the Arctic 
24 Joint Communiqué of the Governments of the Arctic Countries, 35 I.L.M. 1386 (1996), <http://
arctic- council.org/filearchive/Joint%20Communique%20of%20the%20Governments%20
of%20the%20Arctic%20Countries.pdf>.
25 Arctic Council Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meeting, Iqaluit, Canada, 17–18 September 1998, <http://www.arctic
- council.org/4 learchive/of4 cial%20rules%20and%20procedures.pdf> [Rules of Procedure].
26 Arctic Council Terms of Reference for a Sustainable Development Program as 
adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Iqaluit, 
Canada, 17–18 September 1998, <http://arctic- council.npolar.no/Meetings/Ohers/CBW/
ACTermsofReference2.pdf> [Terms of Reference].
27 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, Articles 2–3. 28 Ibid., Article 2.
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Council is limited to these eight states in the absence of any provision for 
expanding the membership.
B. Permanent Participants
Representatives of certain indigenous peoples groups in the region are 
entitled to be permanent participants in the Arctic Council.29 The Ottawa 
Declaration incorporates three associations of indigenous peoples as per-
manent participants,30 which were also observers in the AEPS,31 and has 
also provided opportunities for the participation of other indigenous groups 
in the region.32 According to the declaration, a permanent participant can 
be chosen from among the majority of the Arctic indigenous constituency 
representing ‘a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic 
state’ or ‘more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic 
state.’33 The Arctic Council can accredit more permanent participants, but 
their total number must always be less than the number of the council’s 
members.34 Currently, there are six permanent participants: (1) the Aleut 
International Association; (2) the Arctic Athabaskan Council; (3) the 
Gwich’in Council International; (4) the Inuit Circumpolar Council; (5) the 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North; and (6) the Saami 
Council.35 Therefore, the council could, if it so desired, accredit one more 
permanent participant.36
The inclusion of permanent participants is a way of recognizing the spe-
cial importance of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic region.37 The idea 
behind the selection of the permanent participants is to ensure their active 
involvement and full consultation.38 They are welcome not only in minis-
terial meetings but also to all other meetings and activities of the Arctic 
Council.39
29 Although the Ottawa Declaration has used the term ‘indigenous peoples’ out of respect 
for its traditional use by indigenous groups, it has also made it clear that the word ‘peoples’ 
does not have any implications relating to the creation of rights under international law (ibid., 
Article 2).
30 The Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous 
Minorities in the Far North, Siberia, the Far East of the Russian Federation.
31 AEPS, supra note 9, Preface. 32 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, Article 2.
33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.
35 Despite the fact that the organization changed it name to the present form before the 
creation of the Arctic Council in 1994, the declaration uses the former name, the Association 
of Indigenous Minorities in the Far North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian 
Federation.
36 There are eight members of the Arctic Council. Since it already has six permanent par-
ticipants, it could choose one more. 37 Terms of Reference, supra note 26 at para. 1.
38 See the Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, Article 2; Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, 
rule 5. 39 Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, rule 5.
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The Rules of Procedure allow the permanent participants to take part in 
all meetings and activities of the Arctic Council. According to the rules, a 
permanent participant is entitled to raise a point of order during discussion 
on any issue, and this point will be decided immediately by the chairper-
son.40 Consultations with the permanent participants are also essential to 
4 x the time and location of biennial meetings41 and limit the size of delega-
tions.42 The permanent participants can also propose supplementary agenda 
items43 or cooperative activities in the Arctic Council meetings.44 The desig-
nation of a representative from each permanent participant to the meetings 
of the senior arctic of4 cials (SAO) has been con4 rmed.45 Consultations with 
the permanent participants are also necessary for the chair to convene SAO 
meetings.46
C. Observers
Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non- Arctic states and other 
organizations.47 It is granted to those organizations or states that are able to 
contribute to the work of the Arctic Council.48 They are invited to all meet-
ings and activities of the Arctic Council, and their status continues as long 
as consensus exists at the ministerial meetings (the status of an observer can 
be suspended if they engage in practices that are at odds with the Ottawa 
Declaration).49 The Arctic Council may allow observers on an ad hoc basis 
for individual meetings. When the Cooperation began, observer status for 
certain entities was approved for a period of two years, but, lately, the Arctic 
Council has been approving observers without a time limit.50
Annex 2 of the Rules of Procedure must be followed in order for observ-
ers to gain accreditation.51 Nominations or applications for observer sta-
tus are directed to the host country (the state that holds the chair), and the 
application must contain a written description of the applicant’s ability 
to contribute to the Arctic Council. If the applicant is an organization, it 
needs to submit more information (for example, the purpose of the organi-
zation, a copy of the annual report, the activities, the total number of 
40 Ibid., rule 12. 41 Ibid., rule 15. 42 Ibid., rule 13. 43 Ibid., rule 19.
44 Ibid., rule 26. 45 Ibid., rule 21. 46 Ibid., rule 25.
47 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, Article 3.
48 Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, rule 36. 49 Ibid., rule 37.
50 Reykjavik Declaration on Occasion of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council, 24 November 2004, Reykjavik, Iceland, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/
Reykjavik_Declaration.pdf> [Reykjavik Declaration]; Salekhard Declaration on the Occasion 
of the tenth Anniversary of the Arctic Council and the Fifth AC Ministerial Meeting, 
26 October 2006, Salekhard, Russia, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/SALEKHARD_
AC_DECLARATION_2006.pdf> [Salekhard Declaration].
51 Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, Annex 2 at para. 1, refers to the names of the accredited 
observers of the AEPS that have been granted observer status under the Arctic Council.
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members, and its system of governance).52 At present, six states (and four 
states with ad hoc observer status),53 ten international organizations,54 
and eleven non- governmental organizations55 have observer status in the 
Cooperation.
2. Operational Framework
Operational framework means, for the purposes of this article, the struc-
ture through which the Cooperation performs its activities in order to 
achieve its 4 nal goal—sustainable development and the environmental 
protection of the Arctic. It mainly includes SAOs, working groups, and the 
Secretariat.
A. SAOs
SAO meetings include a senior of4 cial from each of the Arctic states and 
representatives from the indigenous peoples organizations that have per-
manent participant status in the Arctic Council. The SAO coordinates, 
monitors, and guides the working groups, task forces, and other subordi-
nate bodies of the Arctic Council.56 It receives reports from the working 
groups and subordinate bodies, discusses with them, and reports regularly 
to the Arctic Council on the basis of these communications. The SAO also 
reviews proposals concerning cooperative activities submitted by the Arctic 
states and permanent participants and prepares recommendations on these 
proposals for the ministerial meetings. The Arctic ministers request or 
instruct the SAOs to provide the means of addressing individual issues con-
nected with the Arctic Council. The Rules of Procedure require at least two 
SAO meetings per year, but the frequency of SAO meetings depends on the 
52 Ibid., Annex 2, para. 3.
53 France, Germany, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are observ-
ers. The last SAO meeting in November 2009 approved China, Japan, Italy, and the Republic 
of Korea as ad hoc observers.
54 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission, the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Nordic Environmental Finance 
Corporation, the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Development 
Programme, and the United Nations Environment Program. The last SAO meeting 
approved the EU Commission as an ad hoc observer. See <http://arctic- council.org/section/
observers_intergovernmental_and_inter_parliamentary_organization>.
55 The Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, the Arctic Circumpolar Gateway, 
the Association of World Reindeer Herders, the Circumpolar Conservation Union, 
the International Arctic Science Committee, the International Arctic Social Sciences 
Association, the International Union for Circumpolar Health, the International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs, the Northern Forum, the University of the Arctic, and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature. See <http://arctic- council.org/section/observers_non_governmental>.
56 See the Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, Part II: Arctic Council Meetings.
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 willingness of the host country, which is responsible for assigning a chair-
person and calling the meeting to order.
B. Working Groups
The Arctic Council may form working groups, task forces, and other sub-
sidiary bodies to prepare programs and carry out its activities under the 
guidance of the SAO.57 The main work of the Arctic Council takes place 
within six working groups.58 The working groups include representatives 
drawn mainly from the national ministries and other government bod-
ies of the member states, as well as from the permanent participants, but 
the programs and projects have had much more variety in their structure 
of representation. The ministerial meetings 4 x the composition and man-
date of the working groups. Each working group selects a chairperson and 
vice- chairperson, 4 xing their tenure in consultation with the SAO. The sec-
retariats of the working groups and subordinate bodies are supported vol-
untarily by the individual Arctic states.59 The location, agenda, and date of 
the meetings of these bodies are set by the consensus of the participating 
Arctic states. The working groups may establish their own operating guide-
lines subject to the approval of the SAO. Each of these working groups is 
described in more detail in the following sections and will provide a good 
understanding of the overall cooperation system.
(i) AMAP
The AEPS established the AMAP task force in 1991. It was transformed 
into a working group in 1993. The key objective of the AMAP working 
group is to measure the level of anthropogenic pollutants and assess their 
effect on the Arctic environment. AMAP’s tasks include the preparation 
of integrated assessment reports on the status of Arctic ecosystems and 
trends, the identi4 cation of possible causes for changing conditions, the 
detection of emerging problems and their possible causes, and the evalua-
tion of potential risks to the Arctic ecosystems. AMAP’s mandate includes 
57 Ibid., Part III: Implementation of Cooperative Activities.
58 Ibid., Part III and Part IV.
59 The Secretariat for the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) is located 
in Oslo, Norway. The Secretariat for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the Arctic 
(PAME) is located together with the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) 
Secretariat in Akureyri, Iceland. The Secretariat for the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic (EPPR) and the Secretariat for Arctic Contaminants Action 
Programme (ACAP) are situated in Moscow, Russia, and the Secretariat for the Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG) is located in Ottawa, Canada.
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making  recommendations for required actions that would reduce threats to 
the ecosystems and residents of the region.60
The assessments of AMAP are based upon published scienti4 c data 
obtained from its own monitoring programs, traditional knowledge, and 
other national and international research institutions. For the incorpora-
tion of AMAP’s recommendations at the national level, each Arctic state is 
required to de4 ne its national implementation plan. When it was 4 rst devel-
oped, AMAP was directed to establish comprehensive monitoring pro-
grams in three priority 4 elds: persistent organic chemicals, heavy metals, 
and radionuclides. The 1996 ministerial meeting in Inuvik tasked AMAP 
to 4 nalize a report on the state of the Arctic environment by early 1997. It 
was presented to the 4 nal AEPS cooperation meeting in Alta.61 The report 
raised many issues for decision makers from an Arctic, regional, and global 
perspective. For instance, the report showed that persistent organic pol-
lutants (POPs) tend to end up in the Arctic because of the prevailing wind 
patterns, even though these substances are only marginally produced in the 
Arctic region. In 2002, AMAP 4 nalized a report on Arctic pollution, which 
was presented to the 2002 ministerial meeting in Inari.62 The meeting con-
sidered the implications of the 4 ndings of the report as they pertained to the 
Arctic Council policies at both the national and international levels.63 The 
report documented increasing mercury levels in some parts of the Arctic, 
and the ministerial meeting agreed to address this problem through global 
cooperation.64
In 2004, the ministerial meeting in Reykjavik requested AMAP to com-
plete by 2006 two assessments—one of the oil and gas industry’s impacts 
on the Arctic and the other on acidi4 cation of the Arctic—and to prepare 
proposals for effective measures to counter the threats identi4 ed in these 
assessments, along with the continuation of works in progress. It approved 
AMAP’s Strategic Plan 2004+ and welcomed the efforts of AMAP and the 
Arctic Contaminants Action Programme (ACAP) to address the emerging 
problem of chemical contaminants in the Arctic.65
The 2006 ministerial meeting in Salekhard directed AMAP to cooperate 
with other working groups and relevant scienti4 c bodies in its reviewing 
60 AEPS, supra note 9 at s. 6.1.
61 Alta Declaration on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 13 June 1997, 
<http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/The%20Alta%20Declaration.pdf> at Preamble [Alta 
Declaration].
62 AMAP, Arctic Pollution 2002, State of the Arctic Report, <http://www.amap.no/> [Arctic 
Pollution 2002 Report].
63 Inari Declaration on the Occasion of the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council, 10 October 2002, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/inari_Declaration.pdf>, 
Article 5 [Inari Declaration]. 64 Ibid.
65 AMAP, AMAP Report 2004:5, Strategic Plan 2004+, <http://www.amap.no>.
 by guest on August 9, 2011
yielaw.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARCTIC-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 133
process, which looks for needs and gaps in climate monitoring in the Arctic 
in order fully to realize a comprehensive Arctic observation network 
through collective action.66 It reviewed the assessment report on acidifying 
pollutants, Arctic haze and acidi4 cation in the Arctic, and requested future 
assessments on acidi4 cation that would review the extent of air pollution 
and climate change.67
The recent work plan of AMAP has covered much ground, including 
the publication of the 2009 AMAP State of the Environment Report 
on Selected Pollution Issues and the related 2009 AMAP Update Report on 
Selected Climate Issues of Concern, as well as the presentation and dis-
semination of these reports at appropriate venues.68 It has also prepared an 
extended summary of the project entitled Snow, Water, Ice, and Permafrost 
in the Arctic.69
(ii) PAME
In 1991, the Arctic states committed themselves to take preventive and 
other measures, directly or through competent international organi-
zations, to protect the marine environment of the Arctic from different 
sources of pollution.70 The priorities related to this commitment include 
following the relevant provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOSC),71 maintaining international standards regarding the dis-
charge of pollutants, taking part in international forums to reinforce rec-
ognition of the sensitivity of the ice- covered parts of the Arctic Ocean, and 
ensuring the protection of the Arctic marine environment from accidental 
pollution.72
The 1993 ministerial meeting in Nuuk established the PAME working 
group in order to implement the priority areas identi4 ed in the AEPS. The 
1996 ministerial meeting in Inuvik tasked PAME with developing both a 
regional program of action for the protection of the Arctic marine environ-
ment from land- based activities and guidelines for offshore petroleum activ-
ities. In 1998, PAME was mandated by the ministerial meeting in Iqaluit to 
assess present and possible shipping activities to ascertain whether there 
66 Salekhard Declaration, supra note 50, ‘Climate Change in the Arctic.’
67 Ibid.
68 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) Work Plan for 2009—2011 and 
Tentative List of Deliverables 2009–2013, ‘Assessments,’ <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/
amap_draft_work_plan_2009_- _2011.pdf>.
69 Module 2: The Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate.
70 Rovaniemi Declaration, supra note 8.
71 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
72 AEPS, supra note 9 at s. 7.
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is a need for additional shipping measures in the Arctic. The mandate 
included working on an international code of safety for ships operating in 
polar waters (Polar Code) under the auspices of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO).73
The 2002 ministerial meeting in Inari requested PAME to develop a stra-
tegic plan for the protection of the Arctic marine environment that would 
lay the foundation for a more coordinated and integrated approach in 
addressing the challenges of the Arctic coastal and marine environments.74 
The ministerial meeting also endorsed the revised Arctic Offshore Oil and 
Gas Guidelines,75 which were 4 rst adopted by PAME in 1997 and recently 
updated.76
Recently, PAME has developed its work plan for 2009–11 based on the 
priorities chosen by the present chairmanship of the Cooperation.77 The 
plan includes three main objectives: improving knowledge about the Arctic 
marine environment and taking action based on existing knowledge, deter-
mining the competence of applicable commitments and promoting their 
implementation, and creating partnerships, programs, and technical sup-
port both within and outside the Cooperation.
(iii) EPPR
The AEPS established the EPPR as a priority in 1991 and later trans-
formed it into a working group. The EPPR’s initial mission, as identi4 ed 
by the AEPS, included the exchange of information concerning all rel-
evant issues in the 4 eld of emergency prevention and response and the 
establishment of a system for early noti4 cation of signi4 cant accidental 
73 Iqaluit Declaration on the Occasion of the First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, 
Iqaluit, Canada, 17–18 September 1998, Article 26 [Iqaluit Declaration]. The Guidelines for 
Ships Operating in Arctic Ice- Covered Waters were adopted by the International Maritime 
Organization as recommendatory provisions. Canada was the leading country in preparing 
the guidelines, and the Arctic Council had a close connection to the proceedings through 
Canada.
74 Inari Declaration, supra note 63, Article 5.
75 PAME, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 12 October 2002, Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment Working Group, <http://old.pame.is/sidur/uploads/ ArcticGuidelines
.pdf> [Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines]. The Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines are a revised 
form of the guidelines as they were 4 rst adopted by the Alta meeting in 1997. The revision was 
based on comments from a variety of representatives, including Arctic governments, regional 
governments, non- governmental organizations, indigenous groups, industries, and members 
of the scienti4 c community.
76 Arctic Council Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group, Arctic 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 29 April 2009, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/
Arctic%200ffhsore%200il%20and%20Gas%20Guidelines%202009.pdf>.
77 See Protection of Arctic Marine Environment of the Arctic Council, PAME Work Plan 
2009–2011, <http://www.pame.is/images/stories/PAME_Work_Plan_2009–2011/PAME.b_
work__plan_2009–2011.pdf>.
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pollution or an imminent threat of such an incident.78 The ministerial 
meeting in Inuvik expanded the EPPR’s work and requested that it would 
complete the Arctic Guide for Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response. This request also included further developing the preventative, 
mitigation, and response measures for accidental oil and gas releases in 
the Arctic, which is a 4 eld of policy that overlaps with some of the other 
working groups. Other priorities set by the ministerial meeting included 
analysing the effectiveness of existing accident reporting systems, re4 ning 
the risk analysis on environmental threats to the Arctic,79 and analysing 
the adequacy and effectiveness of existing international agreements and 
arrangements in the Arctic.
The EPPR working group 4 nalized its analysis of the adequacy and effec-
tiveness of agreements and arrangements relevant to land- based maritime 
or nuclear accident responses in 2000.80 The 2004 ministerial meeting in 
Reykjavik suggested the inclusion of natural disasters within the activities 
of the working group and noted the completion of the Shoreline Cleanup 
Assessment Technique Manual.81 The EPPR work plan for 2009–11, which 
was included in its report to the ministerial meeting in Tromsø, addressed 
issues such as oil and gas, radiation, and natural disasters and also pledged 
to cooperate with other organizations, including the other working groups 
involved in the Cooperation.82
(iv) CAFF
Like AMAP, the CAFF working group had its origins in the 1991 AEPS. 
The AEPS recognized that economic development projects, the long- range 
movement of pollutants, and the degradation of habitats posed grave threats 
to Arctic M ora and fauna.83 It ascertained that most existing agreements 
protecting M ora and fauna had no speci4 c focus on the Arctic, which was a 
big problem with respect to the traditional livelihood and cultures of Arctic 
indigenous peoples. Lacking was a forum in which scientists, indigenous 
peoples, and conservation activists could exchange data and information 
78 AEPS, supra note 9 at s. 8.1 (i)–(x).
79 Inuvik Declaration, supra note 22, Article 6, para. 6.
80 Barrow Declaration on the Occasion of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council, 13 October 2000, Article 10, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/barrow%20
- %20english.pdf> [Barrow Declaration]. See also David L. VanderZwaag, Arctic 11 YbIEL 
265 (2000).
81 Reykjavik Declaration, supra note 50, ‘Emergency Prevention Preparedness and 
Response.’
82 EPPR, EPPR Working Group Report on 2006–9 Activities, 20 January 2009, Sixth 
Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Tromsø, Norway, 29 April 2009, section 4, <http://arctic
- council.org/4 learchive/eppr_dreft_work_plan_2009_- _2011.pdf>.
83 AEPS, supra note 9, at s. 9.
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relating to shared species and habitats. To this end, CAFF was established 
as a working group in 1992 and recognized by the Nuuk Declaration on 
Environment and Development in the Arctic in 1993.84
Various priorities for CAFF were identi4 ed by the 1996 ministerial meet-
ing in Inuvik, including the development of a circumpolar protected area 
network (CPAN).85 The meeting asked CAFF to develop a draft Arctic 
strategy relating to the goals of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
by recognizing an important link to the convention.86 The focus of CAFF 
expanded in 1998, when the Iqaluit ministerial meeting endorsed CAFF’s 
Strategic Plan for the Conservation of Arctic Biological Diversity as an 
overall framework for CAFF activities and its implementation through the 
creation of more detailed work plans.87 The ministerial meeting also wel-
comed CAFF’s intention to prepare an overview of the status and trends 
in changes to ecosystems, habitats, and species in the Arctic. The meeting 
also requested CAFF to identify the necessary elements for a program to 
monitor circumpolar biological diversity and make assessments as well as 
identify, jointly with AMAP, the effects of climate change and UV- B radia-
tion on Arctic ecosystems.88
CAFF’s present work plan for 2009–11 includes a follow- up to the Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) through the Arctic Biodiversity 
Assessment (ABS) and the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, 
the continued work of the CAFF expert groups—the CAFF Flora Group 
and the CAFF Seabird Group—and collaboration with the other working 
groups involved in the Cooperation as well as with international conven-
tions, agreements, and organizations.89
(v) SDWG
The AEPS formed the Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization 
in 1993, which was later transformed under the Arctic Council into a work-
ing group named the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).90 
84 Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, 16 September 1993, 
Article 2 [Nuuk Declaration].
85 See CAFF, Circumpolar Protected Area Network (CPAN): Strategy and Action Plan 
(1996), <http://arcticportal.org/en /caff>. See also Timo Koivurova, Governance of Protected 
areas in the Arctic 5 Utrecht L. R. 44 (2009).
86 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
87 CAFF, Strategic Plan for the Conservation of Arctic Biological Diversity, September 1998, 
at <http://web.arcticportal.org/uploads/hw/Kd/hwKdRxnTLfzt5cewJeEtjg/Strategic- Plan
- for- the- Conservation- of- Arctic- Biological- Diversity.pdf >.
88 Iqaluit Declaration, supra note 73, Articles 20–1.
89 See CAFF Working Group of the Arctic Council, CAFF Work Plan 2009–2011 Ministerial 
Period, April 2009, <http://archive.arcticportal.org/460/01/CAFF_Work_Plan_2009–2011
.pdf>. 90 Nuuk Declaration, supra note 84, Article 2.
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The 1998 ministerial meeting in Iqaluit adopted the Terms of Reference, 
which provided a procedure for proposing sustainable development 
projects.91 The 2000 ministerial meeting in Barrow adopted the Sustainable 
Development Framework Document,92 which identi4 ed six priorities for 
the sustainable development program.93 They are (1) health issues and the 
well- being of people living in the Arctic; (2) sustainable economic activi-
ties and increasing community prosperity; (3) education and cultural herit-
age; (4) children and youth; (5) the management of natural, including living, 
resources; and (6) infrastructure development.94
The Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) was published in 2004 
for the purpose of assisting the SDWG.95 The AHDR identi4 ed major gaps 
in knowledge, including the areas of cumulative changes in cultural identity 
and social well- being, industrial inM uences on community viability and gov-
ernance arrangements, and innovations in the Arctic.
The current priorities of the SDWG are included in the work plan for 
2009–11, which complements the existing declarations adopted under the 
Cooperation, the Sustainable Development Terms of Reference, the SDWG 
operating guidelines, and the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development 
Action Plan.96 The priorities focus mainly on ongoing projects and activi-
ties, the inclusion of new projects and activities, possible follow- up projects 
and activities, and thematic areas for SDWG projects and activities.97
(vi) ACAP
The Arctic Council endorsed the Arctic Council’s Action Plan to Eliminate 
Pollution in the Arctic at the 2000 ministerial meeting in Barrow.98 In 2006, 
the action plan was transformed into a working group entitled the Arctic 
Contaminants Action Program (ACAP). ACAP focuses mainly on pollution 
prevention and remediation. The priorities of ACAP were selected based on 
AMAP’s 4 ndings in regard to POPs, heavy metals, radioactivity, and the 
91 Terms of Reference, supra note 26, Articles 1 and 3.
92 Framework Document (Chapeau) for the Sustainable Development Program, 13 October 
2000, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/Framework%20Document.pdf>.
93 Barrow Declaration, supra note 80, Article 1.
94 Ibid.
95 Arctic Human Development Report, 2004, <http://www.svs.is/AHDR/AHDR%
20chapters/ English%20version/Chapters%20PDF.htm>.
96 SDWG, SDWG Work Plan for 2009–2011, <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/sdwg_
work_plan_for_2009–2011_4 nal.pdf>.
97 Thematic areas include certain issues in the Arctic: socio- economic, cultures and lan-
guages, human health, adaptation to climate change, the management of natural resources, 
energy, and communities. Ibid. at s. D.
98 Barrow Declaration, supra note 80, Article 2.
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depletion of the ozone layer.99 Most of the activities of the working group 
are related to the Russian Federation. The Multilateral Cooperative Project 
on the Phase- out of Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) Use, the Management 
of PCB- Contaminated Wastes in the Russian Federation, the Reduction/
Elimination of Dioxins and Furans Released in the Russian Federation, 
and the Reduction of Atmospheric Mercury Releases from Arctic States are 
some examples of ongoing ACAP projects.
ACAP’s work plan for 2009–11 includes, inter alia, developing an inte-
grated hazardous waste management strategy, assessing the performance 
of Russian hazardous waste destruction facilities, the implementation of 
control technologies, and the continuation of relationships with the other 
working groups involved in the Cooperation as well as various international 
organizations such as the Barents Euro- Arctic Council, UN Environment 
Programme, and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation.100
In addition to these working groups, the Arctic Council has also estab-
lished some action programs. These programs are operated jointly by the 
working groups, the permanent participants, and various organizations that 
maintain a relationship with the Arctic Council. An action program can 
later be transformed into a working group.101 The Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment is an action program under the Arctic Council. In addition, 
the Search and Rescue Task Force is currently being established, and it will 
negotiate an Arctic search- and- rescue instrument to be ready by the 2011 
ministerial meeting, which will be the 4 rst time the Cooperation has negoti-
ated a legal instrument.102
C. The Secretariat
The Arctic Council has not had a permanent secretariat since its inception. 
In fact, the Rules of Procedure have imposed the responsibility of provid-
ing secretarial supports on the state that holds the chair.103 Nonetheless, 
the council currently has a semi- permanent secretariat located in Tromsø, 
Norway, which has been shared by Norway, Denmark, and Sweden dur-
ing their chairmanships (2006–12).104 There is much uncertainty whether 
99 ACAP, List of Approved Activities and Proposals for Future Activities, June 2001, at 2, 
<http://arctic- council.npolar.no/index.html/Meetings/SAO/2001%20Ro/ACAP2001.pdf>.
100 See ACAP Work Plan for 2009–2011 (as a draft and subject to approval by the SAOs) at: 
<http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/acap_4 nal_work_plan_2009–2011.doc>.
101 Examples are the SDWG and ACAP.
102 Meeting of Senior Arctic Of4 cials, Final Report, 12–13 November 2009, Copenhagen, 
s. 5.2 (Search and Rescue Task Force). 103 Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, rule 32.
104 Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objective for their Arctic Council chairman-
ships 2006–12, Common objectives and priorities for the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish 
chairmanships of the Arctic Council (2006–2012), <http://arctic- council.org/article/2007/11/
common_priorities>.
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Canada, which will assume the chair after Sweden, will continue to use the 
Tromsø Secretariat.
I V.  T H E IS SU E OF CLI M AT E CH A NGE I N A RC T IC CO OPER AT ION
Neither the AEPS nor the Arctic Council included the issue of climate 
change in their working agendas or as a primary concern at the time they 
were established. However, the issue of climate change has increasingly 
become a feature in the Cooperation’s agenda and presently dominates the 
work of the Cooperation in many ways.105
1. The Issue of Climate Change under the AEPS
The AEPS included the problem of climate change at the time of its estab-
lishment but not as one of its priority concerns.106 One of the principles that 
it adopted was to ‘respect the Arctic’s signi4 cance for and inM uence on the 
global climate.’107 The argument at that time focused on the already exist-
ing international forums that had started to work on the depletion of the 
ozone layer and climate change issues.108 The AEPS acknowledged climate 
change as a major threat to the Arctic environment109 and expected a close 
working relationship with several international climate change programs 
to exchange relevant data for the purpose of assessing climate change in 
the Arctic.110 The 1993 ministerial meeting in Nuuk requested that AMAP 
engage in research related to climate change.111 Moreover, in 1996, the AEPS 
reaf4 rmed its support for the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC),112 and it also asked AMAP to review the inte-
grated results of existing programs dealing with climate change regularly 
‘with a view to identifying gaps in the scope of the monitoring and research 
under these fora and with a view to ensuring that speci4 c issues related to 
the Arctic region are placed on the agenda of the appropriate international 
bodies.’113 AMAP responded to this request by including the issue of cli-
mate change in its 1997 report on the state of the Arctic environment,114 
which prompted the ministerial meeting in Alta to  encourage AMAP to 
105 For a detailed description, see Timo Koivurova and Md Waliul Hasanat, Climate Policy 
of the Arctic Council in Climate Governance in the Arctic, at 51–75 (Timo Koivurova, Carina 
Keskitalo, and Nigel Bankes, eds., 2009).
106 The priority areas were persistent organic contaminants, oil pollution, heavy metals, 
noise, radioactivity, and acidi4 cation. 107 AEPS, supra note 9 at s. 2.2(iii)(c).
108 Ibid. at s. 3. 109 Ibid. at s. 6. 110 Ibid.
111 AMAP, AEPS Nuuk Report 16 September 1993. The Nuuk report was adopted along 
with the 1993 Nuuk Declaration, <http://arctic- council.npolar.no/Archives/AEPS%20Docs/
Arctic%20Council%C2%A0_%C2%A0Nuuk%20Report.htm>.
112 Inuvik Declaration, supra note 22, Preamble. 113 AMAP, supra note 111.
114 Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report. This was developed 
into the more comprehensive AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, which was 
presented to the 4 rst ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in 1998.
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continue the monitoring process and assess the impacts of climate change 
on the Arctic environment.115
2. The Issue of Climate Change under the Arctic Council
Research on climate change in the Arctic intensi4 ed following the estab-
lishment of the Arctic Council. The AMAP and CAFF working groups 
had already organized a workshop on climate change before the 4 rst 1998 
ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council was held.116 In the meantime, the 
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) had also initiated a number 
of projects on the impact of climate change in the Arctic from the mid- 1990s 
onwards. In late 1998, the Executive Committee of the IASC suggested that 
the IASC work with the Arctic Council and the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and that their appropriate subsidiary bodies 
develop and maintain a scienti4 c assessment of consequences of climate 
variability in the Arctic region.117
The IASC cooperated with CAFF, AMAP, and the permanent 
participants of the Arctic Council to form the Assessment Steering 
Committee.118 The SAOs were convinced of the need to carry out an 
Arctic climate impact assessment (ACIA) after two workshops had been 
organized in 1998 and 1999. The United States provided secretarial sup-
port and funding assistance to establish the ACIA.119 The Barrow min-
isterial meeting endorsed the ACIA as a joint project of AMAP, CAFF, 
and the IASC.120 The Barrow ministerial meeting requested the ACIA to 
evaluate and synthesize knowledge on climate variability in the Arctic 
and to support policy- making processes and the work of the IPCC.121 
It urged the ACIA to address the consequences of climate change for 
the Arctic environment, human health, social structures, cultures, and 
economies.122
The 2002 ministerial meeting in Inari recognized that global climate 
change would have enormous consequences in the Arctic and that the 
115 Alta Declaration, supra note 61 at para. 9.
116 AMAP/CAFF Workshop on Climate Change, Rovaniemi, 24–5 March 1998.
117 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), An Assessment of Consequences of 
Climate Variability and Change and the Effects of Increased UV in the Arctic Region 
(Implementation Plan Version no. 3.7), prepared by the Assessment Steering Committee, 
September 2000, preface, <http://arctic- council.npolar.no/Meetings/ohers/barrow/Arctic%20
Council%C2%A0_%C2%A0Climate%20Impact%20Assessment.htm>. See also Annika 
E. Nilsson, A Changing Arctic Climate: Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (2007).
118 ACIA, ACIA Scienti3 c Report (2005) at 6, <http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scienti4 c
.html>.
119 Ibid.   120 Barrow Declaration, supra note 80, Article 3.
121 Ibid.   122 Ibid.
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Arctic could serve as an early warning of climate change.123 It noted the 
innovative methodology used in creating the ACIA, in which indigenous 
knowledge was used in parallel with modern scienti4 c methods.124 The 
meeting also urged that an integrated approach to existing activities be 
taken to address the challenges caused by climate change in the Arctic 
environment.125
The ACIA published a synthesis report in 2004126 and a scienti4 c report 
in 2005127 on the basis of the same data.128 The synthesis report was for-
warded to the Arctic Council and the international science community, and 
it identi4 ed the prevailing trends of climate change in the region and the 
implications of warming in the Arctic for the rest of the world.129 The report 
also set out its ten key 4 ndings:
 1.  the Arctic climate is now warming rapidly, and much larger changes are 
projected;
 2.  Arctic warming and its consequences have worldwide implications;
 3.  Arctic vegetation zones are very likely to shift, causing wide- ranging 
impacts;
 4.  the diversity of animal species, their ranges, and distribution will 
change;
 5.  many coastal communities and facilities face increasing exposure to 
storms;
 6.  reduced sea ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access to 
resources;
 7.  thawing ground will disrupt transportation, buildings, and other 
infrastructures;
 8. indigenous communities face major economic and cultural impacts;
 9.  elevated ultraviolet radiation levels will affect people, plants, and ani-
mals; and
123 Ibid. 124 Ibid., Article 8. 125 Ibid. at para. 5.
126 ACIA, Impacts of a Warming Arctic, ACIA Overview Report (2004) [ACIA Synthesis 
Report]. 127 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, supra note 119.
128 The synthesis report has been prepared in a simple manner that is understandable to 
general readers and policy makers, while the scienti4 c report is somewhat more extensive 
and is mainly aimed at technical experts. The ACIA scienti4 c report, entitled Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment and published in 2005, is the 4 rst comprehensive evaluation of climate 
change in the Arctic, changes in ultraviolet radiation and their impacts on the Arctic and the 
rest of the world.
129 The report divided the Arctic region into four sub- regions according to different 
impacts of climate change. They are: sub- region I (East Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, northwest Russia, and the adjacent seas), sub- region II (Siberia and the adjacent 
seas), sub- region III (Chukotka, Alaska, the western Canadian Arctic, and the adjacent seas), 
and sub- region IV (the central and eastern Canadian Arctic, west Greenland, and the adja-
cent seas).
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10.  multiple inM uences will interact to cause increased impacts on people 
and ecosystems.130
The 2004 ministerial meeting in Reykjavik recognized climate change as 
the cause of severe risks to the region, and it recommended the dissemina-
tion of the ACIA 4 ndings in various forums so that those 4 ndings might 
be considered in national and international climate policy- making, mainly 
in terms of mitigation and adaptation to climate change in the Arctic. The 
meeting directed the SAOs to report on progress in organizing activities 
connected with climate change at the next ministerial meeting in 2006.131 
The ACIA 4 ndings encouraged the Arctic Council members, permanent 
participants, and observers to issue a joint statement at the 4 rst meeting 
of the Kyoto Protocol, which also served as the eleventh Conference of the 
Parties (COP- 11) to the UNFCCC, to energize the climate regime, and to 
consider the ACIA results in decision making concerning the global climate 
change regime.132 The Cooperation prepared the ACIA policy document,133 
which acknowledged the need to further organize the work of the Arctic 
Council and its subsidiary bodies.134
The 2006 ministerial meeting in Salekhard recon4 rmed the implementa-
tion of the ACIA policy document;135 provided a general endorsement of 
the development of Arctic expertise in the 4 eld of climate change and of an 
increase in the adaptive capacity of Arctic residents;136 highlighted the need 
for further research conducting up- to- date assessments; directed the SAO to 
review these assessments and report to the following ministerial meeting;137 
and established a ‘focal point’ process to discuss options for ACIA follow-
 up activities.138 The focal point consists of the chair of the SAOs, the chairs 
of the Arctic Council working groups, and one representative from among 
the permanent participants.
The 2009 ministerial meeting in Tromsø made some practical decisions 
with respect to addressing climate change in the Arctic, inter alia, recogniz-
ing that mitigating the impact of anthropogenic climate change depends 
130 ACIA Synthesis Report, supra note 126, at 10–11.
131 Reykjavik Declaration, supra note 50, ‘Emergency Prevention Preparedness and 
Response.’
132 See <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/AC%20statement%20CoP11%20Montreal_4 nal.
pdf>.
133 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document, Issued by the Fourth Arctic Council 
Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik, 24 November 2004, <http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_
Policy_Document.pdf>. See also The Arctic Council Policy Document on Global Warming 99 
A.J.I.L. 256 (2005).
134 Reykjavik Declaration, supra note 50, ‘Emergency Prevention Preparedness and 
Response.’
135 Salekhard Declaration, supra note 50, ‘Climate Change in the Artic.’
136 Ibid. 137 Ibid.
138 Report of Senior Arctic Of3 cials to Ministers at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial 
Meeting, Reykjavík, 24 November 2004, ‘The Role of the Arctic Council,’ <http:// 
arctic- council.org/4 learchive/SAO_ReporttoMinistersReykjavik_2004.pdf>.
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mainly on substantially reducing the global emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases.139 Recognizing the urgent need for an effective 
global response to address the challenge of climate change, the ministerial 
meeting agreed on the active contribution of all Arctic states in reaching an 
adequate outcome at COP- 15 to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in December 
2009. It decided to report on mass loss from the Greenland ice sheet to 
COP- 15 and expressed the hope that the full results of the Arctic cryosphere 
project, entitled Snow, Water, Ice, and Permafrost in the Arctic, would be 
delivered in 2011.140
The ministerial meeting encouraged its members to strengthen their work 
on adaptation to climate change, including community- level actions, and to 
share information on effective practices. It also appreciated the initiatives 
of the indigenous peoples. It emphasized the importance of regular updates 
concerning the impact of climate change in the Arctic. Considering that 
short- lived climate forcers such as black carbon, methane, and tropospheric 
ozone precursors may contribute to climate change in the Arctic, as stated 
in the AMAP 2009 Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern141 report, 
the ministerial meeting decided to establish a task force on short- lived cli-
mate forcers to identify existing and new measures to reduce emissions of 
these forcers and recommended immediate actions and a report on their 
progress at the next ministerial meeting. In the joint chair program for the 
years 2006–12, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden identi4 ed climate change as 
the top priority issue.
In addition to the above- mentioned activities, climate change has appeared 
as a priority in other Arctic- related venues. For instance, the strategic plan 
for the protection of the Arctic marine environment developed by PAME, 
which the Cooperation endorsed in 2004 and which is widely known as the 
Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, identi4 ed climate change and increasing eco-
nomic activities as two of the major issues affecting sustainable develop-
ment in the Arctic.142 The Arctic Council also endorsed the 2000 ACAP, 
which selected 4 ve priorities for identifying actions in its overall strategy. 
In the 4 rst phase, all of these priorities are closely connected to climate 
change.143
139 Tromsø Declaration on the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council, Tromsø, Norway, 29 April 2009, ‘Climate Change in the Arctic,’ <http://arctic
- council.org/4 learchive/Tromsoe%20Declaration- 1.pdf>.   140 Ibid.
141 Senior Arctic Of3 cial (SAO) Report to Ministers, Tromsø, Norway, April 2009, at 7–8, 
<http://arctic- council.org/workarea/agenda_tromso_meeting_april_2009/4 learchive/4 nal_
sao_report_to_ministers_april_2009.pdf>.
142 See Workshop Report in support of the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, Reykjavik, Iceland 
20–22 October 2003, ‘Foreword,’ <http://www.pame.is/images/stories/AMSP_4 les/Workshop
- Report.pdf>.
143 See Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic, Barrow, 13 
October 2000, s. 3.1 (Identi4 cation and Assessment of Problems), <http://www.ac- acap.org/
4 les/acap%200rg/ACAP_overall_strategy_Oct_2000.pdf>. The priorities are: food security, 
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V. ACH I EV EM EN T S OF T H E CO OPER AT ION W I T H R ESPEC T TO 
CLI M AT E CH A NGE I N T H E A RC T IC
The most important achievements of the Arctic- wide Cooperation regard-
ing climate change are the establishment of the ACIA and the ACIA policy 
document.144 The ACIA can be considered a signi4 cant development as far 
as addressing climate change in the Arctic is concerned. The aim of the 
ACIA was to gather knowledge on climate change and ultraviolet radia-
tion and provide reliable information to the governments and peoples of 
the region by using indigenous knowledge in parallel with modern scienti4 c 
methods.145 The ACIA has presented the Arctic as the early warning zone 
for climate change because the consequences of global warming have been 
evident there since the 1960s and the consequences of global warming are 
projected to be twice as intense in the Arctic as in the rest of the world.
The ACIA projected the impact of climate change on human beings—in 
particular, the indigenous peoples of the Arctic—from various perspectives. 
Climate change may threaten the cultural survival of indigenous peoples 
whose ways of life are based on hunting, herding, and 4 shing. These peo-
ples may be deprived of their traditional food and have to adapt to new 
species that may move to the north. The hunting of marine mammals on 
thin ice will become more challenging. Open water is less predictable than 
water that is covered by ice. New insects and animal vectors may cause new 
diseases. Increasing skin cancer, cataracts, and viral infections are already 
evident in the Arctic. The effect of climate change on the petroleum and 
4 sheries industries may be mixed. Increased shipping would develop the 
4 nancial situation of the Arctic, but it could also cause further pollution.
The ACIA policy document suggests two types of action: mitigation and 
adaptation.146 For the mitigation of climate change- related risks, the docu-
ment, in considering the 4 ndings of the ACIA and other relevant studies 
under the UNFCCC and other agreements, has suggested taking incen-
tive actions without delay to address global emissions. It urges limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions to levels consistent with the ultimate goal of the 
 including drinking water; human health; ecosystem health, including biodiversity; the protec-
tion of living natural resources; and socio- economic bene4 ts, including cultural values.
144 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document, Issued by the Fourth Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik, 24 November 2004, <http://www.acia.uaf.edu/
PDFs/ACIA_Policy_Document.pdf> [ACIA Policy Document].
145 See Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, Barrow, Alaska, 
United States, 12–13 October 2000, ‘Ministerial Roundtable Discussions,’ at 6, <http://arctic
- council.org/4 learchive/barrow_notes.pdf>.
146 ACIA Policy Document, supra note 144, ‘Arctic Climate Policy Actions.’
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UNFCCC,147 promoting appropriate technologies and sources of energy, 
and adopting policies and programs for the conservation and enhance-
ment of carbon sinks and reservoirs, following the principles of sustainable 
development.148
Adaptation is needed in situations where climate change is unavoid-
able, and special attention is needed to strengthen the adaptive capacities 
of populations in the Arctic.149 The policy document recommends that the 
Arctic states work closely with Arctic residents, including indigenous and 
local communities in order to promote the ability to adapt to, and man-
age, the various impacts of climate change and ultraviolet radiation. The 
development and management of new economic opportunities in a sustain-
able manner may protect the environment and population of the Arctic. 
Local and indigenous knowledge, as well as the participation of local and 
indigenous communities, are required in the implementation of adaptive 
management strategies, policies, and programs concerning the use of natu-
ral resources and in reducing the risks from natural calamities, taking into 
account costs and bene4 ts.
The policy document also recommends increasing natural and social 
science research on the impact of climate change and adaptation to it.150 
It encourages national and international research bodies and sponsors to 
develop and implement programs. It seeks to expand links to circumpo-
lar research and monitoring networks in order to ensure relevant data for 
various research and monitoring programs. It also recognizes the need to 
consider methods of conducting further studies regarding climate change in 
the Arctic.
The policy document recommends that member states disseminate the 
ACIA documents in international forums to improve cooperation and 
address implications of climate change in the Arctic and promote the ACIA 
at the national and local levels by using various methods and languages in 
order to include more residents of the Arctic in the process.151 It af4 rms 
the importance of providing residents of the Arctic with information on 
climate change and monitoring in order to help them adapt and encourages 
the member states to integrate ACIA materials into educational, research, 
and training programs. Finally, the policy document recommends the 
147 In fact, the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas con-
centrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system’ (Article 2). However, the convention does not clearly de4 ne that 
level and thus the concentrations that would exceed it. For details, see Michael Oppenheimer 
and Annie Petsonk, Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent Interpretations 73 
Climate Change 195 (2005).
148 ACIA Policy Document, supra note 144, ‘Arctic Climate Policy Actions.’
149 Ibid.   150 Ibid., ‘Research, Observations, Monitoring and Modelling.’
151 Ibid., ‘Outreach.’
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reorganization of the work of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies 
to provide better results in mitigating climate change. It recommends that 
the ministers:
direct ●  relevant technical working groups of the Arctic Council to review 
the scienti4 c chapters of the ACIA in the context of their ongoing and 
future work programs and to report on the progress made at the 2006 
ministerial meeting;
decide ●  to keep under review the need for an updated assessment of 
climate change in the Arctic, drawing, inter alia, on the IPCC fourth 
assessment report and the results of the 2007–9 International Polar 
Year;
direct ●  SAOs to nominate a focal point and to be responsible for an 
ACIA follow up, including an assessment of gaps in knowledge; and
communicate, ●  as appropriate, any Arctic Council ACIA follow- up 
actions to the COP of the UNFCCC.152
A number of projects are currently operating under the various working 
groups of the Cooperation to address the consequences of climate change. 
In February 2010, AMAP registered sixty- 4 ve projects related to climate 
change operated by Arctic and non- Arctic states.153 Most of these projects 
are research oriented for a better understanding of climate change in 
the Arctic and its impact on Arctic populations, M ora, and fauna. Since the 
completion of the Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the 
Arctic project, which aimed speci4 cally at increasing the adaptive capacity 
of Arctic communities, there have been new projects, such as the Arctic 
Cryosphere: Snow, Water, Ice, and Permafrost in the Arctic.
The Cooperation has been concerned with the activities of the UNFCCC 
and has supported the convention since its inception, although the 
Cooperation does not have a formal position (for example, observer status) 
under the convention. At the tenth anniversary of the Arctic Council, it 
was noted that all of the members had joined the climate convention,154 
however, the unwillingness of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
was not mentioned. The Cooperation decided to set up an Arctic venue at 
the recent UN climate summit in Copenhagen, to organize a side event and 
promote its projects on the Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate and 
the Arctic Cryosphere: Snow, Water, Ice, and Permafrost in the Arctic to 
COP- 15.155
152 Ibid., ‘The Role of the Arctic Council.’
153 The projects can be found in the AMAP Project Directory on the AMAP website at 
<http://www.amap.no/>.
154 Salekhard Declaration, supra note 50, ‘Climate Change in the Arctic.’
155 Meeting of Senior Arctic Of4 cials, supra note 102 at s. 2.1 (Arctic Council Outreach at 
COP- 15).
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The Cooperation has gained a leading position in producing scienti4 c 
knowledge on various issues related to the Arctic, particularly on climate 
science, and it supports high standards of research and appropriate initia-
tives in this regard. For instance, a task force on short- lived climate forcers 
is being established, and the Cooperation has been successful in involving a 
good number of non- Arctic states, along with international organizations, 
for this purpose. Furthermore, it has formed a climate expert group—the 
main aim of which is to provide expert advice to AMAP concerning future 
activities related to climate change in the Arctic. The group consists of two 
co- chairs who together call meetings with relevant experts in the 4 eld of 
climate change.156
V I.  M A I N SHORTCOM I NGS OF T H E CO OPER AT ION I N 
A DDR E S SI NG A RC T IC CLI M AT E CH A NGE
Some shortcomings in the Cooperation system relate not only to the issue 
of climate change but also to issues with the whole system. Considering 
general weaknesses together with the climate- speci4 c drawbacks may pro-
vide fruitful ideas about the Cooperation, as explained in the following 
sections.
1. Soft Law Character
The major shortcoming of the Cooperation, as identi4 ed by many scholars, 
is its soft law character—its inability to make formal decisions that are 
legally binding on the member states. In other words, it is seen more as a 
decision shaper rather than a decision maker. However, the rapid climate 
changes of recent years have posed new challenges that a formal inter-
national organization with classical characteristics would not be able to 
address. A special arrangement of inter- state cooperation is needed with 
M exibility particularly in terms of the involvement of relevant non- state 
actors in policy making.
2. Lack of a Permanent Secretariat
The lack of a permanent secretariat can be seen as one of the main de4 -
ciencies within the Cooperation. Having an independent secretariat would 
enable the Cooperation to continue with its regular work, giving an indi-
vidual personality to the Cooperation and keeping it free from the inM u-
ence of individual members. A permanent secretariat could continue the 
Cooperation’s functions in particular when the chair shifts because many 
156 The Climate Expert Group is co- chaired by John Walsh (University of Alaska) and 
Øystein Hov (Norwegian Meteorological Institute). There are no 4 xed members in the group. 
However, the co- chairs may request distinguished climate experts if they desire to have a 
meeting.
 by guest on August 9, 2011
yielaw.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW148
projects planned for the period of the outgoing chair remain incomplete. 
Alternatively, in the absence of a permanent secretariat, the activities of 
the Cooperation depend very much on the will of the state that holds the 
chair.
3. Ineffective Funding Mechanism
The fact that the Cooperation lacks its own funds to be used for its projects 
can be seen as a drawback to ful4 lling its main objectives. At present, any 
Arctic state or permanent participant may propose any projects whatso-
ever that serve the key interests of the Cooperation, subject to showing 
a guarantee of adequate funding and support from another Arctic state. 
In fact, states may propose projects that are not very important simply 
in order to get credit for being the lead country of an Arctic Council 
project. The Cooperation manages its regular work with annual fees from 
the members. However, implementing development projects depends on 
outside funding. At present, it has developed a project support instrument 
jointly with the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, which will be 
functional soon.157 The Cooperation has limited control over its projects, 
and one of the main reasons for this situation is the issue of funding—
any lead country may withdraw a project at any phase. For instance, 
Norway withdrew a follow- up to the Vulnerability and Adaptation 
to Climate Change in the Arctic project at the last SDWG meeting.158 
There is no speci4 c guideline to ensure the Cooperation’s control over its 
projects.
4. Poor Coordination with Respect to Working Groups
No clear boundaries delineate the working groups, which has made it dif-
4 cult to determine which working group is the appropriate one to operate 
certain projects. At one time, there was criticism that the activities of the 
working groups generally lack speci4 city and are largely descriptive.159 The 
participants at the recent SDWG meeting used such wording to criticize the 
fact that AMAP deals with health care issues, while CAFF handles cultural 
matters.160 Canada proposed a strategic task force to decide on the working 
area of each working group and determine what speci4 c type of work is to 
be done by which group.
157 See PSI Status ACAP Working Group Meeting, Ottawa, Canada, 16–18 September 2009, 
<http://www.ac- acap.org/files/WGM%202009.09.16–18%200ttawa/4_Presentations/Status
%20PSI- Criteria%20and%20Process%202009.ppt#256,1,PSI Status>.
158 Observation by the present author in the SDWG Regular Meeting, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, 10–11 November 2009.
159 David VanderZwaag, International Commons: The Arctic 9 YbIEL 266 (1998).
160 Observation by the present author, supra note 158.
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5. Problems Concerning National Delegates
National delegates in the various committees or meetings in the Cooperation 
mainly come from their respective national foreign ministries and other 
departments, and are participating in the activities of the Cooperation 
in addition to performing their regular tasks. What is more, the mem-
ber states frequently change their SAO and other representatives to the 
Cooperation. For these reasons, they can neither pay adequate attention 
to the Cooperation’s work nor become deeply knowledgeable about the 
Cooperation, which results in the national delegations having few experts 
(subject to exceptions, of course), as opposed to the permanent participants, 
who use consultants with real knowledge about the functioning and activi-
ties of the Cooperation and other issues related to the Arctic. Sometimes a 
member state may include people who are not able to make a useful con-
tribution to their delegation or it may send a big team that lacks proper 
coordination.
6. Lack of Realization of Arctic Needs at the National Level
Member states often do not pay adequate attention to issues related to the 
Arctic in their national priorities. One reason for this oversight could be 
that the inhabitants of the Arctic do not have enough inM uence in national 
policy making. National delegates to the Cooperation may lack knowl-
edge on issues related to the Arctic since most of them are chosen from 
their national capital, mainly by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which is 
located far away in the south (except for Iceland). However, the Arctic part 
of the Arctic states is different from the national capitals in many respects. 
A survey conducted in certain southern cities of the Arctic states revealed 
that few people living in the non- Arctic parts of the member states know 
anything about the Cooperation.161
7. Members’ Lack of Con4 dence in the Cooperation
The Cooperation has been unable to create con4 dence in its members, par-
ticularly with respect to addressing the consequences caused by climate 
change in the Arctic. For instance, the 4 ve states that have a coast on the 
Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States), 
who are members of the Arctic Council, convened a meeting in 2008 aimed 
at managing the increasingly accessible Arctic Ocean. They adopted a dec-
laration at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat in which the three other 
members (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) were not involved.162 In the decla-
161 The interviews conducted by the present author took place in Washington, New York, 
Moscow, Copenhagen, Aarhus, Stockholm, and Helsinki.
162 The Ilulissat Declaration Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–9 May 
2008, 48 I.L.M. 372 (2009), <http://arctic- council.org/4 learchive/Ilulissat- declaration.pdf>.
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ration, the coastal states do not see the necessity of creating any new legally 
binding instruments since existing international agreements, mainly the 
LOSC, seem suf4 cient to address the increasing challenges in the marine 
Arctic. The same states convened another meeting in March 2010 in Chelsea, 
Canada. The initiative of the coastal states can be seen as a major challenge 
since a core Arctic issue is being dealt with outside the Cooperation.
8. Disagreements among the Members
The member states observe different challenges and opportunities caused 
by climate change in terms of their national interests. Thus, it seems reason-
able that the members have taken different positions on some issues. There 
is clear disagreement in terms of 4 nancial support and formalizing the 
Cooperation, in addition to disagreements on speci4 c issues.163 For instance, 
from the very beginning, Canada wanted to have a formal international 
organization. Finland took the initiative of reorganizing the Cooperation 
during its chairmanship. Norway tried to bring signi4 cant changes within 
the Cooperation’s functioning system during the last chair period, which 
did not work out due to different opinions among the member states.164 
The United States is very reluctant to see the Cooperation become a for-
mal international organization. However, uniting states associated with the 
Cooperation may yet bring about a functional global climate regime since 
two members (Russia and the United States) and an ad hoc observer (China) 
play a key role in global climate politics.165
9. Other De4 ciencies of the Cooperation
In addition to the above-mentioned de4 ciencies, the Cooperation lacks a 
separate unit dealing with external relationships with other states and rel-
evant organizations, suf4 cient practical activities using the results of the 
research, and the ability to evaluate prepared documents (guidelines and 
reports) in terms of inM uence and value.
V I I.  PROP OSA L FOR A MODEL CO OPER AT ION A DDR E S SI NG 
CLI M AT E CH A NGE I N T H E A RC T IC
1. Introduction
Although there have been many reforms to the Cooperation since its incep-
tion, many scholars still question, twenty years after its establishment, its 
163 Samantha Smith has expressed her view as follows: ‘For a variety of reasons, the US 
has worked to ensure that the Arctic Council has a limited mandate, and thus has limited 
signi4 cance.’ Samantha Smith, Ministerial with Only Three Ministers 4 WWF Arctic Bulletin 
4 (2000).
164 Interview with Stein Paul Rosenberg, senior advisor to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Section for the High North, Resources and Russia), Norway (11 November 2009, 
Copenhagen). 165 Stokke, supra note 6 at 349–50.
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effectiveness, particularly with respect to climate change.166 However, the 
Cooperation is unwilling to welcome criticism even though there have been 
internal debates about its success. For instance, the SAO meeting criticized 
Oran Young severely when he introduced the Arctic governance project, 
warning, at the same time, that the chairperson should not include any such 
project criticizing the Cooperation in future agendas.167 The Cooperation’s 
achievement with respect to creating awareness among indigenous peoples 
in countering climate change has not been without question.168 It is true that 
the present activities of the Cooperation are not suf4 cient to counter the 
challenges created by rapid climate change, which, in any case, is a daunting 
task. There is also evidence that international law has occasionally incor-
porated rules that once were soft law169 and that soft law can serve as a 
platform for making treaties.170
2. Reasons for Reforming the Cooperation
At present, the Cooperation has taken the issue of climate change seriously 
due to its increasing impact on the ecosystem and inhabitants of the Arctic. 
However, it is true that researchers involved in climate science have become 
frustrated since politicians have not implemented many of their 4 ndings. 
The ongoing uncertainty and failure of the UNFCCC to establish an effec-
tive global climate change regime are evidence that there is a need for 
regional cooperation such as the Arctic- wide Cooperation.171
166 Koivurova, supra note 5.
167 Observation by the present author in the SAO meeting (12–13 November 2009, 
Copenhagen).
168 Towards an Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty, Statement Issued by Inuit Leaders 
at the Inuit Leaders’ Summit on Arctic Sovereignty, Kuujjuaq, Quebec, 6–7 November 2008, 
<http://www.sikunews.com/skriv_ut.html?catid=2&artid=5711>.
169 The incorporation of three General Assembly resolutions (GA Res.1721/XVI, 1884/
XVIII and 1962/XVIII) into the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Celestial Bodies 1967 is an 
example. For details, see C.M. Chinkin, The Changes of Soft Law: Development and Change 
in International Law 38 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 850 at 857 (1989).
170 For instance, the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 13 December 1963, UN Doc.A/Res/1962 (XVII), led to 
the negotiation of the Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. The Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-
 Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 
G.A. Res.2749, U.N.GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 24, UN Doc.A/8028 (1971), reprinted 
in 10 I.L.M. 220 (1971), preceded the negotiation of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 
December 1948, UN Doc.A/Res/217 (III 1948), preceded two legally binding instruments: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
171 For instance, the recently adopted Copenhagen Accord has in no way satis4 ed people 
around the world, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/107.pdf>.
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The 4 ndings of the ACIA and the recent report of the IPCC predict an 
alarming situation for the globe as well as for the Arctic. The situation of the 
Arctic will become more complicated when the Arctic Ocean opens up due 
to the melting of sea ice caused by climate change. Navigation, 4 shing, and 
the exploration and exploitation of resources by coastal and other states rec-
ognized by the LOSC will create numerous challenges for the Arctic envi-
ronment—for example, impacts on health, tourism, and traditional culture. 
On the other hand, the melting of the Greenlandic ice sheet and the frozen 
Arctic Ocean will cause a rise in sea levels that will result in the creation of 
a large number of environmental refugees because many coastal and low-
 lying island states will be under water. The situation will be unmanageable 
if those environmental refugees try to move to the industrialized states that 
are largely responsible for global climate change.
The Cooperation needs to be strong enough to address these challenges 
before the Arctic Ocean is completely open due to melting ice. As a regional 
forum, the Cooperation may adapt to changes at the Arctic level and join 
the global community in mitigating climate change because regions outside 
the Arctic obviously contribute to climate change in the Arctic.
3. Existing Proposals Regarding the Reform of the Cooperation
From the very beginning, it was argued that a formal international treaty 
was the best basis from which to deal with these issues. Donat Pharand, for 
instance, wanted to develop Arctic- wide cooperation by drafting a formal 
international treaty under the auspices of the Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee during the formation of the AEPS.172 However, neither the AEPS 
nor later the Arctic Council accepted his proposal. After the Cooperation 
had been in existence for a decade, some scholars did not even see the pos-
sibility of it being a formal international organization in the near future.173
Linda Nowlan has argued for the formalization of Arctic cooperation 
through an international treaty that would derive inspiration from the 
Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty and contain principles, substan-
tive legal obligations, and innovative features relevant to the Arctic.174 She 
has pointed out the dissimilarities (for example, lands under national juris-
diction, permanent inhabitants, industrial activities, strategic and milita-
rized territories) and similarities (for example, an inaccessible and fragile 
environment that is vulnerable to outside sources, an extreme climatic con-
dition) between the Arctic and Antarctica while explaining the need for a 
172 D. Pharand, Draft Arctic Treaty: An Arctic Region Council Proposal Prepared for the 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (1991), <http://www.carc.org/pubs/v19n02/5.htm>.
173 VanderZwaag, Huebert and Ferrara, supra note 6 at 166–71.
174 L. Nowlan, Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection 44 IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper 40 (2001), <http://data.iucn.org/dbtw- wpd/edocs/EPLP- 044.pdf>.
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new Arctic environmental agreement.175 She concludes that there must be 
a move made to promote and strengthen the innovative features that are 
already part of the Arctic regime.176 However, at some point, she argues 
for allowing a certain period of time to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
existing soft law arrangement and determine whether it needs to be supple-
mented by a treaty.177 David Leary expresses reservations about consider-
ing the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) as a model for an Arctic treaty since 
the Arctic includes areas that are mainly under the national jurisdiction 
of the Arctic states, and there are territorial disputes for areas that lie beyond 
national jurisdiction.178 On the other hand, Philippe Sands has argued that 
there is a case for formal international cooperation for the Arctic, similar to 
that which exists for Antarctica, in the near future:
The adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the establish-
ment of the Arctic Council provide a useful opportunity to develop new legal 
arrangements and institutions to govern an ecosystem which transcends national 
boundaries and requires international cooperation for its adequate protection to 
be assured. The soft law approach currently envisaged provides a 4 rst step; ulti-
mately, it will be necessary to establish appropriate institutional arrangements and 
substantive rules, perhaps similar to those applied in the Antarctic, to ensure that 
agreed obligations are respected and enforced.179
The European Parliament has suggested adopting an international treaty 
for the protection of the Arctic inspired by the ATS, however, taking into 
account the populated nature of the Arctic and ensuring the rights and needs 
of the Arctic inhabitants.180 In contrast, the European Union Commission 
has preferred the implementation of existing instruments rather than creat-
ing any new legal instruments for protecting the Arctic environment.181
The SAOs have made a concrete proposal to reform the Cooperation that 
includes, inter alia, better coordination among the working groups, com-
munication with other regional bodies, increased funding, the provision 
of 4 nancial support to permanent participants, and the expansion of the 
role of observers.182 Following this step, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, 
175 Ibid. at viii–ix.   176 Ibid. at 66. 177 Ibid. at x.
178 Leary, supra note 6 at 54–5.
179 Sands, supra note 6 at 731.
180 European Parliament, Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, para. 15. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6
- TA- 2008–0474>.
181 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, the 
European Union and the Arctic Region, Doc. COM/763(2008) 4 nal (20 November 2008) at 4, 
<http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0763:FIN:EN:PDF>.
182 See SAOs Report to Ministers on The Review of the Arctic Council Structures, Doc. 
SA02002/A/8.0, Version 15 May 2002 FINAL), at <http://arctic- council.npolar.no/index.html/
Meetings/SAO/2002%200u/8_0_review.pdf>. Finland commissioned Mr. Pekka Haavisto to 
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a  permanent participant in the Cooperation, has suggested reforms in 
response to the selected weak points.183 However, the suggestions were, 
according to Norway—which was the chair at the time—very similar to 
suggestions made when Finland was chair in 2001–2.184
The Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), an international non-
 governmental organization, has proposed forming a commission under the 
present Cooperation in order to conclude a formal treaty protecting nature 
in the Arctic.185 As Neil Hamilton, who was then the director of the WWF 
Arctic Programme, has said:
We need a new approach, which includes thinking about a solid Arctic Treaty and a 
multilateral governance body  . . .  This is the only way to ensure the implementation 
of sustainable development regimes and help the Arctic adapt to the severe impact 
of climate change and ultimately stabilise the world’s climate.186
Olav Schram Stokke has argued for a M exible approach to norm building in 
order that the Cooperation can interact with other existing institutions.187 
Indeed, the Cooperation has already involved a number of existing institu-
tions and cooperated in producing scienti4 c data. He and Geir Hønneland 
have noticed ‘three great powers’ in terms of Arctic actors: the Russian 
Federation, the European Union, and the United States. Any initiative con-
cerning the Cooperation needs their support and active contribution to suc-
ceed.188 The Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC), which 
is another entity of Arctic politics, was initiated in 1996 and involves the 
ministries of defence of Norway, Russia, and the United States. The United 
Kingdom joined the AMEC later in 2003.
Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber have proposed a M exible governance 
structure in the Arctic to advance national interests in a cooperative man-
ner that takes into account the regional interdependence of the Arctic states 
and their own economic and political pressures as well as technological 
prepare a report for the SAOs concerning the structure of work in the Arctic Council. The 
4 nal report was delivered to the Arctic Council Secretariat on 29 June 2001 after the SAOs 
had discussed the draft report (12–13 June 2001). This report formed the background for the 
SAO recommendations.
183 Improving the Ef4 ciency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council: A Discussion Paper 
prepared by the Arctic Athabaskan Council, March 2007, 6–8, <http://arctic- council.org/
4 learchive/AAC_Arctic_Council_Future_Dec_2006.pdf>. 184 Ibid. at 8.
185 See Worldwide Fund for Nature, <http://www.panda.org>.
186 See <http://www.wwf.org.uk/what_we_do/press_centre/?134/New_rules_needed_for_
the_Arctic_WWF>.
187 O. Schram Stokke, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Idea of a Binding Regime for 
the Arctic Marine Environment, paper prepared for the Seventh Conference of Parliamentarians 
of the Arctic Region, Kiruna, Sweden, 2–4 August 2006, <http://www.arcticparl.org/_res/site/
File/images/Underlagsrapport%20eng- rysk3.pdf>.
188 Geir Hønneland and Olav Schram Stokke, Introduction, in Hønneland and Stokke, 
supra note 6 at 6–8.
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advancements.189 Meanwhile, Hans Corell has proposed the implementation 
of existing international treaties rather than building a new regime for the 
region, although he advocates the strengthening of the present Cooperation 
by engaging more entities such as the general public, politicians, businesses, 
and governments.190
D.R. Rothwell has advocated that the Arctic could be seen as part of 
the common heritage of mankind.191 Although an inspiring idea, Rothwell’s 
proposal has to meet with the reality of the law of the sea. Only the deep 
sea bed is currently seen as part of the common heritage of mankind, and 
after the Arctic states have drawn the outermost limits of the continen-
tal selves, there is not much sea bed left. Yet, the consequences of climate 
change in the Arctic have different impacts on different places. Therefore, 
Timo Koivurova has suggested that creating a framework treaty that would 
be managed by the Arctic states would be a faster way to proceed since the 
consequences of climate change in the Arctic will create severe environmen-
tal problems for the region in a relatively short time frame.192 His detailed 
proposal with Erik Molenaar points out some ambitious alternatives, focus-
ing mainly on marine contexts.193 However, it would be dif4 cult to conclude 
such an instrument since the Arctic states vary in their commitment to the 
activities of the Cooperation.
V I I I.  CONCLUSION
There was not much reform in the Cooperation when the AEPS was replaced 
by the Arctic Council in 1996—there were a few changes, although the fun-
damental elements of the Cooperation, including its legal status, 4 nancing, 
and institutional structure, remained nearly identical. Of particular impor-
tance, where issues related to climate change are concerned, is the soft law 
character of the Cooperation—that is, the fact that it cannot produce any 
legally binding rules or standards. Therefore, most of the proposals men-
tioned earlier in this article recommend a formal legal instrument to replace 
the Cooperation in the belief that a formal, legally binding agreement would 
be taken more seriously by the member states than a soft law instrument.194 
189 Jabour and Weber, supra note 6 at 40.   
190 Corell, supra note 6 at 321–4. 191 Rothwell, supra note 6 at 229–31.
192 Koivurova, supra note 6 at 22 and 26.
193 Timo Koivurova and Erik J. Molenaar, International Governance and Regulation 
of the Marine Arctic: A Proposal for a Legally Binding Instrument, a report prepared for 
the WWF International Arctic Programme (2010), <http://img9.custompublish.com/get4 le
.php/1092819.1529.wdyyvtwvst/Proposal+for+a+Legally+BindingInstrument+for+Printing
.pdf?return=arcticgovernance.custompublish.com>.
194 See, however, Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, 
and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note 54 Int’l Org. 603 at 604 (2000); Md. Waliul Hasanat, 
De3 nitional Constraints Regarding Soft Law 3 AALCO Quarterly Bulletin 8 at 31–2 (2007); 
 by guest on August 9, 2011
yielaw.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW156
However, these proposals do not seem feasible at this time because of the 
lack of support for a binding instrument from the member states.
A wise suggestion would be not only to consider the available documents, 
reports, and statements in making recommendations to improve the func-
tioning of the Cooperation but also to take into account the historical point 
of view and the reaction of the members and the permanent participants. 
The existence of three ‘great powers’ and their positions will certainly have 
an inM uence on the future characteristics of the Cooperation. An early ini-
tiative for a formal treaty might even lose some members if it is launched 
before all members fully recognize the importance of the Cooperation 
with respect to combating climate change. Another downside of a formal 
treaty with respect to the Cooperation is that it may pose new challenges 
to the special position that indigenous peoples have gained through the 
Cooperation.195 Alternatively, if a group of states is really committed to 
achieving success in a speci4 c 4 eld through international cooperation or 
based on some instrument, then the legal status of the cooperation196 or 
the instrument197 does not seem like a serious obstacle. In fact, states com-
ply with certain instruments because of their own interests or in order to 
maintain their reputation in international society.198 Thus, in the case of the 
Cooperation, it would be important to pay attention to the practical obsta-
cles that it faces at the moment rather than creating legally binding obliga-
tions or a formal international organization. The focus could be on how 
the Cooperation could make politicians knowledgeable about issues affect-
ing the Arctic, particularly with respect to climate science. Such knowledge 
would enable the Cooperation to address climate change in the Arctic more 
effectively. In the short term, working groups should be coordinated effec-
tively, and their working boundaries should be clari4 ed. The Arctic states 
should ensure that extra burdens are not imposed on national delegates, so 
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: What Speci3 c Environmetnal Rights Have 
Been Recognized? 35 Denver J. Intl L. & Policy 129 (2006).
195 The Cooperation supports the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) along with granting 
them permanent participant status. See Koivurova, supra note 6 at 26.
196 For instance, as a soft law body, the Barents Euro- Arctic Council has contributed to 
the conclusion of a legally binding instrument: the Agreement between the Governments in 
the Barents Euro- Arctic Region on Cooperation within the Field of Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response, Moscow, 11 December 2008.
197 The Basel Capital Accord could be an example. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision set out a group of policies regarding 4 nancial institutions in 1988. The accord, 
never considered a treaty under international law, does not create binding obligations on 
the states involved. Not even the committee has the authority to enforce recommendations, 
although most of the states adhere to its policies in their 4 nancing system by enacting relevant 
national legislation. Surprisingly, the policies have been observed not only by the states that 
negotiated the accord but also by states that were not involved. See the Basel Capital Accord 
at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm>.
198 See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance- Based Theory of International Law 90 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1823 at 1864 (2002).
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that they can spend enough time on the Cooperation’s activities; national 
governments should develop closer contacts with residents of the Arctic and 
ensure their proper representation in national delegations; and regional rep-
resentatives in national governments should be included in order to high-
light issues affecting the Arctic at the national level. The SAOs should not 
be changed too frequently. If an SAO retires from governmental service, the 
position should be 4 lled by someone who has experience participating in 
the delegation.
Setting up an international Arctic secretariat with an of4 ce with perma-
nent representatives from all of the member states and one for the permanent 
participants might ensure up- to- date communications in all relevant issues 
involving national and group interests. States interested in various issues 
would have an opportunity to exchange opinions in a more comfortable set-
ting at the premises of the Secretariat, which might lead to the conclusion 
of several international instruments or arrangements regarding different 
issues, where the Cooperation would play the central role of negotiating 
such instruments. Establishing con4 dence and faith among the members is 
largely a political issue—more interaction may be seen as a means for gain-
ing such con4 dence and faith. The proposed secretariat could be the perma-
nent venue for such communications, and it could be surrounded by various 
units: one could assess the utilization of research 4 ndings conducted under 
the auspices of the Cooperation, another could coordinate international 
external relations, and another could evaluate prepared documents (guide-
lines and reports) in terms of inM uence and value.
Cooperation among the Arctic states was established in 1991, and 
advanced through several reforms from 1996 to the present. These changes 
have brought the Cooperation closer to institutional status. However, it still 
faces certain challenges within its present capacity and has so far been una-
ble to deal effectively with the consequences of rapid climate change in the 
Arctic. Its timely reform is warranted. Such a reform would allow the Arctic 
states to combat the impacts of climate change in the Arctic as well as play 
an effective role in limiting global climate change. In fact, there is not much 
time left.
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ABSTRACT. The Northern Forum has been in existence for more than two decades. The cooperative initiatives
implement through the forum allow sub-national governments from different parts of the world to improve the quality
of life of northern inhabitants and to support their sustainable development. Over time, the forum has established a clear
structure with self-created rules and guidelines. However, its legal status is somewhat ambiguous: it has neither fulfilled
the essential criteria of an international organisation nor that of an intergovernmental cooperative body. Nevertheless,
these shortcomings are not immense obstacles to the forum’s ability to serve the well being of residents of the northern
regions. The forum has granted membership to business organisations, as well as to sub-national governments, which
is an innovative concept in international cooperation. This article examines the evolution, administrative system, and
legal status of the forum along with its contribution to the development of international law. The article concludes with
observations on how this unique international regional co-operation forum could be characterised under international
law and whether it has any influence in creating new norms in international administrative and environmental law.
Introduction
The Northern Forum (hereinafter the forum) is a unique
international cooperation body that operates at a sub-
national level. Formally established in1991, it aims to im-
prove the quality of life of peoples living in the north and
to support their sustainable development. Its membership
consists of sub-national governments (that is, regional,
sub-regional and municipal) from three continents (Asia,
Europe and North America) although it is registered as
a non-profit corporation under the domestic law of the
United States. The forum describes itself as an interna-
tional organisation even though its founding document is
not an international treaty and nor is it covered by the
law of international organisations as articulated in public
international law. It operates on the basis of internally
defined resolutions and bylaws and maintains relation-
ships with other relevant international organisations. Its
financial affairs are governed by U.S. national and state
of Alaska laws.
Thirteen sub-national governors, in their official ca-
pacity, from eight states (Norway, Mongolia, United
States, Soviet Union, Finland, Canada, Japan and China)
established the forum, under the Alaska Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act in November 1991 for ‘charitable, scientific,
literary and educational purposes’ (NF 1991a: article
iii). Subsequently, it has accepted new members and has
established a clear functional structure. However, its legal
status under international law remains ambiguous: the
constituent instrument is not a treaty, thus it is clear
that it is not an international organisation. Nonetheless,
the forum’s creators were mainly representatives from
regional governments (not national-level state represent-
atives), which means that the forum is not an intergov-
ernmental cooperative body. It allows business organisa-
tions to hold membership alongside sub-national govern-
ments and this is an innovative concept in international
cooperation.
The forum has been studied very little despite being in
existence for two decades. The only other articles appear
to be a short description (Langlais 2000: 23–28) and an
even briefer description by the author (Hasanat 2007: 23–
25). For this reason, it is important to have a closer look
at its structures and functions. This legally-oriented study
raises several questions. Does the forum hold a clear legal
status under international law? What type of obligations
does the forum create for participating entities? Does
the forum pose any challenges to classical international
law? Has the forum created any new norms in modern
international law? The answers to these questions will
be of interest and benefit to northerners and the global
community alike.
This article explores these questions and searches for
their answers rather than offering a critical view of the
forum’s performance, successes or failures. Since there
are no general accounts in the academic literature, it is
useful to examine the evolution, structure and functions
of this unique form of international co-operation without
comparing it to parallel developments of other northern
and Arctic international co-operation forums.
The article consists of eight parts. Following brief
reviews of its historical background, structure and opera-
tional systems, this article explores legal elements within
the forum itself, including its status and the challenges
such an entity poses in international law as well as an
assessment of the influence the forum offers for the
creation of new norms in international law.
History of the Northern Forum
The genesis of the forum dates to the 1970s, two decades
before its formal establishment. The development of a
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common platform for the regions of the north evolved
from several initiatives that led to the establishment of
a not-for-profit, membership-supported international or-
ganisation (Langlais 2000: 23). The structure and focus of
the current activities of the forum emerged from a series
of four major conferences. These meetings culminated in
the official establishment of the body in 1991.
Early meetings of the International Conference on
Human Environment in Northern Regions
The seed of the forum was sown in 1974 when the
Governor of Hokkaido, Japan organised an international
conference on the human environment in northern region
in Sapporo. Representatives from 15 provincial and re-
gional governments in North America and three Scand-
inavian capital cities attended the inaugural meeting of
what was to become the Northern Forum. The conference
identified common opportunities and challenges related
to environmental, climatic, or socio-economic concerns
in northern regions. The participants concluded that the
way one region addressed a particular issue could be
applied to other regions. Improved communication and
cooperation among the inhabitants of northern regions
through more frequent meetings to discuss common is-
sues would improve the standard of living of inhabitants
across the northern regions.
The second International Conference on Human En-
vironment in Northern Regions convened in Alberta,
Canada in 1979 with representatives from 22 northern
regions. Their goal was to identify the means for improv-
ing the lifestyle of inhabitants of northern regions (NF
undated a). They realised that having an organisation to
deal with common concerns emerging from the northern
climate could benefit the entire region, although no defin-
ition of ‘northern climate’ was offered.
Cooperating in a changing world: the statement of
intent and evolution of the Northern Forum
By 1990, the world had changed and the opening of
the USSR to the outer world provided northern Russian
regions with the opportunity to join in the creation of a
‘voice of northern regions’ with the convening of the third
Conference of Northern Regions in Anchorage, Alaska
(NF undated a). The conference progressed in two stages:
i) the Governor’s summit on regional environmental co-
operation, during which governors, premiers, ministers
and chairs of northern regions or their representatives
adopted political decisions; and ii) cooperating in a chan-
ging world, four workshops organised under the auspices
of the International Business Forum with contributions
from political and business representatives.
Regional leaders agreed to move forward with in-
ternational cooperation for the development of northern
regions; the business community representatives mainly
prepared recommendations to advance cooperation. Par-
ticipants recognised that the irregular or ad hoc basis
for transboundary cooperation was not serving the needs
of inhabitants of the region and recommended the es-
tablishment of a permanent regional organisation for the
north, namely the Northern Forum (Governors’ summit
1990: clause I). The ‘statement of intent’ was adopted
by nineteen regional governors representing nine states
(Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Soviet Union,
Sweden and United States). The delegates intended that
the forum would act as a mechanism for regular interac-
tions among representatives of northern peoples; improve
the quality of local, national, and international decision
making regarding northern issues by providing a means
through which ‘northern voices’ could be heard; and
offer opportunities to exchange ideas, address common
problems, as well as plan mutually beneficial cooperative
northern regions’ initiatives (Governors’ summit 1990:
clauses I and II). Although ‘northern regions’ remained
undefined, the conference did encourage other northern-
ers to participate in this cooperative initiative.
The signatories to the statement of intent agreed to
establish the forum as a ‘permanent organization’ (clause
III (A)) with representatives from all participating regions
establishing a council (Governors’ summit 1990: clause
III (B)). The secretariat would serve as a collective voice
both regionally and internationally (Governors’ summit
1990: clause III(C)). They decided that the office of
the Governor of Alaska would provide staff services on
an interim basis which was tasked with receiving and
disseminating specific proposals regarding the terms of
reference for the forum and circulating draft bylaws for
comment and approval within six months. They also
identified issues of common concern for cooperative
activities (Governors’ Summit 1990: clause IV):
environmental assessment, monitoring and research;
infrastructure, including northern communications
and transportation systems;
northern technology and engineering;
human resources, including culture, education, and
health;
protection and cooperative management of northern
renewable resources; and
pollution prevention and clean-up.
While political leaders established the parameters for
regional cooperation at the sub-government level, the
international business forum explored issues from the
viewpoint of obstacles and opportunities to business
and economic development in the north (International
Business Forum 1990: 1). The workshops came to a
consensus on a detailed model for regional cooperation
recommendations (International Business Forum 1990:
1–4) under three broad categories:
1) Natural resources development, fisheries, and
appropriate northern technology (for example
development of model technology transfer and
communication systems and regional demon-
stration projects; targeting small business, tour-
ism, manufacturing and international trade
initiatives; natural resource conservation; devel-
opment of fishery management measures for the
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Bering Sea; facilitating fisheries industry innov-
ation in processing, species utilization, market-
ing, and waste products utilization; international
fisheries research)
2) Northern markets, financing and tourism (for ex-
ample sources of and access to capital, creation
of an international fund for economic develop-
ment, inventory and coordination of economic
development institutions, coordinated efforts to
dispel myths of the north that hinder investment,
enhanced support for regional advocacy and im-
plementation of measures)
3) Communications and transportation (for ex-
ample enhanced multilateral cooperation in tele-
communications and air and sea routes)
The adoption of the statement of intent galvanized
cooperation and facilitated communication among par-
ticipant regions, which led to the May 1991 Northern
Forum conference. The participants to this conference ad-
opted the Northern Forum agreement (NF 1991d), which
established the functional bodies and rules governing
the forum. Most of these bodies were established on an
interim basis and were later transformed into permanent
units.
A draft charter for the forum, together with bylaws
and draft policies excerpted from the statement of in-
tention, served as the basis for discussion. Participants
agreed to nominate/elect a board of directors who would
be tasked with preparing a final set of bylaws, rules, and
regulations, which then would be confirmed by the gen-
eral body (NF 1991c: 38) comprised of regional leaders
(NF 1991c: 28). They decided to register the forum as a
not-for-profit organisation in order to be affiliated with
the United Nations (NF 1991c: 32).
Participants raised several questions concerning the
funding of the forum (NF 1991c: 22). How would one
region finance a selected project that had priority and one
that benefits other regions? Who would provide the fund-
ing for the forum, that is, federal or local governments? In
the end, they agreed to two types of projects: those funded
by all members that demonstrated the regional capacity of
the forum at the international level, and regional projects
funded by interested parties that met the goals of the
forum and reported to it (NF 1991c: 33). At that stage,
some participants were concerned about the limits of their
authority to give consent to an international cooperative
initiative such as the forum (NF 1991c: 31).
Understanding was reached on certain words used in
the draft charter. They used the word ‘local’ to avoid
confusion with terms articulated in the national consti-
tution of a state and a lower case ‘g’ when referring
to governors. During the debate they did not find it as
critical as if it were involved in court (NF 1991c: 79–
80). Yet, some participants had the idea that northern
provinces and Arctic provinces are the same since the
definition of ‘north’ remained unresolved at this meeting.
Clarification was needed on the extent to which a sub-
regional entity such as a province, as a member in the
forum, could support a forum statement that was different
from its national government view (NF 1991c: 65).
The conference concluded with the adoption of the
Northern Forum Agreement (NF 1991d), which included,
inter alia, provisions for an interim organising committee
(Board of Directors) consisting of one representative
from each of the eight participating nations. The main
tasks of the Board were to review and revise bylaws,
charters and principles used by the Northern Forum and
its secretariat; to determine budget and fee structures
for the members, to define ‘northern regions’, to clarify
membership rules, to make up the permanent Board of
Directors, and to review and revise proposals for the
process of selecting priority projects (NF 1991d: section
4). The office of the Governor of Alaska was to develop
a proposal for the process of selecting priority projects
to be submitted to the board for review and comment
(NF 1991d: section 5). The signatories of the Northern
Forum Agreement agreed that all documents prepared by
the interim board would be reviewed by the founding
meeting of the forum. The founding meeting would
consist of governors from all participating regions and
would take the necessary steps to establish the forum
formally and a timetable for that meeting was established
(NF 1991d: section 6).
The founding meeting of the Northern Forum
The leaders officially adopted the charter in the founding
meeting of the forum (NF 1991e) and registered articles
of incorporation before a notary public in the state of
Alaska in 1991. The participants at the founding meeting
agreed that, in addition to their regular interactions, the
forum would act as a means for cooperation, continuing
consultation and exchange of concerns among the north-
ern leaders (NF 1991b: preamble).
At subsequent regular meetings of the forum, regional
leaders have adopted a series of declarations concerning
principles and priorities for forum activities (NF 2008a:
section 2.6(1)). The 1993 Tromsø declaration (NF 1993c)
set out the goals and plans of the forum, concerning, inter
alia, sustainable development strategies following on
Agenda 21 (United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development 1992) and the Brundtland Commission
Report (UNGA 1987). In 1995, the forum provided
guidelines and goals for the secretariat and member
regions, enhanced the stated principles, and undertook
a self-evaluation of its progress over the previous five
years (NF 1995: preamble and section 2.B). In the 1997
Yakutsk declaration, leaders expressed their commitment
to expansion of regional interaction and their optimism
about the prospects of further cooperation in enhancing
the role of the Arctic and the north in the international
community (NF 1997: section 1).
The Lapland declaration (NF 1999: commitment of
current activities) established a framework with spe-
cified time limits for results from priority projects and
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development of a viable long term financial strategy. This
defined the forum’s mission as follows:
To improve the quality of life of Northern peoples
by providing Northern regional leaders a means to
share their knowledge and experience in address-
ing common challenges; and To support sustainable
development and the implementation of cooperative
socio-economic initiatives among Northern regions
and through international fora [original emphasis]
(NF 1999).
The 2001 Alberta declaration (NF 2001a) recognised
the need to advance northern economies, to improve the
socio-economic capacity of the northern regions, and to
enhance in a sustainable manner the quality of life in
northern regions, in particular that of indigenous peoples.
It also committed members to enhance the profile and
operations of the forum and to continue to make it
a multilateral voice for the northern regions. In 2003,
the St. Petersburg declaration (NF 2003b) focused on
the northern sea route as the single most important
infrastructure priority in the northern regions and recog-
nised the responsibility of members in protecting the
Arctic environment, advancing indigenous participation
in northern economies, the sustainable use of natural
resources, maintaining and enhancing unique cultures in
the northern regions, and promoting, as a priority, the
creative potential of indigenous peoples.
The northern leaders noted with appreciation in 2005
the progress on priority projects and established part-
nerships with other circumpolar and global international
organisations and the national governments of the north
(NF 2005: background). They expressed their intention of
enhancing the forum’s partnership with the Arctic Coun-
cil and other international organisations (for example the
Barents Regional Council, the Network of Regional Gov-
ernments for Sustainable Development, Nordic Council,
Arctic Parliamentarians, and the United Nations) by
identifying additional cooperative measures. The north-
ern regional governments committed themselves to ex-
pand the forum’s work in research and cooperation in
climate change adaptation and to continue efforts to
promote conservation of nature and ecologically sensitive
development (NF 2005: background).
By 2007 northern leaders were able to demonstrate
their progress in health care and education, expanded
international cooperation regarding northern issues, and
enhanced cooperation with the business community (NF
2007: B.1). They acknowledged the creation of the Busi-
ness Support Services programme and praised mem-
bers for their commitment to strengthening cooperation
between regional governments and the business com-
munity (NF 2007: B.5). The declaration noted the suc-
cess of projects enhancing quality of life in three major
categories:
health care (for example telemedicine, infectious dis-
ease control, and treatment of substance abuse) educa-
tion, including promotion of international understand-
ing culture (for example support of performances
and efforts to preserve unique northern cultures) (NF
2007: E.1)
Scientific cooperation under the auspices of the forum
has focused on expanding knowledge about the northern
environment and protection of life and property, in par-
ticular the impacts of, and adaptation to, climate change.
The declaration also called for members to explore part-
nerships for circumpolar monitoring (NF 2007: E.2).
The leaders committed themselves to organise yearly
summits of ministers, including those from environment,
education, health and economic development, to enhance
cooperation between the member regions (NF 2007: E.2);
to extend partnerships to relevant international organisa-
tions or UN agencies, and to take part more efficiently in
the activities of the Arctic Council and the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (United Nations
1992), and to implement a public relations campaign
to enhance awareness of northern and Arctic issues and
strengthen the voice of northern regions (NF 2007: E.2).
In the 2009 Whitehorse declaration, northern leaders
recognized the impacts of global financial crisis on the
regions and agreed to focus its projects and programmes
on this issue (NF 2009c: D.1). They acknowledged the
enormous benefits of bilateral and multilateral relations
among regional governments from both a northern and
global perspective. They emphasised the need for the
review of the forum’s strategic plan to focus on im-
plementation of new projects and initiatives rather than
a review of its mission or overall goals and objectives
(NF 2009c: D.2). They recommended coordination of
business summits and meetings on the current situation
in northern economies (for example decreasing of rural
population, lack of employment); innovation and ex-
pansion of green industries as alternative energy source
and climate change mitigation and adaptation actions; a
circumpolar regional pact aimed at addressing economic
growth and advancing indigenous participation in north-
ern economies (NF 2009c: D.3).
The forum will celebrate its twentieth anniversary in
2011 at its next biennial meeting in Korea where northern
leaders will address future challenges faced by the north.
Structure of the forum
The forum comprises entities responsible for internal de-
cision making purposes as well as overall policy making.
The composition of these entities is based on a two-
tiered/level membership system that has emerged over
the past 20 years. After a review of the membership
categories, each of the governing entities of the forum
will be examined in turn.
Membership in the Northern Forum
Under the charter (NF 1991b: article VII), members must
satisfy the requirements set forth in Article III of the
bylaws, which provide for the granting of membership
to regional governments (membership I) and business
partners (membership II).
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The interested governments of the northern regions
are eligible for membership. However, it was somewhat
unclear to how to appraise whether a region had the
ability to become a member until the forum defined
‘northern regions’. Participants to the third Northern
Regions Conference in 1990 (NF undated a) engaged in a
long discussion about the selection criteria for defining a
region as the basis of forum membership (NF 1991c: 40).
To this end, they defined northern regions and member-
ship selection on the basis of the following criteria:
Harsh climate and vulnerable ecosystems;
Small population, diverse and strong indigenous cul-
tures;
Economy based primarily upon extraction of natural
resources and outsourcing of all goods;
Limited internal investment capital, high operating
costs;
Limited infrastructure, mostly oriented north-south;
and
Limited influence on national government and mul-
tinational corporate decision making (NF 2008b:
section 3.2).
Clearly other regions share similar climatic conditions
and fulfill these criteria but they are not members of
the forum (for example some parts of Nepal, India,
Pakistan or South America), nor have they applied for
membership. The forum has not invited them to join and
has not sought to extend its areas beyond the northern
hemisphere.
The rules of procedure determine the rights of mem-
ber regions (membership I). A member is entitled
To attend all meetings and sponsored events of the
forum;
To participate in project working groups, conduct and
host project activities as agreed to by members;
To receive various publications of the forum;
To receive information from the secretariat and asso-
ciate secretariats on projects and issues of concern to
particular members;
To participate in open meetings and events of the
United Nations (UN) as part of the forum’s official
delegation;
To participate in the Arctic Council’s (AC) projects
and activities as an observer. Attend AC meetings as
part of the forum’s official delegation;
To vote in creating and approving forum policy
statements, bylaws amendments, supporting priority
projects and taking any and all other actions necessary
to operate the forum (NF 2008b: section 3.2).
Over the years, new members have joined and some
have left. The forum has adopted a flexible approach to
withdrawal (NF 2008a). However, a member region has
to pay its regular annual fee which the forum has fixed at
15,000 US dollars for a region of 100,000 population or
more; in case of smaller population it is 5,000 US dollars
although the BOG may change the amount in both cases
on a biennial basis (NF 2008b: section 3.4). A member
region may manage the fee from its local resources or
ask (full or partly) its national government as a part of
the regular allocation within its annual budget.
The board of governors may terminate the member-
ship of an inactive member (that is in cases of non-
payment of dues and of not contributing to cooperative
initiatives) upon notification, with an option to resume
membership upon payment of membership arrears (NF
2008b: section 3.6). Several founding members have
withdrawn from the forum. In 2002, the forum adopted its
current streamlined classes of memberships (NF 2002b):
i) full regional government member (including Russian
federal cities, and municipal governments where no re-
gional structure exists); and ii) business partners (that is
businesses, chambers of commerce, NGOs, and others
with an interest to work in cooperation with the forum
to achieve its goals).
At present, the membership I category comprises
Nunavut and Yukon Territories and Quebec Province
(Canada); Heilongjiang Province (China); City of Ak-
ureyri (Iceland); Hokkaido Prefecture (Japan); Gangwon
Province (Republic of Korea); Chukotka Autonomous
Okrug, Khanty Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, Komi Re-
public, Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Vologda and Yamal-
Nenets Autonomous Okrug (Russian Federation); and the
state of Alaska (United States) (NF undated c). In addi-
tion to these members, the Province of Lapland (Finland),
which had been continuing with the forum membership
since the beginning up to 2010, is now somewhat am-
biguous – neither has Lapland withdrawn the forum’s
membership nor the forum has terminated/suspended
the membership. In fact, this has been resulted from
Finnish interior regional administrative reform which
has abolished the provincial government of Lapland.
During this transitional period the everyday functions of
the former government are currently taken care through
three authorities (Regional State Administrative Agen-
cies; Centres for Economic Development, Transport and
the Environment; and the Regional Council of Lapland)
as an interim basis. However, none of these three has
taken up the forum membership to this date.
Membership II status is granted mainly to business
partners with a significant role in the northern economy.
Business partners include companies and associations
such as chambers of commerce. Granting membership to
business entities is a unique characteristic of the forum
and an innovative idea in international cooperation. The
first Northern Business Conference was held in 1999 in
conjunction with the forum’s fourth general assembly
(NF 1999). Subsequently, the forum has hosted regular
trade and business summits during its biennial meetings,
a productive way for the regions to expose business and
trade potential to each other. Like membership I, the
forum has introduced annual dues (subject to change
by the BOG) for its business partners which are based
on three different categories: small business membership
(50 employees or fewer) dues as ascertained 1,000 US
dollars; while, for medium business (employees from 51
to 99) and northern forum sponsor (100 employees or
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more) the amounts are 5,000 US dollar and 10,000 US
dollar respectively (NF 2008b: section 3.4).
At the present there are 22 business partners from
four countries: they are Ded Moroz Tourism Company,
EPL Diamond, Generations Fund of Khanty-Mansiysk,
Khanty-Mansiysk Bank OSC, International Women’s
Expeditions, Makarov Clean Water JV, JSC Prognoz,
Promtechnologya-Arktika, Tispa Diamond (Russia) Ltd.,
Uralsvyazinform OJSC, Yugoria State Insurance Com-
pany, Yugoria State Television & Radio Company of
Kmao, Yugra Timber Holding, and Yugraavia Khanty-
Mansiysk Airport from Russian Federation; Alaska Nat-
ive Heritage Center, Alaska Sealife Center, Denali Com-
mission, GIT Satellite LLC, and World Trade Center of
Alaska from the USA; Ferguson Simek Clark Interna-
tional, and Rockford Lang International Consulting Inc.
(RLICI) from Canada; and Kometos Oy from Finland
(NF undated d).
Business partners are entitled to attend all the open
meetings of the forum (NF 2008b: section 3.3). This
provides them with the opportunity to meet regional
government officials to discuss business and trade chal-
lenges and opportunities. They have the right to access
the forum’s databases, publications, and other resources,
as well as to use the office of the forum secretariat when
in Anchorage in conducting their business (NF 2008b:
section 3.3). The idea of inclusion business groups in the
forum serves the mutual interests of business community
(expansion of business, getting relevant information, sec-
retarial support, tax or visa related assistance etc) and
local residents (job opportunities, economic development
in the remote areas etc).
The membership rules have been amended over the
years. For example, to meet functional requirements,
an entity granted category II membership may change
its status to category I. Initially, membership II status
was extended to associations of municipalities in the
absence of regional government level memberships. This
was expanded to single municipalities when the forum
amended its bylaws in order to grant membership to the
municipality of Akureyri, Iceland, in 2001 (NF 2001b).
In 2002, the City of Akureyri was granted the status of
membership I (member region) (NF 2002a).
Initially, the forum had two additional membership
levels, associate and advocate, both of which were non-
voting but entitled to attend the general assembly, board
of directors and regional coordinators meetings (NF
1993b). Associate membership was meant for business
and corporate institutions and advocate membership for
individuals, non-profit organisations, or NGOs with a
demonstrated interest in relevant northern issues (NF
1996a). However, the forum did not use these member-
ship categories.
Organisational structure of the Northern Forum
The forum comprises three primary decision making bod-
ies: the Board of Governors, the Executive Committee
and the Regional Coordinators Committee. A permanent
secretariat manages day-to-day business. Its primary role
is to provide continuing oversight, supervision and guid-
ance to the executive director, the head of the secretariat
(see below), concerning fiscal or policy matters of the
secretariat, and other activities of the forum. Additional
support is provided by the Northern Forum Advisory
Council. The role of each of these operational entities is
discussed in turn below.
Initially, the Board of Directors was the decision
making body. In 2001, the forum changed the name to the
Board of Governors (BOG) to reflect its high profile more
accurately (NF 2001d). The BOG includes all member
regions and exercises all the powers and authority granted
by their national laws subject to any restrictions imposed
by the forum’s articles of incorporation and bylaws (NF
2008a: sections 4.1–4.2). Generally, the forum expects
that the seat of each region be held by the top executive
official of the region (for example governor, premier or
chair) although plenary power may be delegated (NF
2008a: section 4.2). Usually, each governor serves a four
year term on the BOG. If the status of the governor
as senior government official changes, he/she shall be
deemed to have resigned and his/her successor in the
member region will serve out the remainder of the term
until the next general assembly (NF 2008b: section 4.2).
In addition to general governance, financial and public re-
lations responsibilities, the BOG establishes and reviews
strategic directions and sets institutional priorities (NF
2008b: section 4.1).
The General Assembly of the BOG (GA) includes all
fully recognised members together with associate entities
and business partners (NF 2008b: section 4.5). A GA is
held every other year (NF 1991b: section 1.01). It can
elect a seven person executive committee to represent
all members between the GA meetings. An informal but
structured meeting of the governors (or the senior exec-
utive officials), the governors summit, is a component of
the GA (NF 2008b: section 4.5(3). Heads of the regions
discuss policy issues and other strategic planning matters
of concern. This informality is enhanced by the strict
provision that only one staff member can accompany a
governor during the summit (NF 2008b: section 4.5(3).
The BOG selects an executive committee (EXCOM)
consisting of five members, one chair and four vice-
chairs, representing each of the five regions (that is North
America, Northern Europe excluding Russia, Northwest
Russia, Northeast Russia, and Northern Asia excluding
Russia) (NF 2008a: section 6.1).
The current EXCOM is an anomaly in that two co-
chairs from North America (Nunavut and Yukon regions
of Canada) were selected (NF 2009a). The EXCOM is to
meet at least once every calendar year (NF 2008b: section
6.1). Its primary role is to provide continuing oversight,
supervision, and guidance to the executive director con-
cerning fiscal and policy matters of the secretariat, and
other activities of the forum. It acts on behalf of the BOG
to address issues requiring immediate attention that arise
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during interim periods between regular board meetings,
including authorisation of changes in expenditures that
affect the approved budget of the forum.
The Regional Coordinators Committee (RCC) is gen-
erally responsible for the implementation of forum de-
clarations, work plans, projects and other activities dir-
ected by the BOG (NF 2008b: section 6.2). Delegates
are chosen by each member of the BOG and a regional
coordinator nominated by the chair region of the forum
presides over the RCC (NF 2008a: section 6.2). The RCC
provides recommendations to the BOG or the EXCOM
on the work and performance of the secretariat and of the
executive director and guidance to the latter concerning
issues that might be brought before the EXCOM and/or
the BOG.
Prior to 2006, the RCC met in alternate years; since
then it has convened yearly in person or through telecom-
munications (as was the case in 2009). The established
custom and practice is that an RCC meeting is convened
roughly three months before each BOG meeting because
its proposals need to be approved by the BOG (NF 2008b:
section 6.2).
Since its inception, the main secretariat has been loc-
ated in Anchorage, Alaska; a satellite office is located in
Moscow, Russia. The secretariat is headed by an execut-
ive director chosen by the BOG and serves as the presid-
ent of the forum. The main tasks of the secretariat are ad-
ministering daily operations of the forum, including plan-
ning and facilitation of the biennial GA and other exec-
utive level meetings, fund raising, information exchange
and dissemination, and project coordination (NF 2008b:
section 1.3). There are also other staff tasked for different
administrative or public relations activities including pro-
ject management specialists and regional representatives
from member regions (NF undated b). The deputy dir-
ector (NF 2008b: section 5.8) and secretary/treasurer (NF
2008b: section 5.9) are examples. The deputy director
exercises the power and functions of the executive dir-
ector in the absence of or on the request of the executive
director; and the BOG may keep this position vacant
as desired (NF 2008b: section 5.8). Then, the secret-
ary/treasurer is tasked for maintaining financial matters
including preparing a biennial audit that contains all the
income and expenses to be submitted to the EXCOM and
BOG (NF 2008b: section 5.9). In addition to this biennial
report, the duties of secretary/treasurer and/or the exec-
utive director also include the preparation for the BOG,
EXCOM, RCC of an annual financial report that includes
current financial situation (membership dues, payments)
on basis of which the EXCOM and RCC approve the
forum’s annual budget (with necessary changes in ex-
penditure or fundraising efforts) (NF 2008b: section 8.2).
Established under the rules of procedure (NF 2008b:
section 6.3) and the bylaws (NF 2008a: section 6.3), the
Northern Forum Advisory Council comprises past chairs
of the forum. Established at the fifth biennial GA in
2001 (NF 2001c), the advisory council provides strategic
direction to the BOG and EXCOM, helps develop a
long term vision, facilitates the forum’s financial sta-
bility, and other functions as defined by the BOG (NF
2008a: section 6.3 and NF 2001c). The council is also
expected to promote the forum in the inter-regional and
international arenas (NF 2008a: section 6.3). Ironically,
although the forum is prepared to accept the vision,
persistence and wisdom of this group of experts with
real knowledge and practical experience in meeting the
needs and expectations of northern peoples, it does not
assume responsibility for the costs associated with their
participation (NF 2001c).
Operational systems of the Northern Forum
The operations of the forum, that is, its activities in
support of its goals, are undertaken through various
prioritised projects. The rules of procedure suggest es-
tablishing a working group for each priority project
composed of the chair and project participants from
regions participating in that project. The chair is chosen
by the members of the working group for the purposes of
planning, implementation, and reporting: each working
group works closely with the secretariat and the RCC
to meet annual reporting and financial requirements; a
working group is independent and can seek assistance
from special advisors, experts or observers and prepare
its own meeting schedule and project implementation
timeline (NF 2008b: section 7.2).
The statement of intent established the first working
group, which had the task of preparing the list of priorities
for action emanating from the governors’ summit (Gov-
ernors’ Summit 1990: clause III (F)). Working groups
established to date include those concerned with brown
bears, flood management, healthy lifestyles, telemedi-
cine, infectious diseases surveillance (with the Arctic
Council), and the Association of Northern Zoos. Some
working groups are well structured (for example the
brown bear working group) with long time members who
work together continuously. Others are less formal, and,
at most, meet once a year. However, for a project to be
approved by the BOG, there has to be a group of people
working on it; a project cannot be something proposed by
an individual with the hope that other regions will follow,
as it has been too often the case in the past (N. Novik, per-
sonal communication, 19 January 2011). Some working
groups, such as the northern tourism working group, are
inactive, possibly because the regional coordinators have
no interest in their subject matter or because they do not
know how to find people to participate in the working
group (N. Novik, personal communication, 19 January
2011). However, there is the possibility that such working
groups could be reactivated.
Approving priority projects requires consensus agree-
ment among members present at the GA (NF 1991b:
article X(1.01)). This is evidence of the importance
accorded each member regarding development projects.
Clause V of the 1990 statement of intent (Governors’
Summit 1990) sets out specific areas for forum activities:
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Joint efforts to establish communication networks
among northern peoples, with special emphasis on
television;
Shared monitoring of atmospheric pollution (for
example nitrogen and sulphur oxides);
Joint research on oil pollution in northern seas;
Interaction among the peoples of the north;
Opportunities to open the northern sea route to
international shipping;
Action to ensure that best available environmental
technology is employed and properly financed;
Joint research on hazardous waste disposal and the
safe clean up of contaminants;
International dissemination of knowledge about the
special situation of northern hunting societies;
Collaboration among the northern regions on oil spill
prevention and response;
Joint efforts to protect the cultures of northern
peoples;
Improvement of northern and Arctic environmental
monitoring and creation of regional data systems for
ecological and meteorological influences on northern
regions; and
Monitoring of northern peoples’ adaptation to
industrial development.
In practice, the forum has introduced number of
programme areas that cut across issues and specific
themes. For instance, society and culture programmes can
deal with healthy lifestyle, telemedicine, and infectious
diseases; a sustainable development programme could
deal with northern tourism, rural development, northern
building and technologies.
Legal elements in the Northern Forum
The leaders of the northern regions have created legal
tools to govern the internal operations of the forum as
well as its external relations. However, it is difficult to
determine the legal authority of these instruments under
international law and the extent to which they create
legally binding obligations on forum members. These
include each of the forum operating instruments (that is
bylaws and rules of procedure) and founding instruments
(that is statement of intent, Northern Forum agreement,
articles of incorporation, and charter (Governors’ Sum-
mit 1990; NF 1991d, 1991a, 1991b)), as well as more
broadly-based instruments such as declarations and res-
olutions, as well as the Rovaniemi code of conduct (NF
1994a).
The bylaws and rules of procedure for the legal basis
for operation rules to meet the objectives set out in the
Northern Forum charter (NF 1991b: article XIII (1.00);
NF 2008a: section 2.4; NF 2009b). The rules of procedure
expand the provisions in the bylaws and set out the
functional management methods of the organisation on
a day-to-day basis (NF 2009b).
The statement of intent (Governors’ Summit 1990),
signed in September 1990 by nineteen governors of
northern regions, supporting the establishment of a
permanent entity (NF 1991a: article II (9.00)), could be
seen as a milestone document. The leaders agreed to
some commitments in principle with clear guidelines that
could be loosely compared to fundamental principles set
out in the constitution of a modern state (Governors’
Summit 1990; preamble).
This instrument identifies common characteristics in
the northern regions, in particular environmental pro-
tection, economic well being, and the appropriate role
of regional government in decision making. It describes
regional priorities for northern region policy makers,
namely,
Coordination and cooperation of the management of
migratory species of fish, waterfowl and marine and
terrestrial mammals,
Transboundary air and water pollution,
Maintaining the unique culture, economy and live-
lihood of indigenous peoples living in the remote
regions in the north,
Managing shared natural resources and ecosystems
(Governors’ Summit 1990: preamble).
The statement of intent was an agreement (in prin-
ciple) to establish the forum as a mechanism for regular
interaction among northern leaders in their official capa-
city as representatives of northern publics to deal with
such issues (Governors’ Summit 1990: article I).
Following the adoption of the agreement in 1991 (NF
1991d), the structural components of the forum, and their
functional parameters, were put in place, namely the
GA, permanent secretariat, and the Board of Directors,
subsequently BOG. In addition, the agreement provided
the basis for operational instruments and procedures, for
example, the bylaws and charter as well as the convening
of the founding meeting to establish the forum formally.
The consensus demonstrated in the agreement is evidence
of the strong unity among the governors to work together
on northern issues of common concern and to adopt
obligatory provisions to undertake these activities.
The forum articles of incorporation (NF 1991a) de-
scribe it as a non-profit corporation and were adopted on
8 November 1991 and registered before judicial authority
in Alaska. However, the articles do not clarify whether
the forum is an international forum of sub-national gov-
ernments in the northern region.
The purposes of the forum, as described in the art-
icles, are for the charitable, scientific, literary and educa-
tional purposes within the meaning of specific provisions
of U.S. national law (United States 1986: section 501(C)
(3)), including convening of conferences (NF 1991a:
article III). However, the instrument does not define the
geographic scope of the forum. The incorporators, rep-
resentatives from northern regions, assumed the role in a
personal, not official, capacity, and established the Board
of Directors. The articles include provisions to protect
directors from assuming liability for claims against the
forum (NF 1991a: articles VIII-X).
The charter (NF 1991b), in the model of a treaty
with a preamble and articles, sets out the purposes,
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principles, powers and functions of the forum. It calls on
sub-national governments (states, provinces, territories,
counties, prefectures and autonomous regions) to address
common challenges faced by the inhabitants of the re-
gions, in particular economic development and protec-
tion of natural environment and traditional cultures of
indigenous peoples (NF 1991b: preamble). The purposes
establish its advisory character, for example, ‘to propose
a framework for specific action in the resolution of
problems addressed by the organization’ and ‘to act as an
advisory body to form official statements of position with
respect to issues of northern concern’ (NF 1991b: article
III (1.03–1.04)). Its functional character is established
in provisions such as the call on members ‘to initiate,
coordinate, and effectuate positive changes solutions to
problems addressed by the organization’ (NF 1991b:
article III (1.05)). The advisory and functional character
established in the charter do not, however, create binding
obligations on the part of participating governments,
merely an invitation to participate in mutually benefiting
collaborative action. Thus the charter can be seen as a soft
law international instrument.
As discussed above, the forum has adopted bien-
nial declarations that set out commitments to current
activities and look to future activities, together with a
few statements on principles or areas of concern. These
declarations denote some promises publicly made by the
BOG and often include references to its international and
commercial partners. These forward looking statements
consider directions for future activities based on the spirit
of international good will and cooperation. They have
been prepared with soft approaches, using words like
‘recognise’, ‘believe’, ‘pledge to promote’, ‘support’,
‘commit to cooperate’, and so on. This type of wording
does not create any strong commitment generating legal
obligations, although it may create a political or moral
commitment on part of the regional governments.
In contrast to declarations, resolutions of the forum
are very formal in terms of decisions making. As set out
in the bylaws, ‘Resolutions are prepared for a specific is-
sue and presented by the Executive Director’ (NF 2008a:
section 2.6(3)). Resolutions are generally developed by
the regional coordinators; then reviewed by the EXCOM;
and finally approved by the BOG (NF 2008a: section
2.6(2)). Moreover, a two-thirds majority vote of the BOG
quorum is required for approval of a resolution (NF
2008a: section 2.6(3)). To date, the forum has adopted
145 resolutions concerning, inter alia, bylaws and rules
of procedure amendments, membership rules, rules con-
cerning appointment of officials, establishment of com-
mittees and other subsidiary bodies, allocation of annual
fees and other financial matters, and project approval.
The 1994 Rovaniemi code of conduct (NF 1994a) rep-
resents a further ‘soft’ measure endorsed by the forum.
The code encourages national and regional governments,
along with businesses, to contribute to the development of
the north, a region of abundant natural resources. Its main
aim is to introduce effective business policies and appro-
priate regulations that will benefit the inhabitants of the
region with respect to property rights (for example land
ownership and use issues) and environmental protection
and sustainable development (for example environmental
safety, assessing environmental liabilities and protecting
lifestyle of the communalities) (NF 1994a: Background).
However, most of the instrument is full of salutary advice.
The code seeks to ensure the rights of investors through
recommendations on ‘investment strategies’ directed to
local, regional and state level administrations, which
could be seen as promising much in terms of local
development:
To reduce uncertainties concerning the conditions
governing the rights of investors, special efforts
should be made by local, regional and state authorities
to: i. ensure the rights of investors (e.g., the ownership
and integrity of property, and the enforcement of con-
tracts); ii. stimulate and assist investment activities
through clearly defined rules and regulations (includ-
ing stable taxation policies); iii. clearly specify the
rules and guidelines regulating environmental safety,
environmental liability and the rights of local popu-
lations, including indigenous peoples, in areas under
development; and iv. take an constructive approach
towards harmonizing the above mentioned policies
with neighboring countries. (NF 1994a: section 1).
The code introduced the concept of ‘common envir-
onmental domain’ concerning the relationship between
property stewardship and ownership with the aim of pro-
tecting the region from activities that deplete or damage
environmental integrity (including water, air and land)
(NF 1994a: section 2). This concept is based on the con-
genial coexistence of people and nature, a precondition
of human life in the harsh and adverse conditions of the
north (NF 1994a: section 2; Heinämäki 2010).
The code also argues for the rights of local peoples,
primarily indigenous communities: improvement of liv-
ing conditions; respect for the cultural and traditional
values; their basic means of subsistence, and their rights
as recognised by national, regional and international
norms and rules; participating in the economic benefits
including training and educational programmes, employ-
ment and in resource development decisions; utilisation
of local indigenous knowledge to the decision making
process; adherence to the international human rights
instruments; importance of the culture and values for
their traditional relationship to resource use of land and
water, and so on (NF 1994a: section 6). It calls for
infrastructure development that takes into account ‘the
needs, values and decision-making rights of each com-
munity concerned, and [is] in harmony with the internal
development policy of the region in question’ (NF 1994a:
section 4) with a focus on environmental protection (NF
1994a: section 5).
Although the code introduces these concepts and prin-
ciples, arguing for the rights of investors, development
of local peoples and protection of the environment, it
does not create any legally binding obligations or real
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commitments on the part of forum members. Rather the
code offers guidelines that serve the goals of the forum.
The legal status of the Northern Forum
There was a long debate among the negotiators regarding
the nature of the forum during its establishment, in
particular whether it should be considered as a private or
public entity. To the surprise of some delegates, the 1991
conference decided to establish a private organisation
to encourage cooperation with government support (NF
1991c: 27). Two years later, it received the status of non-
profit corporation (NF 1993a). At the same time, the
charter introduced the forum as an ‘international organiz-
ation’ and ‘non-governmental organization’ (NF 1991b:
article II). This multidimensional identity presents a
somewhat challenging approach to scholars seeking to
determine the legal status of the forum.
The forum introduces itself as ‘corporation’ and ‘or-
ganization’, among other expressions, each of which
have a different meaning under international law (NF
2008b: section 1.1). An intergovernmental organisation
created by a treaty is a formal body with legal personality
under international law, with legal rights and obligations
and certain immunities; a corporation denotes a legal
person under national law. According to its charter, the
forum is both an international organisation and a non-
governmental organisation (NF 1991b: preamble, article
II). It defines ‘international organization’ as global orient-
ation, with a northern emphasis, and ‘non-governmental
organization’ as recognised and defined by the United
Nations (NF 1991b: article II). This complex character
may surprise some international lawyers although it does
not create any complications in terms of the forum’s
ability to serve the practical needs of the residents of
the northern regions. It is worth noting that in the last
20 years the forum has not faced any legal question in the
USA or abroad.
The forum manages its internal functions in a sys-
tematic manner that is similar to that of an international
organisation. The members follow its operating rules,
guidelines, resolutions, and other internal agreements.
The forum is very formal in convening meetings and
all meetings follow strict procedural rules (for example
notice of meetings is served in the required manner
and time). Nonetheless, the forum’s legal personality is
defined by U.S. national law, that is, the Alaska Nonprofit
Corporation Act (Alaska 2009) and Section 501 (C) (3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (United States 1986),
which is applicable to incorporated non-profit organisa-
tions, and the forum enjoys the privileges and immunities
conferred by domestic law in Alaska. The forum has
introduced necessary changes to adapt to changes in both
federal and state law. Recently, it has amended its bylaws
and the rules of procedure in order to bring the utmost
transparency to its activities, including making official
minutes of the BOG meetings and annual tax statements
publicly available (NF 2009b). Thus, the forum conducts
its affairs in accordance with the laws of the state in which
it is registered, in addition to its self-made instruments,
like a classical international organisation.
Over time, the instruments produced by the forum
have gained some authority. For instance, the acceptance
of punitive actions by the members in relation to failure
to pay annual fees and other dues (that is falling into
the inactive membership category, which includes lose of
voting rights, and financial and secretarial support) (NF
2008b: section 3.6).
Since its inception, the forum has tried to be a formal
body and has established a clear structure with robust
decision making organs (EXCOM and BOG). At the
same time, it has maintained its regional focus. For
example, since 1991 plenary meetings of the GA have
rotated between cities of member states (NF 1991c: 35).
The BOG created a permanent flag for the forum, which
provides a common regional image and integrity (NF
1994b). Personnel engaged in forum activities enjoy legal
immunity to some extent while performing official duties
(for instance, any members in BOG is not personally
liable to the forum unless any exception is made by
Alaska State or US federal laws; or no officials could
be claimed responsible for any debts of the forum (NF
2008a: section 8.6)). That is loosely comparable to the
privileges extended to employees of an international
organisation recognised under international law.
In addition to its formal rules and regulations, the
forum members have established informal internal prac-
tices, that is, those outside the written rules. For instance,
agenda items of a BOG meeting are generally set in
a RCC meeting by agreement among the regional
coordinators.
Phone or video conference attendance during face-
to-face meetings is possible if no objection is made by
another member (NF 1991b: section 1.05). Such practical
measures are both timely and realistic and encourage the
participation of vulnerable members (that is members
experiencing financial or other limitations in attending
meetings physically) in the decision making process of
the forum. These types of practices could be seen as
evidence of sub-national governments’ ability to create
regular practices; over the long term, such practices
generate customary value.
The forum has sought to encourage indigenous
peoples as active participants in northern economies (NF
2009c: D.3), to protect their traditional cultures (NF
2003b: section 3), and to take part in decision making
processes related to their community’s concerns (NF
1994a: sections 4–6). These are significant initiatives that
would recognise their right to self determination although
any special position for indigenous peoples within the
forum has not yet been proposed.
The forum cooperates with many international or-
ganisations and programmes promoting sustainable de-
velopment, environmental conservation and economic
development. These include UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO,
UNFCCC, the Arctic Council, Barents Regional Council,
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WHO) etc (NF 2009c: section D.6). The forum has
observer status at the Arctic Council and is a member
of its sustainable development working group. It was
recognized as a NGO (in early 1994) by the UN, which
allows it to take part in certain UN activities. For in-
stance, the forum is active in UNDP sponsored UN-
Regions Partnerships – Towards Carbon Neutral and Cli-
mate Change Resilient Territories – part of a multiphase
programme which objectives include to support national
governments decentralization by assisting regional and
provincial governments in developing and implementing
their own development strategies in partnership with
all stakeholders (UNDP undated). The forum has also
partnership with the Network of Regional Governments
for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD) and the Forum
of Global Associations of Regions (FOGAR). In 2007,
it concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with the UNDP (UNDP and NF 2007) and a letter of
agreement jointly with UNDP and FOGAR, establishing,
inter alia, a social communication network (UNDP, NF
and FOGAR 2007). These involvements in international
fora provide the forum with the opportunity to be a
partner in the global community and to raise regional
issues in the international arena, that is, the issues facing
the inhabitants living in northern regions.
The forum could be seen as being conservative in
terms of publicising produced documents since a large
number of documents on its website are password pro-
tected and only accessible to members. There is also
some inconsistency between documents (for example the
charter (NF 1991b) refers to article II of bylaws for
regulations relating to membership under section 1.00 of
the charter but membership was dealt in Article III of the
bylaws (NF 2008a)). Some instruments adopted through
regular procedures have not been put into practice or
repealed and remain on the books (for example the
provisions relating to associate membership and advocate
membership in resolutions 12, 41 and 42 (NF 1993b,
1996a, 1996b)). One may criticise the forum for such
mistakes, superficial documentation, or non-application
of an instrument. However, these issues do not appear to
be a dilemma for a soft-law body since they do not harm
any member or associated entity.
The lack of a treaty together with the other short-
comings mentioned above, suggest that the forum is
best characterized as a soft-law body (Hasanat 2007).
Generally, however, an important element of soft-law
cooperation is the participation by national governments,
which is absent in this case. However, the sub-national
level representatives engaged in the forum have a man-
date from the inhabitants of their respective regions,
which demonstrates indirect democratic practice within
the forum. Sub-national governments handling matters
related to issues crossing national borders, which are
usually taken care of by the national government, in
particular foreign ministries, also does not appear to
be ultra vires because in most cases either the national
government has delegated power to the sub-national au-
thority or has not objected to the practice for a long period
of time. For instance, in the 1980s, when the provincial
government of Lapland (Finland) initiated a coopera-
tion agreement with the Murmansk Oblast (Russia), the
central government of Finland exchanged a few letters
concerning how to deal with a regional government of a
foreign state. Ultimately the Lapland Province received
permission from the national government to conclude
the agreement. (H. Viranto, personal communication,
21 February 2011). Then again, national governments
have provided with support to the sub-national govern-
ments as a contribution to societal development that
serves the community interest at the regional level (for
example the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs recently
allocated funds to the Arctic Centre, a research institute
focusing on to Arctic issues, located in Rovaniemi Fin-
land, to help the ministry establish bilateral cooperative
links between Lapland and northwest Russia).
The forum seeks to strengthen this firm relationship
between national and regional governments. For instance,
the 1993 Tromsø declaration stated: ‘We believe that
national governments and regional governments should
work together to improve decision making on envir-
onmental and development issues by strengthening the
power of regional governments’ (NF 1993c: national and
regional government relationships). While the forum has
further recognised the jurisdiction of central governments
over many issues of concern (NF 1995: section 4.D),
there has also been an emphasis on providing information
on the forum and its activities to appropriate central
government to encourage closer cooperation (NF 1995:
section 4.D). Moreover, it has asked central governments
to help raise awareness of issues of concern to northern
regions and to address other relevant issues (NF 1999:
commitment to current activities of the Northern Forum).
The forum is clearly an innovative entity in in-
ternational cooperation, encompassing characteristics
of different types of entities, international organisa-
tions, NGOs, and corporations controlled under U.S.
national laws. It could be described, as a ‘not-for-
profit, membership-supported international organization’
(Langlais 2000: 23). At the same time, it strictly follows
self-made rules while also appearing to be relaxed and
less formal, characteristics which suggest its identity is
as a soft-law body. The non-participation of national
governments directly in the forum further suggest that
even a soft law characterization is too strong. Perhaps the
forum is best characterised as a hybrid soft-law body.
The Northern Forum’s impact on international law
The complex and unique characteristics of the forum
have had diverse impacts on international law. On the
one hand, it has contributed to the development of public
international law; on the other hand, it has posed a few
challenges to international law, in particular to classical
international law. The forum’s contribution to interna-
tional law is both these regards is analysed below.
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The forum’s inputs to international law
The forum has introduced new concepts as well as pro-
moting established ideas in international environmental
law. It has explained standard concepts in innovative
ways that better serve the challenges faced by the inhab-
itants of the north due to extreme geographic or climatic
situations. It has established a few customs and practiced
them since its inception. Moreover, it strictly follows
procedural formalities with respect to specific issues.
Two concepts introduced by the forum, and its in-
terpretation of another international concept, contribute
to the development of international environmental law
and in meeting these challenges: ‘northern regions’ and
‘common environmental domain’. The concept of north-
ern regions has been fashioned is such an innovative
way that it may include regions from different parts of
the world; the common environmental domain concept
offers a useful tool under international environmental
law to counter environmental degradation. Likewise it
has adopted an inclusive approach to the concept of
sustainable development (NF 1994a: section 5):
Sustainable development includes the following con-
cepts: A. Taking a long-term view which takes into
consideration the interests of future generations, the
co-existence of various industries and the health of
local populations; B. Adherence to environmental
standards which prevent pollution and the degrad-
ation of the land and resources; C. Accountability
for environmental damage under which those who
generate pollution pay for its consequences; D. Non-
renewable resource development should be accom-
plished utilizing Best Management Practices to avoid
damaging renewable resources. Reclamation of de-
veloped areas should be part of each development
plan. E. A Precautionary approach to all development
activities in the North, developing and using the best
scientific information and technology available. This
approach includes analysis of reasonably foreseeable
impacts of development [Original emphasis].
Thus, the forum has contributed to the conceptual de-
velopment of international law concerning environmental
protection of certain regions and the well-being of their
communities.
Challenges posed by the forum to international law
The UNDP and the forum concluded a memorandum
of understanding which recognises that ‘. . . partnerships
between regional governments can achieve greater results
than working at the national level . . .’ (UNDP and NF
2007: preamble). This phrase, however, opens up a sens-
itive question in international law, namely, states’ ability
to deal with global challenges, particularly where states
are the key player. The UNDP, finds regional cooperation
more effective compared to traditional intergovernmental
organisations and argues for the granting of ‘meaningful
authority’ to sub-national governments. This raises two
questions: What does ‘meaningful’ denote and ‘author-
ity’ in which context? Searching for the answers to
these questions is likely to show the basic limitations of
classical international law in handling modern challenges
posed by the expanding concept of ‘legal personality’ in
international law.
The Rovaniemi code further poses a challenge to
traditional international law by including the following
statement: ‘These guidelines are not intended to com-
promise in any way national, regional or local sover-
eignty’ (NF 1994a: section 1). This could be seen as
rethinking the concept of strict state sovereignty estab-
lished under classical international law and recognising
the concept of ‘limited sovereignty’ (Lapidoth 1992:
325–346) or ‘responsible sovereignty’ (Birnie 1992: 84).
These concepts of sovereignty were introduced as altern-
atives to ‘strict sovereignty’ in order to address emer-
ging global challenges in environmental protection and
protecting the rights of vulnerable communities (Chayes
and Chayes 1995: 271–286). In contrast, others may
hesitate to recognize the forum’s authority and would
question whether it has any power to make this type of
statement. There are, however, other similar concepts in
the scholarly literature such as ‘ecological sovereignty’
(Conca 2004: 72–79), ‘Arctic sovereignty’ (Inuit Leaders
2008), and ‘polar sovereignty’ (Jabour and Weber 2008:
27–40). The basis of these concepts is considering sov-
ereignty from the view point of ‘fact’ (that is intrinsic to
states) and ‘norm’ (that is defined by international rules)
in which norms facilitate the fact (Jackson 1990: 50–
78). However, there is much doubt about the capacity of
the forum to convince states in advancing its innovative
concepts, which a group of scholars has identified as a
major shortcoming of soft-law bodies (Levy and others
1993: 415–417).
Conclusion
The Northern Forum was established through a lengthy
process that focused on sub-national governmental co-
operation across national boundaries based on mutual
interests in the northern regions. It has built relationships
with international entities such as the Arctic Council and
the United Nations to make the voice of northerners better
heard on the global agenda. Drawing on the experience of
existing cooperative institutions, the founders established
an entity with a unique characteristic under international
law and one that has introduced new concepts and offered
innovative approaches to some existing concepts in inter-
national law.
Many of the innovations of the forum can be seen as
positive steps in advancing regional cooperation in the
north, albeit not without some caveats. It has introduced
a new concept, northern regions, by setting criteria that
seems rather ambiguous in terms of specifying geograph-
ical location compared to the definition established by
other entities such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.
Others might argue though that the forum could be seen
as being progressive in including regions from many parts
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of the world. The record of the forum in drawing attention
of a number of business organisations to the region, and
establishing relationships with international bodies and
taking part in many international projects also serves the
interest of local peoples. Further, it has considered ‘indi-
genous culture’ as one of the principal criteria in defining
the northern regions. However, non-adoption of any spe-
cial position in regard to indigenous peoples in terms of
decision making or compliance with its mandates (as is
the case in the Arctic Council) provides the impression
that the forum is not serious about integrating indigenous
peoples participating entities under its auspices.
It has sensibly adopted modern technology, together
with other innovations, in this age of globalization and
is reaping the benefits. For example, the forum had
increased member regions’ participation through the use
of teleconference technology. It makes decisions with
the support of two third majority votes rather than a
consensus approach (which is the practice of most other
soft-law entities). This development in soft-law cooper-
ation decision making reduces vulnerability to inaction
due to objections by single member. The wide range of
participants (that is both government and business), have
brought new perspectives to resolving regional problems.
The forum has participated as a partner of global devel-
opment cooperation through its relationships with many
international actors focused on raising global awareness
of northern and Arctic issues (NF 2007: section E.2).
As noted by the UNDP, sub-national level cooperation is
often more effective than national government level co-
operation in achieving many goals without compromising
the ability of national governments to work together in
other areas of mutual benefit.
The norms created by the forum also have clear
consequences and its members and business partners and
pose several challenges to classical international law. The
norms are observed as strict, flexible and optional in
terms of compliance and also generate different types
of obligations. It is thus no surprise that the school
of thought called global administrative law (GAL) has
gained prominence among international lawyers (Krisch
and Kingsbury 2006: 1–13). Its particular insight is that
the starting point is not to begin by examining the formal
status of a legal instrument but rather by analysing it
in terms of its functional attributes. If there is an in-
ternational governance regime that falls outside of the
concepts of international law, it is important to focus
on attributes such as accountability and legitimacy. The
concept of hybrid soft-law body fairly serves as work-
ing definition for the forum. However, it requires more
acceptances among international lawyers and further in-
depth research to develop its parameters as a distinct
concept under (modern) international law.
The forum holds an innovative legal status compared
to other existing international cooperative initiatives in
the Arctic. The set of self-created instruments effectively
promote regional development and warrant international
recognition. Much as Migdal has set out in his notion of
state capacity, the forum has adopted a unique approach
to penetration of civil society in northern regions and the
use of its resources for defined state purposes (Migdal
1993: 3–43). While some international lawyers will not
see any legal consequences from the adoption of certain
forum instruments (for example UNDP and NF 2007;
code of conduct (NF 1994a)), these instruments have
proved potential in the development of specific com-
munities or regions irrespective of the involvement of
states. The activities of sub-national governments within
the forum can be seen as exercising delegated power of
national governments, which have added value because
of their uninterrupted practice over a long period of time.
The forum effectively works as a complementary body to
national governments in regard to regional development
that neither violates any order of a national government
nor denies the authority of a national government. Thus,
the forum offers a unique approach to international co-
operation at a sub-national level and contributes to the
well being of present and future generations of north-
erners. The forum also offers unique insights into the
creation of new norms under international administrative
and environmental law.
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6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Features such as temperature increase, sea level rise, decreasing snow and ice 
coverage, together with extreme weather events such as acute hot or cold waves, 
flood, wildfire, tornado or tropical cyclone, drought, thunderstorm, dust storm, and 
so on are major phenomena of today’s climate change. They affect the usual natural 
characteristics of a place (e.g., the geography, seasons, flora and fauna), as well as 
impacting on many issues with respect to human livelihood (e.g., food habit, health, 
cultures and so on) and including their social and economic existence. The 
consequences of climate change manifest in a diverse way in different parts of the 
globe.  Thus, climate change appears as a major driver of global environmental 
degradation and is the key driver of Arctic change. However, the climate change 
issue is not only complex to understand but it is also difficult to deal with.1  
 
The situation in the Arctic with respect to climate change is more serious than 
experienced in other parts of the globe, since the region is much more vulnerable to 
the phenomenon and the changes that occur in the Arctic can be observed more 
clearly.2 Early summer and late winter seasons, the openness of the Arctic Ocean 
and the retreat of the permafrost layer are primarily evident in the Arctic due to 
increasing climate change which generates diverse (mainly negative) consequences 
                                                 
1 Figdor and  Cassady, (2006), p. 6. 
2 See Arctic Report Card: Update for 2010 Tracing Recent Environmental Changes, (2010). 
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on the inhabitants and the ecosystem.3 The early summer and late winter seasons 
impact upon plants and animal species and also bring new insects and diseases to the 
Arctic. These changes have created severe challenges for the governments and 
inhabitants of the Arctic and the climate change occurring in the Arctic also impacts 
on the global changes experienced by others.4  
 
A major consequence of climate change is the gradual opening of the frozen Arctic 
Ocean which has provided Arctic costal states and companies with access to natural 
resources that were once inaccessible. Open sea generates more marine traffic, 
offshore oil and gas drilling as well as other forms of mine extraction. Thus, the 
consequences pose serious concerns in terms of protecting the environment of the 
Arctic and the affect they have on the traditional livelihood of Arctic residents 
(mainly those who depend on ice and snow or arctic mammals). States from outside 
the region and other actors, are becoming more and more interested in Arctic issues 
and are involved in different activities of the Arctic Council (AC), including 
scientific research. The issue of national security has also become an issue, with 
some of the Arctic states becoming concerned as outside interests have increasing 
access to the Arctic Ocean and Arctic waters.  
 
The initiatives of the global community to mitigate climate change and address the 
negative consequences of climate change continue to increase. However, the global 
climate change regime established by the international community is full of 
uncertainties, limitations and challenges. In particular, reaching a consensus for 
                                                 
3 Recent researches show the melting of ice sheets is faster than projected. See Kerr, (2006), pp. 
1747-1750. 
4 For instance, the melting of the Greenland Ice sheet would cause a sea level raise of 23 feet 
worldwide. Oppenheimer and Alley, (2005), pp. 257-267. In contrast; further loss of ice and a 
warmer Arctic would bring colder weather to mid-latitude climates. See Arctic Report Card: Update 
for 2010 Tracing Recent Environmental Changes, (2010), p 15. 
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substantial emission control seems challenging, mainly due to uncertainty as regards 
what is going to happen after 2012 – the ending of the first commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol.5 It can be seen that states have created a few cluster 
groups to bargain for group interests, rather than individually implementing the 
scientific recommendations to combat climate change. The Arctic Council has also 
developed its own climate policy including the production of climate change science 
from global and Arctic perspectives.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the Arctic Council, as the soft-law form 
of cooperation studied in this dissertation, can tackle the vast challenges posed by 
economic globalization (short-term) and climate change (long-term); and whether it 
can be argued that they constitute an adequate response to the consequences of 
climate change in the region or should the Arctic actors establish a stronger 
governance mechanism (perhaps even one based on an international treaty), with 
which to counter the vast challenges which lie ahead. 
 
In order to answer to the two questions posed above, it is imperative to examine two 
particular issues. Firstly, given that many soft-law international co-operation forms 
have been studied within this dissertation, it is of importance to analyze the reasons 
why soft-law has emerged in international law. It is asked: what are the pros and 
cons of this sort of international co-operation and to then apply the findings to the 
Arctic perspective by examination of the inter-relationships between the three forms 
of soft-law co-operation studied in this dissertation (the AC, the cooperation in the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) and the Northern Forum (NF)). Secondly, it is 
of relevance to examine in depth the way the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection 
                                                 
5 For a detailed treatment of present climate governance see  Zelli et al.,  (2010), pp. 25-34;  Aldy 
and Stavins, ( 2009). 
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Strategy (AEPS) and the 1996 Arctic Council have both conducted their climate 
policy and law. 
 
It is noted in Chapter Three that neither the AEPS nor the Arctic Council included 
the issue of climate change as a primary concern at the times they were established. 
The issue of climate change entered into their agenda gradually and presently 
dominates the work of the Arctic Council in different ways.6  
 
During the AEPS’s inception, it set forth a principle showing respect to “the Arctic’s 
significance for and influence on the global climate”. This was the main basis of 
admission of the climate change issue into the Arctic cooperation.7 One reason of 
not including the climate change issue as priority concern within the Arctic 
cooperation at that time, was that a number of international forums had already 
started working on the depletion of the ozone layer and climate change issues.8 
However, the AEPS included climate change in the Arctic as a major threat to the 
Arctic environment,9 as well building a close working relationship with the 
initiatives of those international fora.10 The formal mandate came through the 1993 
Nuuk Ministerial Meeting when it requested Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
                                                 
6 For a detailed description, see Koivurova and Hasanat, (2009), pp. 51-75. 
7 The AEPS, (1991), sec. 2.2(iii)(c). 
8 Ibid., sec. 3. 
9 Ibid., sec. 6. It reads: “Two of the most significant threats to the present Arctic environment may 
come from climate change, induced by global warming, and the effects of stratospheric ozone 
depletion.” 
10 Ibid., sec. 6 contains: “Programs to detect and determine the causes and effects of climate change 
and ozone depletion are to a large extent being developed by other international groupings and in 
other fora. It is important for AMAP to be aware of these programs and to develop links with them 
from an Arctic perspective in order to encourage and facilitate an Arctic component in climate 
programs. Data obtained for assessing climate change will provide important inputs to the AMAP 
dataset. In turn, AMAP data will be relevant to -climate change programs in the Arctic.”[sic]. 
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Programme (AMAP) to engage in climate change research which aimed to assess 
the impact of climate change in the Arctic.11 Subsequently in 1996, the AEPS 
confirmed its support of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC),12 and requested AMAP to regularly review the integrated 
results of existing programmes dealing with climate change, with a view to 
identifying gaps in the scope of the monitoring and research conducted by those 
forums and to ensuring that specific issues related to the Arctic region are placed on 
the agenda of the appropriate international bodies.13 AMAP responded to the request 
by including the issue of climate change in its report in 1997.14 The State of the 
Arctic Environment Report- Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
prompted the Ministerial Meeting in Alta to encourage AMAP to continue the 
monitoring process and to assess the impacts of climate change on the Arctic 
environment.15 
 
Research on climate change in the Arctic intensified following the establishment of 
the Arctic Council. However, before the first Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council in 1998, the AMAP and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) 
                                                 
11 The AEPS Nuuk Report, (1993), the part: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP). 
12  Inuvik Declaration, (1996), the preamble. 
13 The AEPS Nuuk Report, (1996),  the part: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP). It includes: “Noting the existing global cooperation on climate change and stratospheric 
ozone programs, the Ministers requested AMAP to regularly review the integrated results of these 
programs with a view to identifying gaps in the scope of the monitoring and research under these fora 
and with a view to ensuring that specific issues related to the Arctic region are placed on the agenda 
of the appropriate international bodies.”  
14 Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report, (1997).  This was developed 
into the more comprehensive AMAP Assessment Report in 1998, which was presented to the first 
Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council.  
15 Alta Declaration, (1997), para. 9.    
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working groups had jointly organised a workshop on climate change.16 The 1998 
Iqaluit Ministerial Meeting expressed its appreciation of the activities of 
CAFF/AMAP in the field of climate change and their joint intention to monitor and 
assess the impacts of climate change on the Arctic ecosystem.17 
 
In the meantime, the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) had also 
initiated a number of projects focused on the impact of climate change in the Arctic 
from the mid-1990s onwards. These finally lead IASC to co-operate with CAFF, 
AMAP and permanent participants of the Arctic Council and eventually to the 
forming of the Assessment Steering Committee (ASC).18 After two workshops in 
1998 and 1999, the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) were convinced of the need to 
carry out an Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). 19  The ACIA was endorsed 
in the Barrow Ministerial Meeting which ended the US incumbent chair period, as a 
joint project of AMAP, CAFF and IASC (including permanent participants). 20  
 
The ACIA can be considered as a significant regional response to climate change. Its 
aim was to gather knowledge on climate change and ultraviolet radiation and to 
provide authentic data (using indigenous knowledge paralleled with modern science) 
                                                 
16 AMAP/CAFF Workshop on Climate Change, (1998). 
17 Iqaluit Declaration, (1998), para. 21. It comprises: “Welcome CAFF’s intention to prepare an 
overview on the status and trends in changes to ecosystems, habitats and species in the Arctic and to 
identify elements of a program to monitor circumpolar biological diversity and to assess, in 
collaboration with AMAP, the effects of climate change and UV-B radiation on Arctic ecosystems.”  
18 See  ACIA Scientific Report, (2005), p. 6. 
19 In late 1998 the Executive Committee of the IASC suggested that the IASC work with the Arctic 
Council and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and that their appropriate 
subsidiary bodies develop and maintain a Scientific Assessment of Consequences of Climate 
Variability in the Arctic Region. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), ( Implementation Plan 
Version 3.7), (2000), the part:  Preface.  See also Nilsson, (2007). 
20 Barrow Declaration, (2000), art. 3. 
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to the governments and people of the consequences of these environmental problems 
to the region.21 The ACIA was requested to evaluate and synthesise knowledge on 
climate variability and the change of increased ultraviolet radiation in the Arctic, and 
to support the policy-making processes and the work of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC). The Barrow Ministerial Meeting urged the ACIA to 
address the consequences of (especially), climate change as applied to many spheres 
of policy (the impacts on the environment, human health, social structures and 
cultures and economies) and also to include policy recommendations.22 
 
By the time of the 2002 Inari Ministerial Meeting, the work of the ACIA had 
progressed to the extent that the meeting made a point of noting its concern of 
ongoing, significant warming in most areas of the Arctic. It also recognised that the 
impacts of global climate change would have large consequences for the Arctic, and 
that the Arctic can act as an early warning indicator of climate change.23 The 
meeting specifically noted the innovative methodology used in forming the ACIA, 
namely that indigenous knowledge was used in parallel with modern science.24 It 
                                                 
21 Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, (2000), the part: Ministerial 
Roundtable Discussions. 
22 Barrow Declaration, (2000), art. 3. The Council continued with additional activities relating to 
climate change other than the ACIA. The 2000 Barrow Ministerial Meeting endorsed the Arctic 
Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic (ACAP), a programme that selected the 
depletion of ozone layer as one of its four priorities in the first phase – a problem very much 
connected to climate change (Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution in the Arctic 
(ACAP): List of Approved Activities and Proposals for Future Activities (June 2001)), Ibid., art. 2. 
Ozone and climate change are indirectly linked because both ozone-depleting gases and substitute 
gases contribute to climate change. See  Scientific Assessments of Ozone Depletion, ( Global Ozone 
Research and Monitoring Project—Report No. 52 (2010), p. XX ( the part: Influence of Stratospheric 
Ozone and ODS Changes on Climate).  
23 Inari Declaration, (2002), art.8. 
24 Ibid., art.8. 
 169 
urged for a more coordinated and integrated approach to existing activities, to 
address the challenges of the Arctic environment.25 
 
Published in 2004 the ACIA Synthesis Report26  was forwarded to the Arctic 
Council and the international science community. The report identified prevailing 
trends of climate change in the region and the implications of Arctic warming for the 
rest of the world. It also identified four sub-regions 27 on the basis of different 
natural characteristics within their respective parts of the Arctic.  The ACIA report 
included ten key findings,28 and was released just before the 2004 Reykjavik 
                                                 
25 Ibid., art. 5 
26 ACIA Synthesis Report, ( 2004); see generally ACIA Scientific Report, (2005).   
27 The regions areas follows: sub-region I- East Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Northwest Russia and adjacent seas; sub-region II- Siberia and adjacent seas; sub-region III- 
Chukotka, Alaska, Western Canadian Arctic and adjacent seas; sub-region IV- Central and Eastern 
Canadian Arctic, West Greenland, and adjacent seas. 
28  The key findings are:  
1.The Arctic climate is now warming rapidly, and much larger changes are projected; 
2.Arctic warming and its consequences have worldwide implications; 
3.Arctic vegetation zones are very likely to shift, causing wide-ranging impacts;  
4.The diversity of animal species, their ranges and distribution will change;  
5.Many coastal communities and facilities face increasing exposure to storms;  
6.Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access to resources; 
7.Thawing ground will disrupt transportation, buildings, and other infrastructures; 
8.Indigenous communities face major economic and cultural impacts; 
9.Elevated ultraviolet radiation levels will affect people, plants, and animals; 
10.Multiple influences will interact to cause increased impacts on people and ecosystems. 
ACIA Synthesis Report, (2004), pp. 10-11. 
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Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,29 on the basis of which the expectations 
for the Arctic Council to do something substantial in its policy document were 
apparent.30 The 2004 Ministerial Meeting adopted some important decisions, firstly 
of which was the recognition that there are grave risks from climate change to the 
Arctic. 
 
 The meeting also urged that the findings of ACIA be disseminated to various 
forums and that they be taken into account not only within climate change research 
but also within national and international Arctic climate policy-making, both in 
terms of mitigation and adaptation.31 The meeting issued the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment Policy Document, which recognises the authenticity of ACIA synthesis 
report as well as the need to further organise the work of the Arctic Council and its 
subsidiary bodies. 32 The policy document report includes ACIA related decisions 
from the Reykjavik Declaration as stated, and the key findings of the synthesis 
report. It also briefly describes the historical background of ACIA programme. The 
latter part of the document contains climate policy actions and the role of the Arctic 
                                                 
29 Reykjavik Declaration, (2004). 
30 For a good review of the ‘politics’ surrounding formulation of the ACIA Policy Document and its 
major shortcomings, such as its being declaratory in nature and short on specifics, see Watt-Cloutier 
et al., ( 2005), pp. 57–68. 
31Reykjavik Declaration, (2004), the part: Climate Change in the Arctic. The PAME organised a 
workshop in October 2003 which purpose was to provide a forum for exchanging information and 
ideas on drivers of change, trends in oceans management and possible circumpolar responses to 
Arctic oceans issues; where climate change was identified as a strong driver of the changes in the 
Arctic. See Workshop Report In Support of the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, (2003), p. 4. During the 
same Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting the Council endorsed the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) 
which acknowledged the Arctic region as seriously vulnerable to the consequences of climate change; 
it has wrought environmental, economic and socio-cultural changes in the region.  Arctic Council 
Arctic Marine Strategy in Plan, (2004), pp. 3–4.  According to the AMSP 2004 (PAME, 2004), 
climate change is one of the main two drivers (another is increasing economic activity) responsible 
for those changes in the Arctic. 
32 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document, (2004). See also The Arctic Council 
Policy Document on Global Warming,  (2005), pp. 256-57.  
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Council to counter the impacts of climate change. Possibly of most significance, the 
meeting acknowledged the need to further organise the work of the Arctic Council 
and its subsidiary bodies, based on the ACIA’s findings.33 The ministerial meeting 
endorsed the ACIA policy recommendations for mitigation, adaptation, research, 
monitoring and outreach with respect to climate change in the Arctic and as 
contained in the SAO Report to Ministers.34 The SAOs were directed to report on 
their progress in organising climate change work, to the AC at the 2006 Salekhard 
meeting.35 The ministerial endorsed the SAOs recommendations which included 
inter alia, to nominate a ‘focal point’ responsible for any ACIA follow up, including 
an assessment of any gaps in knowledge.36  
 
The Ministers acknowledged that the Arctic Council should respond to the ACIA 
recommendations and to further policy-oriented recommendations as developed and 
presented in the SAOs report. They also instructed the SAOs to appoint a “focal 
point” to plan for the Arctic Council’s ACIA Follow-up activities.37  To this end the 
Arctic Council Focal Point was established in 2005.  
 
At the same time, the AMAP established a Climate Expert Group, which was tasked 
to provide expert advice to the AMAP Working Group to assist its plans for future 
activities related to climate issues in the Arctic. The Group consists of two co-chairs 
                                                 
33 Reykjavik Declaration, (2004), the part: Climate Change in the Arctic.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Report of Senior Arctic Officials, ( November 2004), p. 34.. 
37 Ibid.  
 172 
who together call meetings with relevant experts in the field of climate change. 38 
The first priority of the expert group was to help shape the AMAP scientific 
response to the ACIA report, while its future activities included the planning and 
conduct of assessment activities and other activities as to be determined.39 A second 
responsibility was to provide advice for use in a larger set of Arctic Council 
activities which would be determined from time to time as appropriate.40 
 
The ACIA findings induced the Arctic Council members, permanent participants 
and observers to issue a joint statement at the first 2005 meeting of the Kyoto 
Protocol, which also served as the 11th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, to 
have a climate regime and that the IPCC take ACIA results into account in their 
future decisions.41 
 
The 2006 Salekhard Ministerial Meeting did not suggest any practical initiative to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions that would play a positive role in mitigating 
climate change, although it did reconfirm the implementation of the ACIA Policy 
Document in a general manner.42 The ministerial meeting provided a general 
                                                 
38 At the present the Climate Expert Group is co-chaired by Dr. John Walsh (University of Alaska) 
and Øystein Hov (Norwegian Meteorological Institute). There are no fixed members in the Group. 
However, the co-chairs may request distinguished climate experts if they desire to have a meeting.  
39 Summary of Meeting of AMAP Climate Expert Group,(2006). 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Statement on Climate Change in the Arctic Region, (2005). 
42 Salekhard Declaration, (2006), the part: Other. . Ibid., the part : Climate Change in the Arctic. It 
reads: “Reconfirm their commitments to the Reykjavik Declaration and to the ACIA policy 
document, adopted at the AC meeting in 2004, and that the Member States will continue their active 
efforts to implement the recommendations on mitigation, adaptation, research, monitoring and 
outreach . . . Endorse the ongoing efforts of the SAOs and the Arctic Council working groups to 
implement activities, as appropriate, to follow-up the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and 
the ACIA Policy Document, adopted by the Fourth Ministerial Meeting.” (Original emphasis) . 
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endorsement to developing Arctic expertise in the field of climate change and to 
increasing the adaptive capacity of Arctic residents, including indigenous peoples.43 
The ministers were satisfied that all the member states of the AC were parties to the 
UNFCCC.44  
 
The ministerial requested the Senior Arctic Officials to direct the Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG) to identify and share adaptation expertise 
and best practice and any possible actions in for the better adaption of Arctic 
inhabitants to climate change. They were to report on the status of this activity at the 
next ministerial meeting 45 and to make publicly available any results or lessons 
learned from this undertaking.  The significance of the Salekhard meeting (regarding 
climate change) is that it highlighted the need for further research, to conduct up-to-
date assessments and finally to report to the AC after two years at the next 
Ministerial Meeting.46    
 
The Arctic Council Chair was shifted to Norway in 2006 which identified in its chair 
plan three goals, which had as their aim, the consolidation of the climate policy of 
the Arctic Council. The first goal was to strengthen climate change research and 
monitoring, for example by developing regional climate models and scenarios to 
                                                 
43 Ibid., the part: Climate Change in the Arctic.  It states: “Request the SAOs and the Arctic Council 
working groups to continue supporting, analyzing and synthesizing Arctic climate research, including 
the gathering and compilation of indigenous and local knowledge of the effects of climate change, so 
that the exchange of expertise at the global level through the IPCC can better reflect unique Arctic 
conditions and that global decision-making can take Arctic needs into account.” (Original emphasis). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. It cites: “Request that the follow-up on the ACIA and the ACIA Policy document be based on 
the latest scientific findings and will be kept under review by the SAOs, who will report to the next 
Ministerial Meeting.” (Original emphasis). 
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identify the possible impacts on ecosystems and species distribution. It also looked 
to enhance the knowledge feedback mechanisms of Arctic climate change to the 
global climate system and to increase the overall understanding of the interacting 
impacts from climate change and other stressors. The second goal was to strengthen 
the adaptive capacities of Arctic residents, including indigenous peoples and local 
communities, and to identify the most vulnerable sectors of society. The third goal 
was to consider initiatives and measures to reduce emissions and enhance the 
removal of greenhouse gases in the region. The plan pointed out that even though 
emissions of greenhouse gases from activities in the Arctic are fairly limited in 
global terms, there are important mitigation opportunities in the region, and it 
suggested as examples, the fields of energy efficiency and renewable energy; the 
cleaner production of fossil fuels, including CO2 capture and storage; the use of new 
carbon-free and low-carbon technologies; a reduction in emissions from transport 
(including shipping); the conservation of reservoirs and the enhancement of the 
removal of carbon deposits in soil and by forests and other vegetation.  
 
In the joint chair programme for the Arctic Council (years 2006-2012), Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden identified climate change as being the top priority issue.47 The 
programme envisages that the AC will continue its efforts to provide high quality 
information on climate change that includes input from all Arctic states and peoples. 
According to the plan, the AC should maintain its special focus on the effects of 
climate change on Arctic residents and the traditional ways of life of indigenous 
peoples. it should also share experiences, e.g., the experiences of Member States in 
taking action to develop and implement the local adaptation strategies for Arctic 
areas, of introducing local measures to reduce climate gases, of their reviewing of 
                                                 
47  Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006-
2012. 
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best practices, and of developing and using renewable energy resources in the 
Arctic.48 
 
Climate change was the main agenda item of the SAO meeting in the Lofoten 
Islands, organised at the end of April 2008. At the meeting, SAO Chair, Karsten 
Klepsvik, noted that the objectives for the meeting included progress on the Snow, 
Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) project, non-CO2 drivers and 
International Polar Year (IPY) legacy proposals.49 SAOs approved the revised 
SWIPA project; 50 approved AMAP proposals to assess the influence of non-CO2 
drivers on climate change in the Arctic and paid attention to the projects dealing 
with adaptation to global warming.51 He also affirmed strong support for the Arctic 
Council’s work on Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic 
(VACCA).52 The speech given by the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) Chair to 
the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples (UNPF) to pay attention to dates 
of relevant international events when setting dates of the SAO meetings so as to they 
do not overlap each other was endorsed, with the intention that indigenous people 
may participant in the decision making and discussions on climate change in all UN 
agencies.53 It was also interesting that the World Wide  Fund for Nature (WWF) 
Arctic delivered a report to the SAO meeting, which summarized key aspects of 
Arctic science published since the ACIA was compiled. Even though this was an 
                                                 
48 Ibid., the part: Climate change. 
49 Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, (April 2008). 
50 Ibid., sec. 3.1 (Climate Change and the Cryosphere – Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the 
Arctic – SWIPA). 
51 Ibid., sec. 3.2 (Non CO2 drivers of Climate Change).  
52 Ibid., sec. 3.3 (Progress report on Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic 
(VACCA)).  
53 Ibid. 
 176 
NGO produced report, it was supported by scientific evidence.54 The assessment 
analyses relevant scientific findings of the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC and 
more recent climate science outcomes, and shows that the changes resulting from 
climate change will be much more intensive and rapid than those projected in the 
ACIA. Rather than making any formal acceptance of the report as ACIA II, the SAO 
Chair expressed appreciation of the WWFs production of its report and thanked 
them for demonstrating the importance of work the AC is undertaking.55  
 
The 2009 Tromsø Ministerial Meeting made some practical decisions with respect to 
addressing climate change in the Arctic, inter alia recognising that mitigating the 
impact of anthropogenic climate change depends mainly on substantially reducing 
the global emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.56 Recognising the urgent 
need for an effective global response to address the challenge of climate change, the 
Ministerial Meeting agreed on the active contribution of all Arctic states in reaching 
an adequate outcome at the UNFCCC 15th Conference of the Parties (CoP15) in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. It decided to report on the mass loss from the 
Greenland Ice Sheet to the COP 15 of the UNFCCC and expressed the hope that the 
full results of the Arctic Cryosphere: Snow, Water, Ice, and Permafrost in the Arctic 
project would be delivered in 2011.57 
 
The Tromsø Ministerial Meeting encouraged its members to strengthen their work 
on the adaptation to climate change (including community-level actions), and to 
                                                 
54 Arctic Climate Impact Science – An Update Since ACIA, (Norway 2008).  
55 Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, (April 2008), sec. 11.3 (Presentation by WWF).  
56  Tromsø Declaration, (2009), the part: Climate Change in the Arctic.  
57 Ibid. 
 177 
share information on effective practices. It also appreciated the initiatives of the 
indigenous peoples, since they were performing a leading role in using the best 
available traditional and scientific knowledge to help understand the challenges 
related to climate change, as well as adapting to those challenges.58  
 
The AMAP released a comprehensive report in 2009 - Update on Selected Climate 
Issues of Concern: Observations, Short-lived Climate Forcers, Arctic Carbon Cycle 
Predictive Capability.59 This update report summarizes the recent observations of 
changing parameters in the Arctic. It provides a review of the significance of short-
lived climate forcers and a vision for their mitigation; a re-evaluation of the Arctic 
carbon cycle, and innovative initiatives to improve understanding of the Cryosphere, 
and the ability to model climate change and its consequences in regional scale.60 
AMAP also released a summary – The Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate 
(GRIS): Snow, Water, Ice, and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) 2009.61 This 
summary report is available in Chinese, Danish, French, Greenlandic, and Russian 
translations along with its official English version and submitted to the UNFCCC 
COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen and IPCC for use in the IPCC’s future assessment.  
 
In 2011, AMAP organised (in collaboration with the universities of Arhus and 
Copenhagen), an international conference in May 2011 focusing on the Arctic as a 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59  Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern: Observations, Short-lived Climate Forcers, Arctic 
Carbon Cycle Predictive Capability, (2009). 
60 Ibid, the part: Preface. 
61 Summary – The Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate (GRIS): Snow, Water, Ice, and 
Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA), (2009). 
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messenger of global process including climate change;62 and published an Executive 
Summary of the SWIPA Assessment.63 The AC appreciated the SWIPA project, 
primarily for its works in assessing the local, regional and global effects of observed 
and predicted changes in the Arctic and emphasised a need for an increase in Arctic 
resilience aiming to lessen the human and environmental impacts of climate change 
in the Arctic.64 It instructed the SAO to consider the best use of SWIPA 
recommendations in the future activities of the AC.   
 
The Tromsø Ministerial Meeting emphasized the importance of regular updates 
concerning the impact of climate change in the Arctic, which is appropriate 
considering that short-lived climate forcers such as black carbon, methane, and 
tropospheric ozone precursors may contribute to climate change in the Arctic.65 To 
this end, the Ministerial Meeting decided to establish a Task Force on Short-Lived 
Climate Forcers (TFSLCF) to identify existing and new measures to reduce the 
emissions of these forcers and to recommended further immediate actions and report 
on progress at the next Ministerial Meeting.66 The TFSLCF has recently produced a 
report on mitigation options for black carbon in the Arctic and submitted it to the 
Nuuk Ministerial Meeting of May 2011.67 The Ministers appreciated the report and 
                                                 
62 The Arctic as a Messenger for Global Processes – Climate Change and Pollution, (2011). 
63  SWIPA 2011 Executive Summary: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic, (2011). 
64 Nuuk Declaration, (2011), the part: Climate Change and Environmental Protection. 
65  Senior Arctic Official Report, (April 2009), pp. 7-8. 
66 Tromsø Declaration, (2009), the part: Climate Change in the Arctic. It reads:  
“Decide to establish a task force on short-lived climate forcers to identify existing and new measures 
to reduce emissions of these forcers and recommend further immediate actions that can be taken and 
to report on progress at the next Ministerial meeting,” 
67  An Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Options for Black Carbon for the Arctic Council, 
(2011). 
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encouraged its member states to implement the recommendations made in the report 
as appropriate to their national circumstances in aiming to reduce black carbon 
emissions. They also requested the TFSLCC and AMAP Expert Group to continue 
their research focusing on methane and tropospheric ozone along with further 
research on black carbon where necessary, and provide a report at the next 
Ministerial Meeting in 2013.68 The meeting also decided to establish a Short-Lived 
Climate Forcer Contaminants project steering group which would be tasked with 
circumpolar demonstration projects in order to reduce black carbon and other Short-
Lived Climate Forcers (SLCF) emissions. 69 
 
The Nuuk Ministerial Meeting recognised that the incoming changes to the Arctic 
(mainly caused by climate change), have increased both the challenges and 
opportunities in the region, but expressed a will to strengthen the Arctic Council so 
as to address those changes70. It reaffirmed the importance of traditional knowledge 
and capacity building initiatives of indigenous peoples living in the Arctic, including 
the planning and implementation and adoption of measures against the negative 
consequences of climate change, which have impacted upon the traditional 
livelihood, food safety and security of the inhabitants of the Arctic.71 This 
ministerial meeting made assurance that all Arctic states would work together with 
the other states reached in Cancun and by climate talks in Durban and urged all 
Parties to the UNFCCC to take urgent actions in order to meet the long-term goal of 
limiting the global average temperature to two degrees Celsius above the 
                                                 
68 Nuuk Declaration, (2011), the part: Climate Change and Environmental Protection. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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preindustrial level.72 Interestingly, this is the first time the AC has felt there is a need 
for an integrated assessment73 of the multiple drivers of Arctic change and directed 
the SAO to review matters; on the basis of whose recommendations, the Deputy 
Ministers would consider a possible Arctic Change Assessment and an Arctic 
Resilience report at their next meeting.74   
 
Thus, it seems that climate change work has continued as being science driven and 
that it has proven to be very influential, not only in feeding a climate change 
awareness for the local and regional populace and urging them in a need for 
adaptation, but also in having impacts on the role of mitigation in the climate regime 
(via ACIA and other works taken into the IPCC, or in members commitments to the 
climate talks to be held in Durban, and which feeds into the overall climate change 
regime). 
 
Careful examination of these two issue-areas enable the author to answer to the first 
question and provide basis for answering the second question, that is, whether the 
Arctic Council, as a soft-law regional international forum, is well enough equipped 
to counter the vast challenges caused by climate change and increasing economic 
activities in the region, or is a stronger response mechanism necessary, such as one 
based on an overarching international treaty, as for example  proposed by the 
European Parliament in 2008 and 2009.    
 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 For detailed treatment on integrated approach see  Keskitalo,  (2008). 
74 Nuuk Declaration, (2011), the part: Climate Change and Environmental Protection. 
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2. SOFT-LAW IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
2.1. Why Soft-law has Emerged in International Law? 
 
There are different explanations as to why soft-law has emerged in international law 
as a concept.75 Some argue that a new world order is emerging, which does not 
anymore fit with the 1648 Westphalian state-based structure. It seems obvious that 
the global order is changing very rapidly, given the emergency of almost fully global 
markets, transnational companies, various kinds of transnational loyalties (for 
example environmental NGOs), and an ever-increasing set of global threats (climate 
change, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the loss of biodiversity, etc.), all 
of which require either global or regional solutions.76 This type of new world order 
requires new ways to co-operate, many of which escape those methods familiar to 
international law, namely international treaties and inter-governmental 
organisations. There are nowadays all kinds of international co-operative structures, 
varying from those formed between private companies (with voluntary codes of 
conduct, but supervised by NGOs), to private associations that have been mandated 
to undertake authoritative and influential decisions. Additionally, there are types of 
inter-governmental organisations which have grown on the strength of e.g. a 
multilateral environmental agreement, but can hardly be judged as comparable to 
traditional inter-governmental organisations. Among these types of developments, 
soft-law has clearly been one of the most prominent forms of international co-
operation, but at the same time, one of the most difficult since there are many 
conceptions what soft-law is and what it should be.  
                                                 
75 See Robilant, (2006), pp. 599-554. 
76 For role of soft law see Abbott and Snidal, (2000), pp. 421-456;  Boyle, (1999), pp. 901-913; 
Chinkin, (1989), pp. 850-866. 
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According to the liberal institutionalist school, hard law composed of three 
dimensions – precision, obligation and delegation.77 A strong reliance on consensus-
based decision making could be evaluated as a source of institutional binding and 
legitimacy.78  Sometimes soft law appears as effective as hard law in the meeting of 
specific needs or in solving problems.79 However, viewing soft law as a substitute 
for harder domestic or international obligations may result in more effective hard 
law options being supplanted and the various values that these seek to uphold being 
devaluated.80  
 
The mainstream of international law has been able to come up with constructive 
ways of how these new forms of co-operation can be fitted in with the fairly elastic 
overall construct of international law. Some scholars simply deem these concepts as 
non-legally binding but worthy of evaluation as they exercise compliance on nation-
states as well as lesser bodies. One group of scholars has engaged in finding 
constructive solutions as to how the traditional international law could be used in a 
beneficial way when negotiating and working within these soft-law forums and 
organisations.81 As an example, they have suggested the analogical use of treaty law 
to help to solve problematic issues that may arise in soft-law co-operation.82 Still, it 
seems fair to say that the mainstream of international law has had a hard time with 
                                                 
77  Abbott et al., (2000), pp. 401-420. 
78 See, Ikenberry, (2001).  
79 See Cutler, (1999), pp. 25-48;  Cutler, (2003); Scheuerman, (1999), pp. 3-25; Beveridge and Nott, 
(1998), pp. 285-309. 
80 Blackett, (2004), pp. 121-133. 
81 Sand, (1991), pp. 213–277. 
82  Kingsbury, (2005), pp. 15-62; see also Battini, ( 2005). 
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these arrangements,83 given that they do not fit easily within the existing concepts of 
treaty and inter-governmental organisation. For this reason, concepts, such as the 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) school of thought, have risen in prominence in 
recent years.84 The strong side of GAL is that it does not ask the status of forms of 
international co-operation initially; rather, it perceives them as authoritative and 
influential international forms of co-operation, which need to be studied for the 
exact reasons they do wield power. Since they wield societal power, they should be 
studied – as are other governance forms recognized by international law - according 
to the concepts of good governance criteria, such as transparency, public 
participation, accountability, etc. 
 
2.2. The Strong and Weak Sides of Soft-law 
 
Soft law mostly comes in a complex variety of forms and it is somewhat difficult to 
determine common characteristics among them. However, John  Kirton and Michael  
Trebilcock have found two common instruments:  i) the forms set voluntary 
standards which serve as an equivalent to formally legislated and ratified 
government law and legislation; ii) they form informal institutions at international, 
transnational or national levels, dependent on the voluntarily supplied levels of 
participation, resources, and the consensual actions of their members rather than on 
the formally mandated participation and the regularly assessed obligatory 
contribution, organisation, resources and sanctions of the institution itself.85 Despite 
                                                 
83 See Klabbers, (1998), pp. 381- 391. 
84 Krisch and Kingsbury, (2006), pp. 1-13; Cassese et al. (eds.), (2008). See also Regent, (2003), pp. 
190-214. 
 
85 Kirton and Trebilcock, (2004),  p. 4 (3-30). 
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the variety in appearance of soft-law forms, it does not seem difficult to identify 
their advantages and disadvantages, which are explained below.  
  
2.2.1 Weak sides of soft-law 
 
One weak side of soft-law is that it cannot create any legally binding obligations 
other than by generating voluntary responsibilities or political commitments. States 
may crate legally binding obligations by concluding an international treaty and any 
forum established without the basis of an international treaty cannot enact legally 
binding regulations. Thus, decisions made by a soft-law body remain 
recommendatory and international law has little to do for their compliance in case of 
any unwillingness of those involved. Under the auspices of international law, there 
are established institutions which act against any violation of international law. 
These may sometimes even permit internationally illegal measures (called counter-
measures) for any prior violation of international law by another state.86 Thus, 
partner entities involved in a soft-law approach cannot do anything against the non-
performing of any commitments by another entity, generated through such a soft-
law form.  
 
 Soft law has influenced the discourse over the sources of international law doctrine 
and it has had an effect on diplomatic practices.87 The concern is that if international 
law accommodates soft law as a source, then the source doctrine becomes 
                                                 
86 For instance, if one state violates the rules of war using illegal methods, the state against which the 
illegal methods (e.g. chemical weapon) were applied can legally do the same against the state who 
started illegal methods. It is also known as a ‘counter measure’. 
87  Blutman,  (2010), pp. 605-624.   
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challenged as well as diplomatic processes of treaty making under classical 
international law. These discussions however seem fairly academic, given the 
factual reality of the ever-increasing use of soft-law in international relations.  
 
Another weak side of soft-law is that in some countries, it escapes parliamentary 
scrutiny. In such countries, the constitution requires at least some input from 
parliament in the ratification of a convention, but not if it is conducted in soft-law. 
Thus, soft law can be seen to lack strong democratic practice. Another downside of 
soft-law can be perceived to be that states use it mostly as a form of testing whether 
they are willing to move toward more demanding regulatory efforts. Hence, it shows 
that states often avoid soft-law forms for tackling more demanding and ambitious 
issues. One can also ask whether the use of soft-law can be used as a camouflage for 
inaction. States can argue that they are, in effect, taking responsible action when 
adopting a soft-law instrument, yet this may have no influence at all on their 
behaviour.  
 
2.2.2 Strong sides of soft-law 
 
Soft law offers many advantages: timely action when governments are in a situation 
when they cannot take any hard-law action; bottom-up initiatives bring the 
additional legitimacy, expertise, and other resources required for making and 
enforcing new norms and standards; and an effective means for direct civil society 
participation in global governance.88 Soft law shifts towards a society without a 
                                                 
88 Kirton and Trebilcock, (2004),  p. 5. 
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state,89 while the complementary actions or support of states is essential for the soft 
law to be fully effective.90  
 
Soft-law could be seen as flexible in the sense that amendments to the law can be 
effected without the many national and international formalities and bureaucratic 
procedures often encountered. These can fragment a treaty regime, when for 
example, an amendment is endorsed by some states but not others.91 It can also 
respond quickly to new situations, precisely because there are no formal procedures 
involved, and can involve other actors much more flexibly than the nation-states are 
able to commonly do, because treaties are only for the conduct of states and 
occasionally to their (inter-governmental) organisations. 
 
Tollefson has suggested that in some cases a soft law option may be a viable 
alternative or even substitute for unattainable harder law, in particular in the field of 
the rights of indigenous peoples.92 The same can also be said of the influence the 
International Law Commission’s work has had on the development of customary 
international law, even though many of its products are legally non-binding drafts.  
 
Soft law (thought of in flexible terms) also allows non-state actors to express their 
intention not to compromise any issues of local, regional or national sovereignty. 
                                                 
89  Santos, ( 2002), pp. 94-96. 
90 See, Bernstein and Cashore, (2004), pp. 33-63. 
91  Hillgenberg, (1999), p. 501; see also Francioni, (1996), p. 176; Shaffer and Pollack, (2010), pp. 
706-799.  
92 Tollefson, (2004), pp. 93-118. 
 187 
This could be seen as perhaps rethinking the concepts of ‘limited sovereignty’93 or 
‘responsible sovereignty’94 and recognising their place in addressing the emerging 
global challenges in environmental protection and in protecting the rights of 
vulnerable communities.  Similarly, there are other sovereignty concepts found in 
related scholarly literature such as ‘ecological sovereignty’95 and ‘polar 
sovereignty’96. The Inuit constituencies adopted the Arctic Circumpolar Declaration 
on Arctic Sovereignty during the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, testifying to 
the effect of potential, inherent in the new instruments of international co-operation. 
Thus, it indicates the necessity of rethinking the concept of strict state sovereignty in 
international law, in order to properly address new challenges to vulnerable 
communities caused by climate change.97 
 
2.3. Conclusion on Soft-law in International Law 
 
The author considers that soft-law must be seen as a fact of international life. It is 
obvious that states (and other actors) are increasingly making use of soft-law 
instruments, and they are doing this with intention: they do not want to create an 
international treaty. In the short-term, the best solution from a research viewpoint is 
to admit this reality, but as argued in GAL, there is a need to keep studying these 
new co-operation structures not only from the viewpoint of what they do, but also 
whether they perform on the basis of good governance criteria, such as transparency 
                                                 
93 Lapidoth, (1992), pp. 325-346. 
 
94 Birnie, (1992), pp. 51-84. 
 
95 Conca, ( 2004), pp. 71-81.  
 
96  Jabour and Weber, (2008), pp. 27-40.  
 
97 Chayes and Chayes,  (1998), pp. 271-286. 
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and accountability. Soft-law instruments are used mostly by states as a testing-
ground for engaging in deeper and more ambitious co-operation, but in some cases 
they may well be able to create a strong governance system of their own. In the 
long-term, it will be interesting to see whether international law can evolve with the 
rapid changes in international co-operation forms, in an increasingly international 
society. This also applies to the phenomenon of soft-law. If states continue resorting 
to these forms of co-operation, it may well be that the customary law of treaties 
evolves to develop secondary rules for what we now deem as soft-law instruments.  
 
One possible working definition of soft-law could be: ‘The provisions of treaties 
without real agreement or non-treaty agreements concluded by the states’. However, 
this definition mainly serves as a working definition in this dissertation, given the 
definitional complexities currently surrounding the concept.  
 
At present, the states practice to the conclusion of soft law in addressing global 
environmental challenges and in maintaining international cooperation, has occupied 
a place in the conceptual terrain of international law within a considerably short 
period.98 The variations observed in its academic formulation and endeavour may be 
viewed as one of the barriers to defining soft law, however these contradictions may 
also open up new windows in approaching to achieve a better definition of the 
practice.  
 
 
 
                                                 
98 See Boyle, (2005), pp.3-26. 
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3. SOFT-LAW COOPERATION FORMS IN THE ARCTIC 
 
Soft-law cooperation forms include international governance established without 
concluding any formal international treaty and allow more space for including 
regional actors than just state bodies.99 There are number of soft-law cooperation 
forms prevailing in the Arctic. These include the North Calotte Council, the Nordic 
Council, the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and the 
International Arctic Science Committee among others. This study has focused on 
three forms of Arctic and northern soft-law co-operation; namely the Arctic Council, 
the Barents co-operation and the Northern Forum.100 These three soft-law forums try 
to advance well-being in the region and two of them involve northern indigenous 
peoples in their work; most strongly the Arctic Council by according indigenous 
                                                 
99 For institutional effectiveness of soft-law governance see Skjærseth et al., (2006), pp. 104-120. 
100 The criteria for selecting the cooperation initiatives in the Artic, included Arctic-wide 
participation in the forum (meaning involvement of national governments, sub-national governments, 
inhabitants in the region) and general capability of those forums for the protection of the Arctic 
environment and promoting the wellbeing of the region. Many of forums do not fulfil those criteria, 
except for the selected three (AC, BEAR and NF). For instance, the regional politicians from the 
northern most parts of Finland, Sweden and Norway met through the North Calotte Council 
(established in 1967), where they exchange views on common concerns in the region. The Nordic 
Council (established in 1952) choose members from five Nordic states plus Faroe Island, Greenland 
and Åland, which excluded a huge area in the Arctic (Alaska, Russian and Canadian parts). The 
Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Regions is a discussion forum of lawmakers 
from the eight Arctic states, which works like a think tank; however, it does not accommodate 
governmental representatives either at the national or sub-national level. While, the Arctic Science 
Committee is (established in 1990) composed of scientific groups involved in Arctic research. 
Although all these initiatives contribute to the development of the region in different ways, the 
selected three are more profound in the sense that they involve governments (national or provincial 
level) and local community (mainly indigenous peoples in the region). Furthermore, the 
organisational frameworks of the three are different, which provides a more diverse understanding of 
soft-law forms of cooperation.  
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peoples the status of permanent participants – a status that has now been demanded 
by indigenous peoples involved in Barents co-operation, based on their self-
determination.101 These three co-operation forms have relationships with each other. 
The Northern Forum is an observer to the Arctic Council and the governmental side 
of Barents co-operation (BEAC) includes Canada and the United States as 
observers, thus, in practice, the BEAC including all eight Arctic Council members. 
 
A. The Arctic Cooperation  
 
The Arctic Council (the present form of the Arctic cooperation), is an international 
cooperative forum of the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States). It was established in 1996 with the 
adoption of the Ottawa Declaration,102  replacing the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS), which had been established by the same group in 1991. 
The AC was put in place with the aim of providing mechanisms for addressing the 
common concerns and challenges faced by Arctic states and their inhabitants, such 
as environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic. The AC has 
granted special status to Arctic indigenous communities (Permanent Participant), a 
comparatively new approach to international cooperation which has allowed 
indigenous peoples to sit side-by-side with state officials and address the present and 
future challenges in the Arctic as well as to ensure their active involvement in the 
activities of the AC. To date, the AC has accredited six groups with the status of 
Permanent Participant. These include:  
 
                                                 
101 Koivurova, (2011), pp. 169-192. 
102 Ottawa Declaration, (1996). 
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i) Inuit Circumpolar Council,  
ii) Saami Council, 
iii) Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North,  
iv) Aleut International Association, 
v) Arctic Athabaskan Council, and  
vi) Gwich’in Council International.  
 
The Arctic Council has involved actors outside the region (non-Arctic states as well 
as governmental and non-governmental organisations) within its activities, 
providing them with   ‘Observer’ status. Observer status in the AC is granted to non-
Arctic states and other organisations that are able to contribute to the work of the 
AC. Presently, ten states (including four operating on an ad-hoc basis)103, nine 
intergovernmental organisations104 and eleven non-governmental organisations105 
maintain observer status in the AC. 
The rules regarding AC’s interior functions and its various policy-making decisions 
are made at a biennial meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Arctic 
                                                 
103 France, Germany, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are observers; while, 
China, Japan, Italy, and the Republic of Korea serve as ad-hoc observers. 
104 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature, the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation, the Standing Committee of 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the 
United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Environment Programme. In 2009 
the SAO meeting approved the EU Commission as an ad hoc observer. Online: < http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/40-sao-meeting-copenhagen-november-2009> 
(accessed 9 November 2011).  
105 The Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, the Arctic Circumpolar Gateway, the 
Association of World Reindeer Herders, the Circumpolar Conservation Union, the International 
Arctic Science Committee, the International Arctic Social Sciences Association, the International 
Union for Circumpolar Health, the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, the Northern 
Forum, the University of the Arctic, and the World Wide Fund for Nature. Online: < 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/partners-links> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
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states. Recently, the AC has introduced a yearly meeting of deputy ministers to 
lessen the gap of communication at a political level. Both ministers and deputy 
ministers direct the SAO (Senior Arctic Officials from each of the Arctic states), to 
implement their political commitments. The SAO coordinates, monitors, and guides 
the subordinate bodies established under the AC including its working groups (at 
present six): 
 
i) Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
ii) Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment  
iii) Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
iv) Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 
v) Sustainable Development Working Group 
vi) Arctic Contaminants Action Programme 
 
The Arctic ministers request or instruct the SAOs to provide the means of 
addressing individual issues connected with the Arctic Council. The Rules of 
Procedure require at least two SAO meetings per year, but the frequency of SAO 
meetings depends on the willingness of the host country, which is responsible for 
assigning a chairperson and calling the meeting to order. 
 
The main work of the AC takes place within the working groups. The ministerial 
meetings fix the composition and mandate of the working groups, although each 
working group selects a chairperson and vice-chairperson and fixing their tenure. 
The working groups also establish their own operating guidelines in consultation 
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with the SAO. The secretariats of the working groups and subordinate bodies are 
supported voluntarily by the individual Arctic states. 
 
The working groups include representatives drawn mainly from the national 
ministries and other government bodies of the member states, as well as from the 
permanent participants. The programmes and projects though have had much more 
variety in their structure of representation. The mandates of the working groups 
cover the diverse areas of the state of affairs of the Arctic. These include the 
assessment, causes, possible ways of countering changes occurring in the Arctic; 
each and every thing related to the Arctic, with the exception of military security. 
There are no crystal clear boundaries between the working groups however and this 
has sometimes made it difficult to determine the most suitable working group for 
certain projects or operations. This has not hindered their performance however and 
they have produced quite a good number of research reports, some of which are 
presented in such a fashion that policy-makers and people in general can easily 
digest them, whilst some others are intended for the specialist attention of advanced 
scientists. All of these reports contain information of influential value in the Arctic 
context and many of them also hold global applicability. Thus, one can quite easily 
name the AC as the ‘powerhouse of Arctic sciences’.  
 
The AC had been working with a temporary secretariat since its formation, rotating 
the chair as voluntary funded by states. In 2006, three continuing members (Norway, 
Denmark, and Sweden) agreed on a semi-permanent secretariat located in Tromsø, 
Norway, during their chairmanship period of 2006-2012. This was made permanent 
by the Arctic states at the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting of 2011. 
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B. The Barents Cooperation 
 
The cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) includes two separate 
cooperative platforms: the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents 
Regional Council (BRC). The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden) along with Russia and the then Commission of European 
Communities (now the European Union (EU)), established the BEAC in 1993 after 
signing the Kirkenes Declaration.106 The BEAC aims to promote sustainable 
economic and social development in the Barents Region, which was an area of 
military confrontation during the Cold War.107 Special features of the BEAC include 
granting membership also to states outside the Barents Region, and its chairmanship 
rotates between a select number of members (Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden) 
possessing territories within the region.108 In order to function more efficiently, the 
BEAC has accredited a number of states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) outside the region 
as observers, who intent to contribute to the work of the BEAC. 
 
Seven regional governments109 (e.g. provincial, county, and oblast governments) in 
the Barents Region together with the Saami Council, established the Barents 
                                                 
106 Kirkenes Declaration, ( 1993).  
107 The Cooperation has introduced the concept of the Barents Region, which initially included the 
county of Lapland in Finland, the counties of Finnmark, Troms and Nordland in Norway, the 
counties of Murmansk and Archangel in Russia, and the county of Norrbotten in Sweden. See Ibid., 
the part: Participation and area of application. Later on the region expanded with the inclusion of the 
Republic of Karelia, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Kainu, Oulu, the Vasterbotton Regions, and the 
Republic of Komi. 
108 Terms of Reference for the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, (1993), sec. 6. 
109 The founding members of the BRC are: Archangelsk County (Oblast), Finnmark County Council 
(Fylkeskommune), Lapland County (Län), Murmansk County (Oblast), Nordland County Council 
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Regional Council via a cooperation protocol110 at the same time and place aiming 
the same objectives.111 During the course of time, the BRC has expanded its 
membership to thirteen regions.112  
 
Meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers in the BEAC make its policies as the 
highest decision-making body. These meetings were held annually113 up to 2001, but 
since then they have convened every other year. Ministers of the Environment from 
the member states started to convene regular meetings since 1994,114 and the heads 
of the governments from the member states met in 2003 at its ten-year celebration. 
The CSO (Committee of Senior Officials) consists of ambassadors or officials 
selected by the member states and the EU, and acts as the central point of the 
functional units. The committee meets on a regular basis, usually four or five times a 
year and oversees the activities during the time between ministerial meetings. It has 
a mandate to form subordinate bodies, directed by the ministers and provides 
guidance to them mainly via the working groups or terminates a working group that 
has completed its task. The working groups and subordinate bodies responsible to 
BEAC include:  
                                                                                                                                         
(Fylkeskommune), Norrbottens County (Län), the Saami Council, and Troms County Council 
(Fylkeskommune). 
110 The Protocol Agreement  of the Regional Council of the Barents Region, (1993). 
111 Kozyrev, (1997), p. 45; see also Holst, (1994), pp. 11-24. 
112 Three from Norway (Nordland Fylke, Troms Fylke, and Finnmark Fylke), two from Sweden 
(Västerbotten Län and Norrbotten Län), three from Finland (Kainuu, Oulu, and Lapland) and five 
from Russia (Murmansk Oblast, the Republic of Karelia, Arkhangelsk Oblast, the Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, and the Republic of Komi). 
113 The year 1997 was exceptional in that there was no Ministerial Meeting. 
114 The Ministers of the Environment met for the first time in 1994 in Bodø, where they adopted the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council Environmental Action Programme, followed thereafter by meetings of 
the Ministers of the Environment in Rovaniemi in 1995, Saint Petersburg in 1997, Umeå in 1999, 
Kirkenes in 2001, Luleå in 2003, Rovaniemi in 2005, and Moscow in 2007. Ministers responsible for 
other Departments (e.g., culture, youth and sports) also meet occasionally.  
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i) Working Group on Economic Cooperation   
ii) Working Group on Customs Cooperation  
iii) Working Group on Environment  
iv) Working Group on Youth Policy   
v) Steering Committee for the Barents Euro-Arctic Pan-European 
Transport Area  
vi) Interim Joint Committee on Rescue Cooperation. 
 
The Regional Council comprises leaders from the regions and is the highest 
decision-making body under the BRC. The Executive Regional Committee (RC), 
consists of subordinate officials of regional governments from the member regions 
and the Saami Council, works as the main functional unit within the BRC. It takes 
new initiatives and follows-up on approved projects of the BRC. The BRC has its 
own working groups, mainly composed of regional experts from the member regions 
responsible to the BRC via the RC. These include: 
 
i) Regional Working Group on Environment 
ii) Regional Working Group on Communication 
iii)   Regional Working Group on Youth Issues 
iv)   Regional Working Group on Investment and Economic Cooperation 
 
There are some other working groups are formed under the auspices of both the 
BEAC and BRC. Each of them has shared co-chairs – one from a national level 
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(BEAC) and other from a regional level (BRC). These joint working groups report 
separately to the CSO and the RC could be seen as a unique example how national 
and regional governments can operate together within this mechanism of 
international cooperation. They are: 
 
i) Joint Working Group on Health and Related Social Issues 
ii) Joint Working Group on Education and Research 
iii) Joint Working Group on Energy   
iv) Joint Working Group on Culture  
 
Besides these different working groups under the BEAR cooperation, there is 
another body named the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) which 
consists of the three indigenous communities in the region – the Saami, the Nenets 
and the Vepsian peoples. The WGIP has granted observer status to the Saami 
Council, Association of World Reindeer Herders, and Russian Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). In reality, the WGIP is a permanent 
working group and plays an advisory role to both the BEAC and BRC. The Barents 
Indigenous Peoples Office (BIPO) is responsible for the activities of the WGIP, 
thus, the WGIP appears as an independent body and has influence within the Barents 
cooperation.  
 
The BEAC and BRC maintain a complex relationship. Both councils were 
established based on shared aims and objectives. They have been working in close 
cooperation since their inception and have formed close ties to universities, research 
institutes and administrative institutes, as well as other bodies. The BRC has 
followed the activities and adopted the policies and plans, initially put forward by 
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the BEAC. The International Barents Secretariat provides technical support to the 
BEAC and BRC although there are also national Barents secretariats in all the main 
member states, with the exception of Russia.  Despite their connections, the BRC is 
in no way subordinate to the BEAC. The BEAC could be characterised as a ‘soft-
law body’ by examining its establishing instrument and other produced documents, 
whilst the BRC may be characterised as a ‘hybrid soft-law body’ since it lacks state 
representation.  
 
C. Cooperation in the Northern Forum 
 
The Northern Forum (NF) is an international cooperation of sub-national 
governments (regional, sub-regional and municipal) established in 1991 and aiming 
to improve the quality of life of peoples living in the north and to support their 
sustainable development. The NF grants non-voting membership to business 
organisations (companies and associations such as chambers of commerce)115 
(which is an innovative idea in international cooperation) in order to involve them in 
the development of the northern economy, along with its main members sub-
national governments. Presently its main members include thirteen sub-national 
governments from seven states of three continents (Asia, Europe and North 
America).116 The NF practices a flexible approach to the withdrawal of old members 
and in accrediting new members.  
                                                 
115 The NF has twenty-two business partners located in four countries: 14 from Russian Federation; 
five from United States; two from Canada; and one from Finland. 
Online:<http://www.northernforum.org/servlet/content/business.html> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
116 Currently, this category is comprised of Nunavut and Yukon Territories and Quebec Province 
(Canada); Heilongjiang Province (China); City of Akureyri (Iceland); Hokkaido Prefecture (Japan); 
Gangwon Province (Republic of Korea); Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Khanty Mansiysk 
Autonomous Okrug, Komi Republic, Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Vologda and Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug (Russian Federation); and the State of Alaska (United States). Online: 
<http://www.northernforum.org/servlet/content/memberregions.html> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
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The Board of Governors (BOG) is the highest decision-making body and comprises 
the heads of the member regions (e.g., governor, premier or chair). It meets 
biennially at a General Assembly and decides on general administrative issues, 
financial and public relations and responsibilities, the establishment and review of 
strategic directions and also sets institutional priorities for the NF. The BOG selects 
an Executive Committee (EXCOM) consisting of five members from among the 
member regions in order to oversee, supervise and guide the Executive Director 
(ED), concerning fiscal and policy matters along with other relevant activities of the 
NF during the period between BOG meetings. The BOG ensures regional 
representation when selecting the EXCOM; one representative from each of the 
regions of North America, Northern Europe excluding Russia, Northwest Russia, 
Northeast Russia, and Northern Asia excluding Russia). There is another entity 
named the Regional Coordinators Committee (RCC) which consists of delegates 
sent by member regions. The chair region at the time nominates a coordinator to 
preside over the RCC, whose main tasks include preparing recommendations for 
BOG or EXCOM on different administrative works and to provide guidance to the 
ED concerning issues that might be brought before the EXCOM or the BOG. Its 
secretariat is located in Anchorage, Alaska and headed by the ED (chosen by the 
BOG) who serves as the president of the Forum.  
  
The activities that support the NF’s goals are undertaken through various prioritized 
projects, overseen by specific working groups. These groups work closely with the 
secretariat and the RCC to meet annually for reporting and financial requirements. 
They also monitor knowledge production, for example, organising seminars, 
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workshops and conferences or preparing reports on specific projects, and sharing the 
created knowledge with relevant groups and authorities. Working groups established 
to date include those concerned with brown bears, flood management, healthy 
lifestyles, telemedicine, infectious disease surveillance (with the Arctic Council) and 
the Association of Northern Zoos.  
 
The NF works in a complex way encompassing the characteristics of different types 
of entities including international organisations, NGOs, and corporations controlled 
under U.S. national laws. It follows self-made rules while also appearing to be 
relaxed and less formal, the characteristics of which suggest its identity to be in-line 
with a soft-law body. The non-participation of state representatives has made the NF 
weak as a soft-law body, but it may be characterized as a ‘hybrid soft-law body’.  
 
3.1. Reasons for Creating Soft-law Cooperation Forms in the Arctic 
 
There have been several attempts at establishing a formal international organisation 
in the Arctic.117 Although they did not come to fruition, the current measures and 
initiatives utilized in the governance of the Arctic region may serve as stepping 
stones to the formation of legally binding agreements and international treaties. The 
appearance of a number of soft-law forms of governance in the Arctic has raised 
concern as to whether they properly serve to address the emerging challenges faced 
by the region. The 2004 Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) (prepared 
                                                 
117 For instance, Pharand drafted a treaty model about an Arctic Regional Council, which was 
published by Canadian Arctic Resource Committee (CARC) in 1991, suggesting for the 
establishment of a formal international organisation in the region. Draft Arctic Treaty: An Arctic 
Region Council Proposal (1991). Afterwards Finland commissioned Mr. Pekka Haavisto to prepare a 
report for the SAOs concerning the structure of the work of the Arctic Council. The final report was 
delivered to the AC secretariat on 29 June 2001 after the SAOs had discussed the draft report (12-13 
June 2001).    
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under the auspices of the Icelandic Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2002-2004) 
includes:  
 
“The issues that dominate the Arctic agenda today typically involve institutional 
issues or matters of governance. These concerns arise at the local level (e.g. creating 
co-management regimes), the regional level (e.g. resolving frictions between public 
governments and indigenous peoples organizations, finding ways for county, state, 
and territorial governments to generate needed revenues), and the circumpolar level 
(e.g. sorting out relations between the Arctic Council and the Northern Forum).”118 
 
Thus, it seems important to examine the raisons d’être for the existence of so many 
soft-law forms of governance in the Arctic and which can be achieved by analyzing 
the following subjects. 
 
3.1.1. Issues of concern  
 
The eight Arctic states may not suffice in mitigating the rapid and multifaceted 
changes that are taking place in the region. Non-Arctic states and non-state actors 
(including local peoples) need to be included in the governance process.119 For 
example, actions taken outside of the region significantly affect the climate change 
in the Arctic. These changes have, in turn, directly affected the Arctic environment 
and livelihoods of local populations. It is, however, difficult to compromise living 
standards and the facilities of modern science and to place binding obligations on 
                                                 
118 Arctic Human Development Report, (2004), p. 10 (Summary of Major Findings). 
119 Such as international organisations (governmental and non-governmental), research institutes, 
local peoples, civil society, etc. 
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Arctic states. Initiatives taken to address these issues are also challenging because 
they provide little in terms of visible results. Governments from outside of the 
region therefore, are less likely to sacrifice their national interests for the sake of the 
Arctic environment and the livelihood of its indigenous peoples. 
 
Changes are rapidly occurring in the Arctic and immediate action is required in 
addressing some of them. The adoption of a formal international treaty may be a 
lengthy process, so the complexity of Arctic issues and the multilevel governance 
prevailing in the region may not provide a favourable context for the creation of 
overarching inter-governmental organisations or treaty regimes. 
 
 
3.1.2. The inhabitants 
 
One sector of Arctic residents are the indigenous communities who have resided in 
the region for long periods of time. As a result, the indigenous peoples of the region 
(who would prefer to be referred to as peoples, rather than minorities), have 
developed distinct livelihoods and cultures. It is understandable that national 
decision-making takes place in the region’s capital cities, which are located far south 
of the region (aside from Iceland) and also that there is a clear difference in the 
lifestyles enjoyed by Arctic and non-Arctic residents. Arctic residents may, thus, 
have closer ties to similar groups of peoples living in other parts of the Arctic that 
extend beyond traditional state boundaries. However, formal international 
organisations operating under classical international law do not allow for the parallel 
participation of these groups with states, despite the fact that decisions made for the 
well being of the region require the participation of local residents. Soft-law bodies, 
on the other hand, have the ability to so. As a result, the Arctic indigenous peoples 
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have gained a significant role in contributing to issues of concern (and traditionally 
be dealt with by international organisations), primarily by their participation in 
multiple forums and in the decision-making processes concerning regional 
challenges. The soft-law cooperation in the Arctic can involve other actors flexibly 
and this has increased their legitimacy. They have been able to combine both central 
government level and regional Arctic level involvement, as evidenced by the three 
soft-law forms of cooperation, currently in place in the Arctic. 
 
As previously mentioned, the AC has provided indigenous peoples with the status of 
permanent participants, but also reserved their own position in regards to the 
meaning of ‘peoples’ in international law.120 This status may ensure the active 
involvement and full consultation of the indigenous peoples with respect to many 
Arctic issues121 and they have extensive participation rights at Ministerial Meetings, 
as well as at other Arctic Council meetings and activities.122 The principles adopted 
for the AEPS recognised the application of indigenous knowledge, paralleled with 
modern science, in assessing the state of affairs in the Arctic.123 The issues of 
indigenous peoples were properly placed in the ACIA report which includes inter 
alia the statement: “indigenous communities face major economic and cultural 
impacts”.124  The ACIA Policy Document recommends that Arctic states work 
closely with the residents of the region (including indigenous and local 
                                                 
120 There is a footnote in the Ottawa declaration on this regard that the use of the term “peoples” in 
the declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard the rights which may 
attach to the term under international law.  
121 See Ottawa Declaration, (1996), art. 2; Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, (1998) (SAO 
REPORT, Iqaluit: ANNEX 1), sec. 5.  
122 Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, (1998), sec. 5. 
123 Ottawa Declaration, (1996), art. 2(2). 
124 ACIA Synthesis Report, (2004), pp. 10-11. 
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communities), in order to promote their ability to adapt to and manage the various 
impacts of climate change and ultraviolet radiation.125 The AC also supports the 
Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS).126   
 
In the BEAC, the participation of indigenous peoples is ensured by the CSO 
(Committee of Senior Officials); while in the BRC, the Saami Council maintains a 
membership with regional governments. The WGIP established under the Barents 
cooperation includes six members: one Saami representative from each country—
Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden—along with one Vepsian and one Nenets 
representative from Russia.127 It has three observers, including representatives from 
the Saami Council, the Association of World Reindeer Herders and the RAIPON.  
 
The WGIP plays an advisory role to both wings of the Barents cooperation and 
partakes in the Ministerial Meetings of the BEAC and the Regional Committee (of 
the BRC).128 The WGIP promotes measures in the field of trade and business 
development, language and media, health and social-related issues,129 and also in 
measures within the field of environmental and cultural issues in the Russian Arctic 
regions. The Barents Indigenous Peoples Office (BIPO), (established in Murmansk 
in 2003 and moved to Lovozero in 2007), is responsible for the activities of the 
                                                 
125 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document, (2004), the part: Arctic Climate Policy 
Actions. See also The Arctic Council Policy Document on Global Warming, (2005), p. 256. 
126 See Koivurova, (2008), p. 26. 
127 Terms of Reference for the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region, (2005), sec. 4b.  
128 < http://www.beac.st/?DeptID=8852> (accessed 9 November 2011) 
129 Action Plan for Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 2009-2012 Adopted by the 
Working Group of Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (WGIP), Tromsø, January 
21, 2009. Online: <http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/WGIP_Action_Plan_2009-2012_ENG.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
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WGIP. The Nenets, Saami, and Vepsians - three indigenous peoples groups in this 
co-operation, now demand to be given similar status that indigenous peoples have 
on the Arctic Council, on the basis of their self-determination.130  
 
In contrast with the position taken by the AC and the cooperation shown within the 
BEAR, the NF has not provided indigenous peoples with membership or any form 
of participation within its main bodies. It has, however, adopted the indigenous issue 
as one of its four priorities by including in its Statement of Intent, the mention of 
“maintaining [of] the unique culture, economy and livelihood of indigenous peoples 
living in the remote regions in the north.”131 One of the criteria for defining the 
northern region as ascertained by the NF is its “small population, [as well as] diverse 
and strong indigenous cultures”.132 The Charter of the Northern Forum calls on sub-
national governments (states, provinces, territories, counties, prefectures and 
autonomous regions) to address common challenges faced by the inhabitants of the 
region, in particular economic development and the protection of the natural 
environment and the traditional cultures of indigenous peoples.133 Many NF 
documents have included a number of issues with respect to indigenous peoples, 
including the protection of their traditional cultures134 and their ability to take part in 
the decision-making processes related to community concerns.135  
                                                 
130 Resolution from the 1st Barents Indigenous Peoples’ Congress, (2010), res. 5.  For an analysis, see 
Koivurova, ( 2011), pp. 169-192. 
131 Statement of Intent among the Governors, Premiers, Ministers and Chairs of northern regions at 
the Third Northern Regions Conference, Governors’ Summit on Regional Cooperation, (1990).  
132 The Northern Forum Rules of Procedure, (2008), sec. 3.2. 
133 Charter of the Northern Forum, (1991), preamble.  
134 Saint Petersburg Declaration, (2003), sec. 3. 
135 The Rovaniemi Code of Conducts, (1994), secs. 4-6. 
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3.1.3. Historical reasons  
 
During the Cold War, the Arctic served as military strategic region for the two world 
superpowers – the then Soviet Union and the United States. At that time, the 
possibility of establishing any form of Arctic cooperation seemed unfeasible.136 
Despite the end of the Cold War and the growth of trust and desire to cooperate 
among the eight Arctic states, no formal treaty or legally binding regime has been 
put in place. The European Union has also emerged as a factor by way of its two 
Arctic members, Finland and Sweden.137 Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Hønneland 
have noted that the cooperation and support of the ‘three great [Arctic] powers’ (the 
EU, Russia and the United States) is required for the success of any Arctic 
initiative.138 Even if Canada is not seen by these authors as a global superpower, it 
clearly qualifies as an Arctic superpower with its strong geographical presence in the 
region and the fact that it greatly contributes to regional Arctic policy-making. In 
fact, one can argue that its presence is stronger than that of the United States. The 
United States, in line with most superpowers, has not agreed to most formal 
international organisations or treaties which generate binding legal obligations.  
 
The end of the Cold War has allowed for the development of formal regional 
intergovernmental cooperation, via a diverse set of platforms. The Finnish initiative 
resulted in the creation of the AEPS, which later transformed into the Arctic Council 
under the Canadian initiative. The Barents cooperation was established under the 
initiative of Norway and the governor of Alaska played a leading role in the creation 
                                                 
136 Young, (2005), pp. 9-15. Keskitalo,( 2004). 
137 Denmark is also a member state of the Arctic Council as well as the European Union, but its 
Arctic territories are not part of the EU. 
              138  Hønneland  and Stokke, (2007), pp. 6–8. 
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of the NF. The states, peoples and regional or sub-national governments of the 
Arctic, established these bodies around the same time (the beginning of 1990s), and 
so collaborates that the political history of the Arctic has had a clear influence on 
cooperation development in the area.    
3.1.4. National resource interests  
 
The prime indicator of climate change in the Arctic is the melting of sea ice and the 
opening of new sea routes, which in-turn has allowed for increased access to 
previously inaccessible resources. These changes have led to a rise in shipping and 
economic activities. Thus, coastal Arctic states have taken a particular interest in the 
changes taking place, especially those affecting national interests.139 For example, 
the five coastal Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
and the United States), have formed a group to manage their interests in the Arctic 
and adopted the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008.140 These states are sceptical as to 
whether a new international arrangement could limit their national interests on 
continental shelves or in regard to increasingly accessible natural resources. It is also 
ironic that existing arrangements better serve the national interests of these given 
member states, as they are primarily based on the law of the sea and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)141, which provides coastal 
states with a number of beneficial rights.142 
                                                 
139 For a detailed see also Dodds, (2011), pp. 303- 311. 
140 Ilulissat Declaration,(2008); see also Koivurova, (2010), pp. 146-156.  
141 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (1982). 
142 Article 234. Ilulissat Declaration uses the term ‘law of the sea’ because the US is not a party to the 
UNCLOS. However, the US has many times affirmed that most provisions of UNCLOS codify the 
customary international law of the sea.  
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3.1. 5. Member states prioritize Arctic co-operation in different ways 
 
Arctic cooperation is not viewed with the same importance by all member states. 
The absence of a number of ministers from AC ministerial meetings (except for the 
most recent meeting in Nuuk) serves as evidence for this statement.143 Whereas 
some may find international cooperation in the Arctic to be a fruitful endeavour, 
other actors see it as a casual platform generating varied motivations for 
cooperation. Similarly, a recent survey has found that 61 % of northern Canadians, 
51% of southern Canadians, 61 % of Icelanders, 51% of Danes and 47% of Finns, 
40% of Norwegians, 27% of Swedes, 21% of Russian, and 16% of Americans are 
aware of international cooperation in the Arctic and have heard of the Arctic 
Council.144 Arctic cooperation among the citizens and residents of the eight Arctic 
states is relatively low. This is particularly exasperating for those northern residents 
whose locales are directly affected. It shows a variety in the sentiments and 
understanding of Arctic cooperation between both the governments of the eight 
Arctic states, as well as among their residents. This warrants the need to place Arctic 
issues higher on national agendas so as to create more awareness and to establish a 
formal international organisation that would include all eight Arctic states.  
 
The above mentioned reasons and special circumstances in the Arctic are the main 
causes of developing the high number of soft-law forms of cooperation (as opposed 
to formal international organisations) that are perceptible in the Arctic.  
                                                 
143 This is the First time when six foreign ministers presented in a ministerial meeting. There were 
reasonable grounds of absence for two other foreign ministers from the meeting – Finland could not 
send because the formation of a new government was in progress and the newly formed government 
in Canada sent their health minister.  
144 Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey, (2011), the part: 
International Views on the Arctic Council.  
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3.2. Interrelations among the Arctic, Barents, and Northern Forum forms of 
Cooperation 
 
Each cooperative initiative has its own objectives. The primary objectives of the AC 
are environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic. 
Environmental protection refers to the practise of protecting the environment for the 
benefit of the natural environment, as well as its inhabitants.145 This connects 
several Arctic issues, both the physical environment (ice, snow, wilderness and the 
biological life forms, flora and fauna), and the traditional cultures of Arctic residents 
that include their traditional livelihood, hunting, reindeer herding, as well as other 
aspects. The concept of sustainable development is however, a vague term that 
relates a number of topics.  These include the use of natural resources for the 
wellbeing of local peoples and their future generations, the contribution of economic 
activities to local development, the adaptive capacity of locals to the rapidly 
changing conditions that result from climate change, as well as the utilization of 
these opportunities for positive benefits. Thus, sustainable development covers an 
overall improvement of the situation of local peoples and their future generations. 
The Barents cooperation aims to promote sustainable economic and social 
development in the Barents Region. Similarly, the cooperation in the Northern 
Forum aims to improve the quality of life of those peoples living in the north and to 
support their sustainable development.146 Overall, the objectives of these three soft-
                                                 
145 See, Carraro and Domenico, (1993), pp. 309–328. 
146 The mission or philosophy of the NF is: 
To improve the quality of life of Northern peoples by providing Northern regional leaders a means to 
share their knowledge and experience in addressing common challenges; and  
To support sustainable development and the implementation of cooperative socio-economic 
initiatives among Northern regions and through international fora. [Original emphasis].  
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law cooperation forms, aim to achieve similar results in the long-term. Thus, it is 
important to examine their inter-relationships. 
 
 The manner in which these three soft-law forms of cooperation inter-relate appears 
to be ambiguous on both a policy level and at meetings. Although their websites 
maintain that they cooperate and enjoy strong relations, there is little evidence in the 
form of real cooperation in their daily operational activities. However, their indirect 
relations appear to be more evident and are analysed below. 
 
The Northern Forum’s observer status at the AC serves as the only formal 
relationship between the three cooperative initiatives. This observer status has 
provided the NF with the opportunity to work with the AC’s working groups.  
Currently the NF is a member of the AC’s Sustainable Development Working Group 
and was also a member of the Sustainable Development Task Force under the 
AEPS.147 The Russian regions (via the NF) are now a part of the International 
Circumpolar Surveillance (ICS) for Infectious Disease System of the AC. The NF 
also cooperates with the BRC.148 Scholarly suggestion includes the creation of a 
joint working group and organising occasional joint meetings at senior official level 
(SAO and EXCOM).149 The NF had intended a joint meeting with the SAO (the 
main operational organ of the AC), but unfortunately this has not been arranged at 
this time. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Lapland Declaration (1999), Mission or Philosophy. 
147 The NF also had membership in the Sustainable Development Task Force under the AEPS. 
Rovaniemi Code of Conducts, (1994), the part: Background.   
148 Whitehorse Declaration,(2009), sec. D.6.  
149  Young, (2002), pp. 289-296. 
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These  three  soft-law  forms  of  cooperation  often  express  normative  and/or 
conceptual support for the programmes launched by other initiatives. These include 
formal endorsements, as well as the dissemination of relevant information on their 
websites. Repeated cooperation between the same groups has led to the development 
of a strong bond. For example, states with a membership in both the Arctic and 
Barents cooperation include  Finland,  Russia,  Denmark,  N o r w a y,  Sweden,  and  
Iceland. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom, and 
they have been granted observer status in both cooperation. Canada and the 
United States150 maintain a membership of the AC and observer status at the BEAC. 
Japan and Italy have also been granted observer status in the BEAC and hold an ad-
hoc observer status at the AC. Additionally, the European Commission is also 
strongly connected to both. It holds membership in the BEAC and an ad-hoc 
observer status at the AC. Thus, similar group dynamics may be found in both the 
AC and BEAC. Many of these states (Canada, Iceland, Japan, Russian Federation, 
and United States) also participate in the NF, by means of their sub national 
governments. China and the Republic of Korea have ad-hoc observer status in the 
AC and their sub-national governments have membership of the NF. 
 
 
 
 
In the Arctic and Barents cooperation, foreign ministers meet regularly. Likewise, 
ministerial level meetings of other government departments (e.g. health and 
environment) are also held. In addition to the communications at ministerial level, 
the Arctic and Barents forms of cooperation also connect with each other’s high- 
level civil servants. An example of this is that the high-level civil servants co- 
ordinating both the Arctic Council (as SAO) and the BEAC (as CSO), are mostly the 
same, in particular in the case of states which hold common membership to the two 
 
 
 
 
150  Finland’s position is ambiguous in the NF due to its interior administrative reforms, which has 
deleted the provincial government of Lapland continued with NF’s membership since its inception. 
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governances. Thus, the same actors take part under the auspices of more than one 
cooperative initiative. 
 
Both the AC and BEAC have connected national parliamentarians in distinguished 
forums, such as at the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 
(CPAR)151 and the Barents Forum152. These two forums provide both the AC and 
BRC with fruitful discussions and prepare recommendations for national 
governments, as well as the relevant institutions that meet matters of emerging 
regional importance, that result from rapid climate change and globalization. 
 
These initiatives support each other conceptually and have introduced innovative 
ideas: the AC has introduced ‘Permanent Participant’ status (which may influence 
the development of a similar institution for the Barents co-operation) and used 
traditional indigenous knowledge in parallel with modern science in particular 
producing valuable knowledge in the field of climate change. The BEAC has set up 
‘The Barents Region’ and included members from outside the region, whilst the NF 
has provided the definition of ‘northern regions’ and explained the concept of 
sustainable development in innovative way. Together, they handle complex issues, 
such as environmental protection, sustainable development, climate change, issues 
                                                 
151 The first meeting of Arctic Parliament was held in Reykjavik, Iceland in 1993. Afterward, CPAR 
(which has observer status to the Arctic Council) formed in 1996 with the inclusion of European 
Parliament and thereafter regular meetings were convened in Yellowknife (Canada), Salekhard 
(Russia), Rovaniemi (Finland), Tromsø (Norway), Nuuk (Greenland), Kiruna (Sweden), Fairbanks 
(Alaska) and the European Parliament in Brussels (Belgium). The next conference will be held in 
Iceland in 2012. Conference Statement of Ninth Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, 
( 2010), sec. 39.  
152 The first meeting of Barents parliamentarians was held in Kirkenes 1997, and the first conference 
- in Alta (Norway) 1999. The second conference was in Bodø (Norway) in 2005, the third in 
Rovaniemi in 2007 and the fourth in Syktyvkar in the Komi Republic in 2009. Resolution of the 
Fourth Parliamentary Barents Conference, (2009). It seems that nowadays each BEAC Chairmanship 
hosts a Barents Parliamentary Conference as a general practice. See also ‘Barents Region - 
Cooperation and Dialogue towards Sustainable Development’, pp.6-7 (the part: Parliamentary 
Cooperation). 
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relating to indigenous people, economic and social development, and quality of life, 
which seem particularly challenging in the rapidly changing Arctic arena. Each 
initiative follows its own established norms as articulated in its formal rules and 
regulations and all of them have established informal internal practices – those 
which fall outside the written rules. An example of this is the inclusion of regional 
representatives in the national delegation to the AC. Moreover, these initiatives 
compare their own created norms to those of other initiatives. 
 
In fact, the three selected forms of cooperation are not equal in terms of their soft-
law characters and the strength of the commitment they produce varies greatly. In 
recent years these three soft-law cooperation forms have been moving towards the 
creation of stronger commitments by producing several international instruments, 
despite their soft-law character. For example, members of the AC have adopted an 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic; the first ever legally binding agreement between the eight Arctic states.153 In 
2007 the NF concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)154 with the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and composed a joint Letter of 
Agreement with UNDP and Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture 
(AGORA), with clear legal consequences. Within the Barents cooperation; Finland, 
Norway, Russia and Sweden have signed an agreement in the Field of Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response, in Moscow 2008, which is also legally 
binding.155 The Barents cooperation has established the International Barents 
                                                 
153 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 
(2011).. 
154 Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Development Programme and the 
Northern Forum, ( 2007). 
155 Agreement between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation within 
the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response, (2008).. 
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Secretariat (IBS) by signing an agreement between its four member states.156 The 
IBS and Norway have subsequently concluded a bilateral agreement in order to 
resolve the legal and other issues that may arise between them.157  
 
As a result, it is profound that these initiatives have managed to build informal and 
indirect and conceptual connections while also establishing legally binding 
obligations to some extent on participating Arctic states in their operational fields. 
Recently the BEAC has suggested that the AC exclude ‘environmental hot spots’ 
from its mandate, because all of them are located in the Barents Region and the 
BEAC has been addressing these issues.158 The Barents Institute, Kirkenes, Norway 
and the University of Tampere (Finland) have jointly conducted research into 
selecting possible fields of cooperation where the AC and the BEAC can work 
together; the report will be published which is expected by the end of this year. 
 
3.3. Conclusion on Soft-law Cooperation in the Arctic 
 
The forms of soft-law cooperation outlined above were initiated at the beginning of 
the 1990s and came into operation following the end of the Cold War. All of these 
forms of co-operation chosen in the Arctic were of a decidedly soft-law nature other 
than formal international organisation  in the light of public law. Among the 
                                                 
156 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland, the Government of the Kingdom 
of Norway, the Government of Russia and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on the 
Establishment of an International Barents Secretariat for the Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region, (2007). 
157 Host Country Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the 
International Barents Secretariat for the Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on the Legal 
Status of the Secretariat and the Privileges and Immunities of the Secretariat and its Permanent Staff 
Members, ( 2007). 
158 Interview with Alexander Ignatiev, (2011). 
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cooperative bodies, the  AC maintains the richest profile and serves as an umbrella 
for most forms of international cooperation in the Arctic. The position of the BEAC 
falls into the middle although its connections with the BRC seems relatively more 
practical in terms of regional representation, whilst the NF is becoming less 
significant due to the decreasing interests of several  Arctic states (along with the 
withdrawal of membership of certain regions). The NF has, however, provided new 
ideas that rethink how classical international law fits with the dynamic realities of 
the area. The absence of national government representation, however, has made it 
weaker than a soft-law body. This and a lack of the essential elements of an 
international cooperation has led the author to choose the ‘hybrid soft-law body’ 
concept to determine the NFs position in international law. 
 
The three initiatives maintain their own agenda although their core objectives are the 
same, those being; the well-being of the region with a particular focus on issues 
related to environmental protection and indigenous peoples of the north. They have 
incorporated Arctic and non-Arctic states, international organisations, as well as 
non-state actors in their activities and the same group of states takes part in both the 
AC and the BEAC. These states, both Arctic and non-Arctic, are also connected to 
the NF via their sub-national governments. However, a proper coordination 
mechanism that includes them and enables them to work in a more effective manner 
has not yet been developed.   
 
Currently, there are global efforts to synergize the international cooperative bodies. 
A key objective of Rio+20 (which will be convened from the 4th to the 6th of June, 
2012), is to strengthen the institutional framework for sustainable development by 
enhancing synergies between existing sustainable development co-operative 
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institutions.159 A window of opportunity for strengthening the synergies between the 
Arctic Council, the Barents cooperation and the Northern Forum relates to the 
establishment of a permanent AC secretariat, an idea that was endorsed by ministers 
at the 2011 Nuuk Ministerial Meeting. A permanent secretariat could focus on 
establishing a stronger synergy between the three northern cooperative forums, as 
they move towards a common goal – regional development. As the AC has no 
representation at the sub-national level, the permanent secretariat could examine the 
possibilities of utilizing the Barents co-operation and Northern Forum to influence 
the AC. 
 
A more formalized association or partnership could allow for a stronger focus on 
relevant Arctic issues and a more global orientation. Such a coordination mechanism 
could provide Arctic governance with alternative ideas. It would promote the 
sharing of responsibility among initiatives, as well as effect a reduction in the 
number of regional bodies of governance through merger. This would allow for a 
more effective system of operation and promote a better protection of the 
environment and its inhabitants. 
 
4. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL AND ITS CLIMATE CHANGE WORK 
 
A good test case as to whether a soft-law co-operation forum can tackle difficult 
policy problems is the Arctic Council, which is hard pressed to address current 
concerns of climate change consequence in the region. Being a soft-law co-
operation, the AC can do little to mitigate global climate change which requires a cut 
                                                 
159 Online: 
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?page=view&nr=248&type=12&menu=106&template=
435> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
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in CO2 emission from all parts of the world. However, contributions for adaptation 
to climate change and its consequences require action within the region. The climate 
change work of the AC includes the establishment of the ACIA, the ACIA Policy 
Document, the Arctic Council Focal Point, SWIPA, the Arctic Council Task Force 
on Short-lived Climate Forcers, the Climate Expert Group, climate change related 
projects, and the AC’s involvement in the global climate change regime. 
 
4.1. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
 
The ACIA is a joint project of the AC (AMAP and CAFF) and the IASC. It was 
established in 2000, aiming to gather knowledge on climate change and ultra violate 
radiation as well as to provide an authentic message about their consequences on the 
Arctic environment to the governments and people in the Arctic. In fact, the ACIA 
has presented the Arctic as the early warning region for climate change, since the 
consequences of global warming have been evident in the region from the 1960s 
onwards and the consequences of global warming are projected to be twice as 
intense in the Arctic as in the rest of the world. The ACIA emphasized that climate 
change is a cross-cutting issue which is significant in addressing climate change in 
the Arctic, which is important at the present time when the AC is passing through a 
transitional period – from policy shaping to decision making.  
 
The ACIA produced two reports: In 2004 it produced an overview (synthesis) 
report, mainly prepared for the policy-makers and general public, and in 2005 it 
produced scientific reports prepared for people with technical knowledge (although 
both were prepared based on the same data and obtained from a combination of 
modern research and traditional indigenous knowledge).  
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The ACIA synthesis report presented dramatic changes caused from climate change 
in the Arctic including ten key findings as articulated previously. 160 The report has 
also presented number of alarming phenomena relevant to the Arctic: 
 
 
i) The temperature rise in the Arctic within a century is 
projected to be up to 7 degrees centigrade;161  
ii) The increase of glacial melt and river runoff flows will 
deposit more freshwater into the ocean. This may slow 
the water circulation which usually carries tropical heat 
to the Arctic. Together with a rise in sea level, the 
disturbances of insects and other non-native species may 
cause new diseases;162 
iii)  The present level of received UV radiation per person in 
the Arctic is 30 percent higher than previously 
measured;163  
iv) The northern shrimp collection could decline by up to 70 
percent;164  
                                                 
160 ACIA Synthesis Report, (2004), p. 10-11. 
161Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
162  pp. 46-57. 
163 pp.98-105. 
164  p. 115. 
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v) Infrastructure damage resulting from the thawing of 
permafrost in Siberia, is projected to rise by up to 90 
percent based on a survey of the 1990s;165  
vi)  The abundance of sea lions has declined up to 80 percent 
over a few decades in the seas adjacent to Chukotka, 
Alaska and the Western Canadian Arctic;166  
vii)  In summertime, the maximum northward retreat of ice is 
projected to increase from the present 150-200 
kilometres to 500-800 kilometres during this century.167 
 
One of the important elements of the ACIA report is the projection of climate 
change impacts on human beings (in particular the indigenous peoples of the Arctic) 
and from various perspectives.168 Climate change may threaten the cultural survival 
of indigenous peoples, whose ways of life are based on hunting, herding, and 
fishing. The consequences of climate change in the Arctic may deprive these peoples 
of their traditional food and they may have to adapt to new species which may move 
to the north. The change in the Arctic would also cause more challenging conditions 
for them to hunt marine mammals on thin ice. Open water is less predictable than 
water that is covered by ice. As regards health, new insect and animal vectors may 
cause new diseases and increasing levels of skin cancer, cataracts, and viral 
infections are already evident in the Arctic. The effect of climate change on the 
                                                 
165  p.117. 
166 p. 118. 
167  p. 120. 
168  ACIA Scientific Report, (2005), pp. 61-98 (Chapter 3). 
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petroleum and fishery industries may be mixed. Whilst increased shipping would 
develop the financial situation of the Arctic, it could also cause further pollution.  
 
4.2. ACIA Policy Document 
 
The Arctic Council has issued the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy 
Document inspired by the ACIA report.169 It has recognised the Arctic climate as a 
critical phenomenon of the global climate system.170 The policy document includes 
the ACIA related decision from the Reykjavik Ministerial as it is, the key findings of 
the synthesis report, as well as a brief description of the historical background of the 
ACIA. The latter part of the document contains climate policy action and the role of 
the Arctic Council to counter the impacts of climate change.  
 
In order to combat climate change in the Arctic, the ACIA Policy Document 
suggests two types of actions: mitigation and adaptation.171 For the mitigation of 
climate change-related risks and considering the findings of the ACIA and other 
relevant studies for the implementation of the recommendations under the UNFCCC 
and other agreements; it has suggested taking decisive actions without delay, to 
address global emissions. The Document urges the limiting of greenhouse gas 
                                                 
169 The AMAP and the CAFF were requested to prepare the ACIA policy report on the basis of the 
ACIA findings; they formed a policy drafting team comprising designated people from member states 
and permanent participants. The team prepared three drafts (first, second and third) of the policy 
report as well as those sent to the SAO in an informal manner. They developed four sets of 
recommendations (e.g., i) mitigation, ii) adaptation iii) research and iv) observation, monitoring, 
modelling, communication and education) including a scientific summary. See the Meeting of the 
Senior Arctic Officials, (October, 2003).  
170 Reykjavik Declaration, (2004), the Part: Climate Change in the Arctic.  
171 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document, (2004), the part: Arctic Climate Policy 
Actions. 
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emissions to standard levels, the promotion of appropriate technologies and sources 
of energy, and the adoption of policies and programmes for the conservation and 
enhancement of carbon sinks and reservoirs, following the principles of sustainable 
development.172 
 
The mitigation of climate change in a specific region is both challenging and 
uncertain, mainly for reasons of regional governance. Adaptation to change 
however, could be a useful approach. According to the Policy Document, adaptation 
is needed in situations where climate change is unavoidable and special attention is 
needed to strengthen the adaptive capacities of populations in the Arctic.173 The 
Policy Document recommends that the Arctic states work closely with residents of 
the Arctic (including indigenous and local communities), in order to promote their 
ability to adapt to and manage the various impacts of climate change and ultraviolet 
radiation. The development and management of new economic opportunities in a 
sustainable manner may help protect the environment and population of the Arctic. 
Local and indigenous knowledge, as well as the participation of local and 
indigenous communities, are required in the implementation of adaptive 
management strategies, policies and programmes concerning the use of natural 
resources and in reducing the risks from natural calamities, whilst taking into 
account the costs and benefits. 
 
The Policy Document has encouraged national and international research bodies and 
sponsors to develop and implement programmes since increasing natural and social 
science research on the impact of climate change and adaptation to it may play a 
                                                 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
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useful role in adapting local people to changed situation.174 It seeks to expand links 
to circumpolar research and monitoring networks, in order to ensure the provision of 
relevant data for various research and monitoring programmes. It also recognises the 
need to consider methods of conducting further studies regarding climate change in 
the Arctic. 
 
The Policy Document recommends the dissemination of the ACIA documents in 
international forums to improve cooperation, to address the implications of climate 
change in the Arctic. It also looks to promote the ACIA documents at both national 
and local levels by using various methods and languages in order to include more 
residents of the Arctic in the process.175 The member states could contribute to such 
dissemination. It affirms the importance of providing the residents of the Arctic with 
information on climate change and monitoring in order to help them adapt, and also 
encourages the member states to integrate ACIA materials into educational, research 
and training programmes. Finally, the Policy Document recommends the 
reorganisation of the work of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies to provide 
better results in mitigating climate change.  
 
4.3. Arctic Council Focal Point  
 
The Senior Arctic Officials established the Arctic Council Focal Point (FP) in 2005 
mainly to take care of ACIA follow-up activities derived from the recommendations 
                                                 
174 Ibid., the part: Research, Observations, Monitoring and Modelling. 
175 Ibid., the part: Outreach. 
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of ACIA Policy Document Report.176 In fact the SAO established the ‘focal point’ 
comprised of the Chairs (or their designated representatives) of the Arctic Council 
Working Groups. Whilst the SAOs are represented in the ‘focal point’ by the 
Chairman of the SAOs, the permanent participants are invited to nominate one 
representative to the ‘focal point’ to represent them all.177 The ‘focal point’ group 
would coordinate the ACIA follow-up activities within the working groups and 
prepare proposals for the Arctic Council in relation to ACIA follow-up issues, as 
articulated in the Reykjavik Declaration and the SAO report to Ministers at the 
Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting.178  The ‘focal point’ was expected to 
report on the progress made, to the upcoming SAO meetings and leading to the 2006 
Ministerial Meeting. They were also expected to cooperate closely with the IASC 
and other relevant actors to ensure that proposals for ACIA follow-up by the AC 
working groups are coordinated and they are harmonised with activities outside of 
the Arctic Council.179 
                                                 
176 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document, (2004), the part: Arctic Climate Policy 
Actions. It recommended ministers to:  
1. Direct relevant technical working groups of the Arctic Council to review the scientific 
chapters of the ACIA in the context of their ongoing and future work programmes and to 
report on the progress made at the 2006 Ministerial Meeting; 
2. Decide to keep under review the need for an updated assessment of climate change in the 
Arctic, drawing inter alia on the IPCC fourth assessment report and the results of the 
International Polar Year 2007-2009; 
3. Direct SAOs to nominate a focal point and to be responsible for an ACIA follow up, 
including an assessment of gaps in knowledge; and 
4. Communicate, as appropriate, any Arctic Council ACIA follow-up actions to the Conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC. 
177 Minutes of Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, (April 2005), pp. 8-9.  See also 
Report of the Arctic Council Focal Point (FP) for ACIA Follow-up Activities, ( 2006),  p. 27 [Annex 
8 (Paper prepared by Norway on the topic of revising the Arctic Council Focal Point, the part: 
Review of the establishment of the Focal Point (FP) on 7 April 2005)]. 
178 Ibid. p. 9 (the part: Review of the establishment of the Focal Point). 
179 Ibid. 
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  As mandated, following its six formal meetings, the FP prepared the Focal Point 
Report to SAOs in 2006, for them to advance to the Ministerial Meeting of 2006.180 
The reports included a set of recommendations including that the continuing 
responsibility for coordination of ACIA Follow-up activities would be assigned to a 
single Working Group. The recommendation at that time was for AMAP to assume 
the role, and  the AC should plan and implement ACIA follow-up assessments as 
soon as possible.181  AMAP was assumed to be charged with the establishment of an 
ad-hoc team to prepare a prospectus for review by the AC and to define the structure 
and scope of future assessments.182  
 
The report recommended the FP as an implementation mechanism in order to 
prioritize work for advance adaptation in the circumpolar Arctic, including regular 
scientific assessment or vulnerability and risk. 183  However, disagreement arose in 
whether to establish a new mechanism or to utilise the existing working groups and 
to strengthen them where needed. In the initial stages it suggested a case study 
approach in which case studies addressing adaptation issues were examined and 
shared; to facilitate continuous learning, knowledge sharing and capacity building 
and to gain experience with and further develop methodologies. This approach 
aimed to clearly demonstrate the issues, decision making processes and the results of 
                                                 
180 Report of the Arctic Council Focal Point (FP) for ACIA Follow-up Activities, (2006), p.6 (the 
part: Summery of Focal Point activities since April 2005). 
181 Ibid. pp.4- 5. 
182 Ibid., p. 4. 
183 The part: Annex 7. Adaptation Workshop – Oslo, 26-27 June 2006, Executive Summery and 
Recommendations, p. 25.   
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adaptation measures.184 Another view of undertaking adaptation activities 
(assessments on Arctic vulnerability and adaptation), was to strengthen the basis for 
priority setting and actions planned in regard to adaptation.185 It included the seeking 
of opportunities to promote a global, national and local awareness of the ACIA 
results and to advance education, outreach and information on adaptation issues in 
the Arctic Region. It also looked to the following-through of research, observations, 
monitoring and modelling, such as those included in the ACIA science report and 
policy document.186 These recommendations were built on the Third Assessment 
Report of the IPCC (TAR) and the ACIA reports, and in looking forward to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR4), that the AC should take early and 
substantive action on the adaptation to climate change in the Arctic. 187 
 
However, within a short period to time it was realised that the FP (as composed in 
2005), had insufficient expertise on climate issues. Many parts of the Arctic Council 
objected to their limited access or non-access to FP meetings and in particular, the 
permanent participants looked for stronger representation.188 Under these 
circumstances, Norway suggested two options for replacing the FP; 1. to create a 
new climate working group under the AC, with the main responsibility of climate 
change follow-up and implementation; or 2. establish one of the existing working 
groups as the lead group for climate and involve other working groups as 
                                                 
184 Ibid. 
185 The part: Annex 7. Adaptation Workshop – Oslo, 26-27 June 2006, Executive Summery and 
Recommendations, p. 26.   
186 Ibid. 
187 The part: Adaptation Workshop – Oslo, 26-27 June 2006, Executive Summery and 
Recommendations, p. 25. 
188 The part: Annex 8, p. 28. 
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appropriate.189 2006, the SAOs recognised that the future work on ACIA follow-up, 
should be undertaken within the AC working group structure where all the working 
groups could contribute to this endeavour.190 
 
4.4. Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic  
 
The SAO approved Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) in 
2008. This is in fact an update and extension to the ACIA findings on the 
consequences of change in the Arctic Cryosphere component of the global climate 
system.191 The detailed SWIPA results would be published in the SWIPA Scientific 
Assessment Report,192 and the related SWIPA Overview Report, both of which are 
currently being prepared for publication. This assessment of the impacts of climate 
change on SWIPA brings together the latest scientific knowledge about the changing 
state of each component of the Arctic Cryosphere,193 and examines how these 
                                                 
189 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
190 Report of Senior Arctic Officials, (October 2006), the part: Climate Change. 
191 ‘Cryosphere’ is the scientific term for that part of the Earth’s surface that is seasonally or 
perennially frozen. It includes snow, frozen ground, ice on rivers and lakes, glaciers, ice caps, ice 
sheets and sea ice. The cryosphere structures the physical environment of the Arctic. It provides 
services to humans such as freshwater supplies and transport routes. The cryosphere is an integral 
part of the climate system, and affects climate regionally and globally. 
192 An unofficial unedited draft could be found online: < http://amap.no/swipa/CombinedDraft.pdf > 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
193 SWIPA 2011 Executive Summary: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic, (2011), p. 3 
(the part: Executive summary and key messages: SWIPA Summary for policymakers). It reads:  
‘Cryosphere’ is the scientific term for that part of the Earth’s surface that is seasonally or perennially 
frozen. It includes snow, frozen ground, ice on rivers and lakes, glaciers, ice caps, ice sheets and sea 
ice. The cryosphere structures the physical environment of the Arctic. It provides services to humans 
such as freshwater supplies and transport routes. The cryosphere is an integral part of the climate 
system, and affects climate regionally and globally. 
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changes will impact both the Arctic as a whole, as well as people living within the 
Arctic and elsewhere in the world.194 
 
AMAP released the SWIPA Summary in 2009 which includes fifteen key 
findings195 along with a set of recommendations. The key findings relate to the 
                                                 
194 Ibid. 
195 The key findings are: 
1. The past six years (2005–2010) have been the warmest period ever recorded in the Arctic. 
Higher surface air temperatures are driving changes in the cryosphere. 
2. There is evidence that two components of the Arctic cryosphere (snow and sea ice) are 
interacting with the climate system to accelerate warming. 
3. The extent and duration of snow cover and sea ice have decreased across the Arctic. 
Temperatures in the permafrost have risen by up to 2 °C. The southern limit of permafrost 
has moved northward in Russia and Canada. 
4. The largest and most permanent bodies of ice in the Arctic (multiyear sea ice, mountain 
glaciers, ice caps and the Greenland Ice Sheet) have all been declining faster since the year 
2000 than they did in the previous decade. 
5. Model projections reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 
2007 underestimated the rates of change now observed in sea ice. 
6. Maximum snow depth is expected to increase over many areas by 2050, with the greatest 
increases noted over Siberia. Despite this, the average snow cover duration is projected to 
decline by up to 20% by 2050. 
7. The Arctic Ocean is projected to become nearly ice-free in summer within this century, 
likely within the next thirty to forty years. 
8. Changes in the cryosphere cause fundamental changes to the characteristics of Arctic 
ecosystems and in some cases, the loss of entire habitats. This has consequences for people 
who benefit from Arctic ecosystems. 
9. The observed and expected future changes to the Arctic cryosphere impact the Arctic 
society on many levels. There are challenges, particularly for local communities and 
traditional ways of life. There are also new opportunities. 
10. Transport options and access to resources are radically changed by differences in the 
distribution and seasonal occurrence of snow, water, ice and permafrost in the Arctic. This 
affects both daily living and commercial activities. 
11. Arctic infrastructure faces increased risks of damage due to changes in the cryosphere, 
particularly the loss of permafrost and land-fast sea ice. 
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reasons of Arctic Cryosphere change (1,2); ways of changing (3,4,5); prediction of 
higher changes (6,7); affects of the changes on Arctic ecosystems and people (8-11); 
their impacts on the global climate and global society (12,13); next requirements for 
change (14,15). The recommendations include five different segments – adaptation, 
mitigation, observation, outreach and policy needs.196 With respect to adaptation, it 
urges AC members and governments at all levels in the Arctic work to: 
 
I. Develop regional-scale assessments of cryospheric change and the 
associated risks. 
II. Develop and implement Arctic adaptation strategies appropriate to the 
scale and character of anticipated changes - such strategies must take 
account of other relevant drivers of change. 
                                                                                                                                         
12. Loss of ice and snow in the Arctic enhances climate warming by increasing absorption 
of the sun’s energy at the surface of the planet. It could also dramatically increase emissions 
of carbon dioxide and methane and change large-scale ocean currents. The combined 
outcome of these effects is not yet known. 
13. Arctic glaciers, ice caps and the Greenland Ice Sheet contributed over 40% of the global 
sea level rise of around 3 mm per year observed between 2003 and 2008. In the future, the 
global sea level is projected to rise by 0.9–1.6 m by 2100 and Arctic ice loss will make a 
substantial contribution to this. 
14. Everyone who lives, works or does business in the Arctic will need to adapt to changes 
in the cryosphere. Adaptation also requires leadership from governments and international 
bodies, and increased investment in infrastructure. 
15. There remains a great deal of uncertainty about how fast the Arctic cryosphere will 
change in the future and what the ultimate impacts of the changes will be. Interactions 
(‘feedbacks’) between elements of the cryosphere and climate system are particularly 
uncertain. Concerted monitoring and research is needed to reduce this uncertainty. 
 
196 SWIPA 2011 Executive Summary: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic, (2011), p. 15 ( 
the part: Recommendations). 
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III. Ensure that standards for environmental management are in place, or can 
be adapted, to take account of cryospheric change. Develop regulations 
where necessary. 
IV.  Upgrade the capacity for search and rescue operations and 
environmental hazard responses. 
V.  Facilitate measures to increase the accuracy of forecasting for ice, 
weather, and sea conditions, and make forecasts accessible to all Arctic 
residents and organisations.   
 
For mitigation it suggests that:  
I. International negotiations to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions 
should be pursued as a matter of urgency.  
II. Member States of the Arctic Council should increase their leadership role 
in this process. 
 
For observer it includes that Arctic countries and international organisations should: 
I. Improve and expand systematic, comprehensive surface-based 
monitoring of the cryosphere. 
II. Maintain and support the development of remote sensing methods for 
observing the cryosphere. 
III. Develop and enhance systems to observe the cascading effects of 
cryospheric change on ecosystems and human society. 
IV. Expand research into processes that are important for modelling the 
cryosphere, to reduce uncertainty in predicting cryospheric change. In 
particular, improvements are needed in modelling permafrost dynamics, 
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snow-vegetation interactions, and mass loss from glaciers, ice caps, and 
the Greenland Ice Sheet. 
 
The report suggests informing and educating Arctic societies along with the global 
society about the changes in the Arctic linked to climate change, and how they affect 
people locally regionally and globally for its outreach. This responsibility is 
expected to be undertaken by AC members and observers both collectively and 
individually. Finally, it recommends increased cooperation and coordination efforts  
at all levels of governments and institutions, to respond to the challenges and 
opportunities associated with climate change. It includes the recommendation that 
the “Arctic Council should conduct an integrated assessment of the combined 
impacts of change in the Arctic, focused on how to minimize environmental damage 
and enhance human well-being”.197 
 
4.5. Arctic Council Task Force on Short-lived Climate Forcers 
 
The AC established the TFSLCF in 2009 in order to assess the impacts of short-
lived climate forcers (e.g., black carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone precursors), 
on climate change in the Arctic. The TFSLCF has recently produced a report on 
mitigation options for black carbon (BC) in the Arctic.198 This technical report 
includes relevant useful information may contribute to not only determining the 
sources of BC in the region or limit its emission so as to reduce negative 
consequences in the Arctic, but also to contribute to the development of natural 
science in general. For instance, according to the report, BC remains in the 
                                                 
197 Ibid. 
198An Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Options for Black Carbon for the Arctic Council, 
(2011). 
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atmosphere from periods of days to weeks and warms the climate by absorbing both 
incoming and outgoing solar radiation and also by darkening snow and ice after 
deposition, thereby reducing the surface albedo, or reflectivity. Clearly, it is this 
albedo effect that is particularly pertinent in the Arctic.199 The main findings of the 
TFSLCF report include: 
 
i) The largest sources of black carbon emissions in Arctic Council 
nations have been identified; 
ii) There is still considerable uncertainty regarding the quantification 
of the exact magnitude of black carbon emissions, particularly 
from sources such as agricultural burning, open biomass burning 
(i.e., wildfires and prescribed forest burning), and gas flaring; 
iii) Overall, the total black carbon emissions from Arctic Council 
nations are projected to decrease in the coming decades, primarily 
due to the effective implementation of transportation-related 
particulate matter controls; 
iv) To maximize climate benefits, PM [Particulate Matter] control 
programmes must aim to achieve maximum black carbon 
reductions; 
v) Several mitigation measures have been identified to further 
reduce major emission source categories; 
vi) Additional measurements, research, and analyses are needed to 
better identify the specific BC mitigation measures (both inside 
and outside of the Arctic Council nations) that will lead to the 
largest Arctic climate benefits.  
                                                 
199 Ibid., p. TS-2 (Technical Summary). 
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4.6. Climate Change Related Projects 
 
A number of projects have been undertaken by the various working groups of the 
AC relating to climate change, with some others still ongoing. At present (in 
October 2011), AMAP has registered sixty seven projects related to climate change 
operated by Arctic and non-Arctic states.200 Most of these projects are research-
oriented to achieve a better understanding of climate change in the Arctic and its 
impact on arctic populations, flora, and fauna. Since the completion of Vulnerability 
and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic (VACCA),201 which aimed 
specifically to increase the adaptive capacity of Arctic communities, there have been 
new projects, such as Arctic Cryosphere: Snow, Water, Ice, and Permafrost in the 
Arctic (SWIPA) project. 
 
The conduct of climate change oriented research by the working groups of the AC 
has created experts and strengthened their credibility at a global level in producing 
knowledge related to climate change. This has encouraged global institutions to 
work with them. The ‘Climate Change and POPs [Persistent Organic Pollutants]: 
Predicting the Impacts’202 report can be taken as an example; the UNEP/Stockholm 
Convention Secretariat prepared this report in collaboration with the AMAP Expert 
                                                 
200 The projects could be found in the AMAP Project Directory. Online: < http://www.amap.no/> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
201 Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic (VACCA): An Analysis of the 
Scoping Study Data (2008). Main objects of the VACCA was to undertake a scoping study including  
collect and disseminate information on the expertise, existing and ongoing research and adaptation 
strategies/measures on adaptation to climate change in the Arctic; and to arrange international 
expert/stakeholder workshop in which leading experts, policy makers working group representatives 
and key stakeholders would  meet and discuss on vulnerability and adaptation to climate change as 
well as preparing recommendations for potential future work for the Arctic Council. The project was 
completed in December 2008 and the Tromsø ministerial noted that vulnerability and adaptation 
would be strengthened in future reports on climate change. 
202 Climate Change and POPs: Predicting the Impacts – Report of the UNEP/AMAP Expert Group, 
(2011).  
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Group in 2011.  The results of the report include that climate change may increase 
the planet's vulnerability to highly toxic chemicals. The report focuses on the 
complex relationships between climate change and POPs, and human and 
environmental exposures in a changing climate both in global and Arctic contexts. It 
also identifies several key areas where knowledge gaps exist and provides 
recommendations.203  
 
4.7. Involvement in the Global Climate Change Regime  
 
The AC has been concerned with the activities of the UNFCCC since its inception 
which was limited (until 2009) to re/affirming its support of the Convention, 
organising side-events and issuing a couple of statements, rather than creating any 
strong commitment to emission control. It does not hold a formal position with the 
Convention (e.g., observer status). All AC members have joined the climate 
convention,204 but they have never discussed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
within the AC.  However, the situation has since changed and the AC has been 
trying to become more globally oriented. The AC decided to set up an Arctic Venue 
at the UN climate summit in Copenhagen, organise a side event and release the 
Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate (GRIS) and SWIPA reports to the public 
at COP-15.205 In 2011 the AC gave assurance that all its member states would work 
together with other countries in reaching an agreement at climate talks to be held in 
                                                 
203 Ibid., pp. 7-8 (the part: Executive Summary). 
204 Salekhard Declaration, (2006), the part: Climate Change in the Arctic. 
205 Meeting of Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials, (November 2009), sec. 2.1 (Arctic Council 
Outreach at COP 15).  
 234 
Durban. It also urged all Parties to the UNFCCC to taking urgent action in order to 
meet the long-term goal.206 
 
The AC has gained a leading position in producing scientific knowledge on various 
issues related to the Arctic (in particular climate science) and supports high 
standards of research and the taking of appropriate initiatives in this regard. The AC 
has been successful in involving a good number of non-arctic states, along with 
international organisations, for this purpose. However, the entirety of the AC’s 
activities (e.g., developing awareness among the local peoples to enable them to 
adapt to the changes, and producing climate change science) does not seem 
sufficient – there is also a need to push Arctic issues forward in the global arena for 
collective action.  
 
The AC initially considered the issue of climate change at the secondary level of its 
mandate while, within two years, the climate change issue became well-known with 
the publication of the State of the Arctic Environment Report.207  This report 
highlighted climate change as a driver of Arctic change and policy-makers became 
familiar with the issue which could be described as the first generation of Arctic 
climate change science. Subsequently the establishment of ACIA and the release of 
the ACIA reports (including the Policy Document Report), presented a valuable 
breadth of knowledge on climate change in the Arctic. These reports have provided 
dramatic information concerning the consequences of climate change in the Arctic, 
identified main causes, predicted future changes and suggested some possible means 
of solution. After this, the formation of the Arctic Council Focal Point initiated their 
                                                 
206 Nuuk Declaration, (2011),  the part: Climate Change and Environmental Protection. 
207 Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report, (1997); AMAP Assessment 
Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, (1998). 
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follow-up activities. At that stage, climate issues were identified as the most 
powerful driver of the changes occurring in the Arctic which could be described as 
the second generation of Arctic climate change science. At present, the TFSLCF has 
produced advanced knowledge of science. The SWIPA project has presented an 
integrated approach to Arctic change where climate change is a crosscutting issue 
and connected to all kinds of changes and challenges in the Arctic. These addresses 
are progressively more scientific than previously seen, and could be explained as the 
third generation of climate change science. Thus, increased access to advanced 
climate science has generated some serious concerns and the Arctic states have been 
offering stronger commitments to combat climate change and its consequences in 
the Arctic. Overall, they seek a strong global orientation since a fruitful result may 
come through the active participation of the global community as a whole.     
 
5. CAN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL RESPOND TO THE CHALLENGES POSED BY ECONOMIC 
GLOBALISATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE? 
 
It is now fitting to examine whether the Arctic Council can prepare an adequate 
response to the climate change consequences in the region,  or should the Arctic 
actors establish a stronger governance mechanism (even one based on an 
international treaty) to counter the immense challenges resulting from climate 
change. At the heart of this discussion is how the AC reacts to the threat posed by 
increasing economic activity in the region and whether it enables a proactive co-
ordinated response to promote sustainable development in the region, particularly in 
its waters. 
  
The European Parliament has twice proposed in its resolution, that an Antarctic 
treaty modelled agreement should be negotiated to govern the Arctic (even if they 
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have recently changed their course and no longer advocate an Arctic treaty).208 The 
idea behind the Parliament’s proposal was to borrow the governance framework 
from the other Pole, the Antarctic Treaty’s Environment Protocol, and modify it to 
Arctic circumstances. The Parliament (as a minimum), wanted the European 
Commission to pursue negotiations with Arctic states on the possibility of 
negotiating a treaty to conserve the high seas areas of the Arctic Ocean. The 
overarching Arctic Treaty idea is also suggested by scholars. 209  Independent work 
done by Koivurova and Molenaar for WWF Arctic International, suggests that the 
Antarctic Treaty does not provide a viable basis for a legally binding Arctic 
instrument but they do suggest elements for an overarching Arctic treaty.210 Their 
suggested model derives from the regional seas agreements; their argument being 
that the law of the sea and UNCLOS encourages states to implement its framework 
type obligations on a regional basis. This would have the effect of shifting Arctic co-
operation to only marine areas, in contrast to the AC approach, which includes both 
the land and marine areas of the region.211  
 
There may be benefits to negotiating an Arctic treaty. At the very least, a much more 
ambitious governance could achieved in the Arctic than is currently enacted within 
the Arctic Council. Moreover, the currently fragmented governance of the Arctic 
could be more consistently governed by a set of regional institutions that could co-
                                                 
208 See Online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-
2011-0024+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
209 For instance, see Koivurova, (2008), pp. 22, 26. 
210 International Governance and Regulation of the Marine Arctic: A Proposal for a Legally Binding 
Instrument, (2010). 
211 See Stokke,  (2007), pp. 402-408. 
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ordinate how various treaties (applicable in the region) could be synergistically 
implemented.212  
 
Yet, a political will does not seem to exist to create such a treaty, given that in their 
Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, the Arctic Ocean coastal states explicitly rejected any 
overarching legal regime to govern the Arctic. None of the current Arctic states 
seem to be willing to engage in negotiating an Arctic treaty, as testified by their 
newly revised Arctic national policy documents.213 While, states voluntarily 
expressed cooperation and support with other states and local people (rather than 
create a legally binding obligation as result of hard or harsh negotiation), this seems 
to be more effective mainly in the field of environmental protection.214 
 
The author does not view this as a desirable way to conduct matters, since the 
consequences of both hard law (treaty based) and soft law (non-treaty based) in 
international law mainly depends on how law types interact with changing 
conditions in specific region.215 It has to be also raised, that there are multiple levels 
of international, regional, national and sub-national governance layers in the Arctic, 
which seem not amenable to creating an overarching Convention structure. Much of 
the Arctic Ocean and waters are under the jurisdiction of the Arctic states, making it 
more difficult to introduce overarching international treaties to the region. From the 
authors perspective, it seems much more viable to follow what is currently 
happening in the AC, since it has stepped up its pace considerably in a range of 
                                                 
212  Ostrom, (2003). 
213Borlase, (2010).  For why states and other actors care so much about soft-law arrangements see 
Huang, (2002), pp. 237-258. 
214 See Henkin, (1979), p. 47; Stein, (1990). 
215 See Skjærseth, (2010), pp. 1-14. 
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matters, including its legal development. The AC has also decided to establish a 
permanent secretariat by 2013 in Tromsø, Norway, replacing the semi-permanent 
secretariat, which can also be anticipated as being beneficial.  
 
There are however, still many problems that need to be addressed in the AC if it can 
serve as a platform for effective action.216 The AC lacks a strong coordination of 
working groups, an effective funding mechanism and national delegates well-
experienced in Arctic needs. Also lacking are a separate unit dealing with the 
external relations with other states and relevant international platforms, sufficient 
practical activities which utilize the results of research, robust evaluations of 
prepared documents (guidelines and reports) in terms of their influence and value 
and a strong social media centre.217 The sub-units of the Arctic states that are 
conducting day-to-day governance in the Arctic have no place in the Arctic Council, 
and this can be reflected in their lack of confidence in the AC system. 
 
The Arctic Council and the newly started Arctic Ocean Coastal State Co-operation 
seem to show that the states and other actors in the region have taken a very 
responsible approach to address the forthcoming challenges. To some extent, these 
co-operation forms have been seen as competing with each other, even if at the 
moment it seems that much of the momentum behind the Arctic Ocean Coastal State 
                                                 
216 See Ronson, (2011), pp. 95-111; Young, (2009), pp. 73-82.  
217 A strong media centre seems important for the AC in order to supply relevant news to the 
governments and local inhabitants mainly focusing on member states contributions and other 
sensitive events so as to avoid unexpected tension caused from wrongly broadcasting in other media. 
An example of such broadcasting was when in August 2007, two Russian mini-submarines planted a 
Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean at the North Pole, it was in fact an adventure trip 
partly financed by a Scandinavian businessman. The flag of the Adventurer’s Club of New York was 
also on board and an Australian and an American citizen, who were the masterminds of the trip, were 
included in the mission. However, the media presented the event in a different way, and that Russia 
had occupied the North Pole as part of its sovereign territory although it was no way an official act of 
the Russian Government.  
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Co-operation is overshadowed because of developments in the Arctic Council. The 
second meeting of the Arctic Ocean Coastal States in Chelsea Canada was heavily 
criticized by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who argued that the Arctic 
Council is the best place for dealing with Arctic issues.218 
 
The Arctic Council performs best as a science provider, feeding science on threats to 
the region to all national, sub-national and indigenous governing structures, in order 
for these to respond adequately. This is most evident in its ever-increasing and 
important work on various aspects of climate change in the region, which feed 
information to national and local policy makers as to the adaptation and mitigation 
challenges and options, thereby increasing the overall resilience of the region.  
6. CONCLUSION ON THE ARCTIC COUNCIL IN ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
ARCTIC  
 
The Arctic cooperation started with the establishment of the AEPS merged into the 
Arctic Council, and which has not changed its legal status or financial mechanism. 
Its main shortcomings with respect to dealing with issues related to climate change 
include its soft-law character, which is, however gradually changing in a unique 
manner. A number of proposals recommend a formal legal instrument to handle the 
AC although the member states lack consensus of opinion in order to proffer support 
for binding instruments. One needs to bear in mind that the AC can handle the 
climate change issue in a better way, if it becomes stronger in general and develops 
expertise in climate change science mainly relevant to the Arctic. The reality is that 
special situations in the Arctic (e.g., Arctic issues, history and peoples) facilitate a 
soft-law form of cooperation other than its regular international organisation.  
                                                 
218 Online: < http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/787178--canada-gets-cold-shoulder-at-
arctic-meeting> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
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A much more promising way forward is the most recent development in the Arctic 
Council, which can be seen as being unique in international relations. Although the 
Arctic Council is a soft-law inter-governmental forum, it was able to co-ordinate 
efforts to adopt the first legally binding treaty on search and rescue in the Arctic 
between the eight Arctic states; a treaty on a topic of particular importance to a 
region with difficult rescue conditions and an increasing use of its maritime areas. 
The conclusion of the Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement was followed by the 
establishment of a new task-force on oil spill preparedness and response, a topic that 
is highly relevant, given the opening of waters for offshore hydrocarbon exploitation 
and its transportation by ships. The work of this task-force may well produce 
another legally binding agreement, posing a general question as to whether this is 
the new way in which the Arctic Council responds to the vast challenges of this 
dramatically transforming region. In addition, in those issue-areas where the Arctic 
states do not possess enough capacity to counter the management of emerging 
economic activities in the Arctic (in particular shipping in the melting Arctic Ocean 
waters), they act together to push for global regulation. This is shown in the way the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA)219 conducted by the AC, 
recommended to the member states to push for a mandatory Polar Code in the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a process that is now on-going.220  
 
Together with the newly established process to establish a permanent secretariat in 
Tromsø, it is pertinent to ask whether the Arctic Council is gradually becoming 
ready to counter the challenges posed by economic activities in the region gradually, 
                                                 
219 Arctic Council Status on Implementation of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, (2011). 
220 For an analysis of the process to develop a mandatory Polar Code, see Developing a Mandatory 
Polar Code– Progress and Gaps presented at the Thirty four Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, ( 
2011). . 
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proactively and one-by-one. It is also of importance to emphasize the unique nature 
of this emerging practice of a soft-law body producing proactive and legally binding 
agreements. If we take into consideration that the ministerial meetings have become 
much stronger in recent years (as has the overall guidance from the ministerial 
meetings to match the forthcoming challenges), together with the establishment of a 
permanent secretariat and a new way of tackling these challenges (with legally 
binding agreements); there seems to be some very promising development and this 
lessens the need to ponder any overarching treaty ideas for the region.  
 
Yet, this is not to say that there is no need for reform in the Arctic Council. There 
would clearly be the need to create a form of Arctic Regional Council, to include 
Arctic regional governments in the work of the AC. Working groups should also be 
coordinated more effectively and their working boundaries should be clarified in 
such a way that an AC project may find its clear lead. The Arctic states should 
ensure that extra burdens are not imposed on national delegates, so that they can 
spend appropriate time on the AC’s activities. The SAOs should not be changed too 
frequently – if an SAO retires from governmental service, then the position should 
be filled by someone who has experience participating in Arctic affairs. National 
governments should develop closer contacts with residents of the Arctic and ensure 
their proper representation in national delegations – the proposed Arctic Regional 
Council could play an advocacy role in this regard, while inclusion of more regional 
representatives in national governments might be helpful in highlighting issues 
affecting the Arctic at a national level. Although establishing confidence and faith 
among its members is largely a political issue, a higher level of interaction may be 
seen as a means for gaining such.  
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As a conclusion, it can be said that even if there are still many open questions as to 
whether the AC can counter the challenges ahead (mainly caused by global climate 
change), there are very strong recent developments within the Council. These relate 
to both climate change mitigation and to its response to concerns over the economic 
and social impact of economic activities entering the region. In terms of its climate 
mitigation role, the AC has become the main platform for assessing the pace and 
scale of climate change in the region, thereby influencing global science processes 
such as the IPCC assessments. This in-turn has an indirect impact on how the 
decision-makers perceive climate change proceeding. Since decision-makers at 
various levels have to rely on established climate science to make climate change 
mitigation decisions, it can be argued that the Arctic Council does have a role to 
play in the overall efforts to mitigate climate change. Yet, the climate science work 
in the Council does not pertain only to climate change mitigation but also to those 
efforts in the Arctic, to adapt to the consequences of climate change. As a main 
platform for assessing the consequences of climate change in the region, it 
simultaneously feeds information to various levels of Arctic governance. In respect 
of this, the AC need to take into account how their activities are in-line with cutting-
edge knowledge of how climate change is proceeding in the region, and take 
necessary measures to adapt to its consequences. This role of the AC would be 
enhanced by having a strong media centre (as suggested above), which could 
communicate the main findings of the assessments of the AC more effectively and 
in a popularized manner.   
 
For a long time, the Arctic Council was criticized for not having a strong enough 
structure to manage the incoming economic activities in the region, in particular, 
those in the marine environment. The AC is clearly on the way to making a full 
transition, as it is moves from a traditional decision shaping role to one of decision 
making.  Its political guidance role has become stronger with high-profile ministerial 
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meetings and the new annual deputy minister meetings, and soon it will be serviced 
not only by SAOs, but also by a permanent secretariat. The new manner of 
proactively regulating difficult issues within the Arctic (search and rescue and oil 
spill preparedness and response), testify – to the surprise of many – that the Arctic 
Council has been able to create a new form of governance that is of soft-law status 
but can react to emerging problems in a timely manner and with legal instruments in 
order to provide effective governance.  
 
Even though climate change is rapidly transforming the region, it does seem (at the 
time of writing), that the Arctic Council is moving in the right direction. This 
dissertation has presented proposals to make it even stronger, as well as how the 
various soft-law bodies functioning in the region could synergize their activities and 
in that way keep up the strong momentum with which the AC is currently 
progressing. It is with scholarly attention to the possible problems in the AC that we 
can steer the AC to counter the challenges posed by climate change consequences in 
the region.   
244  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Journal Articles 
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Snidal, Duncan., ‘Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance’,  54:3 International Organization (2000), pp. 421-456. 
Abbott, Kenneth W. Keohane, Robert O. Moravcsik, Andrew. Slaughter,  Anne- Marie. 
and  Snidal, Duncan.,  ‘The Concept of Legalization’ , 54:3 International 
Organization (2000), pp. 401-420. 
Arrhenius, Svante., ‘On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the 
Temperature of the Ground’, 41:251 London, Edinburgh and Dublin 
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science (1896), pp. 237-276. 
Baxter, R R., ‘International Law in Her Infinite Variety’, 29 The International and 
Comparative Law quarterly (1980), pp. 549-566. 
Berliner,  Mark L., ‘Uncertainty and Climate Change’, 18:4 Statistical Science (2003), 
pp. 430-435. 
Bloom, Evan T., ‘Establishment of the Arctic Council’, 93 American Journal of 
International Law (1999), pp. 712-722. 
Blutman,  László., ‘In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law’, 59:3 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2010), pp. 605-624. 
Bowman, Michael., ‘Towards a Unified Treaty Body for Monitoring Compliance with 
UN Human Rights Conventions? Legal Mechanisms for Treaty Reform’, 7:1  
Human Rights Law Review (2007), pp. 225-249. 
 
245  
Boyle, Alan E., ‘Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and 
International Law’, 17 Journal of Environmental Law (2005), pp.3-26. 
Boyle, Alan E., ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treatises and Soft Law’, 48 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1999), pp. 901-913. 
Bruun, Lori Lyman., ‘Beyond the 1948 Convention – Emerging Principles of Genocide 
in Customary International Law’, 17 Maryland Journal of International Law 
and Trade (1993), pp. 193-226. 
Bubier, J L. Moore T R.  and Roulet, N T., ‘Methane Emission from Wetlands in the 
Midboreal Region of Northern Ontario, Canada’, 74:8 Ecology (1993), pp. 
2240-2254. 
Carraro,  Carlo.  and     Siniscalc,  Domenico.,  ‘Strategies  for  the  International 
Protection of the Environment’, 52:3 Journal of Public Economics (1993), 
pp. 309–328. 
Charney, Jonathan I., ‘Universal International Law’, 87 American Journal of 
International Law (1993), pp. 529-551. 
Charnovitz, Steve., ‘Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law’, 100:2 
American Journal of International Law (2006), pp. 348-372. 
Cheng,  Bin.,  ‘United  Nations  Resolutions  on  Outer  Space:  Instant  International 
Customary Law?’, 5 Indian Journal of International Law (1965), pp. 23-112. 
Chinkin, Christine M.,  ‘The Changes of Soft Law: Development and Change in 
International Law’, 38:4 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1989), pp. 850-866. 
 
246  
Churchill, Robin R. and Ulfstein, Gear., ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in 
International Law’, 94:4 American Journal of International Law (2000), 
pp.623-659. 
Corell, Hans, ‘Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal 
Regime’, 37:4 Environmental Policy and Law (2007), pp. 321-324. 
Cutler, A Claire., ‘Public Meets Private: The International Unification and 
Harmonization of Private International Trade Law’, 13:1 Global Society 
(1999), pp. 25-48. 
Dodds, Klaus., ‘Accessibility, Resources and Sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean’ 1:1 
Global Policy (2011), pp.303- 311. 
Fawcett, James., ‘The Legal Character of International Agreements’, 30 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1953), pp. 381-400. 
Gaer, Felice D., ‘A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN 
Treaty Body System’ 7:1 Human Rights Law Review (2007), pp. 109-139. 
Goldstein, Judith. and Martin, Lisa L., ‘ Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and 
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note’, 54 International Organization 
(2000), pp. 603-632. 
Guzman,  Andrew  T.,  ‘A  Compliance-Based  Theory  of  International  Law’,  90 
California Law Review (2002), pp. 1823-1887. 
Hasanat, Md Waliul., ‘Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region in the Light of 
International Law’, 2 The Yearbook of Polar Law (2010), pp. 279-309. 
Hasanat, Md Waliul., ‘Definitional Constraints Regarding Soft Law’, 3 AALCO 
Quarterly Bulletin (2007), pp. 8-32. 
247  
Hasanat, Md Waliul., ‘International Cooperation in the Northern Forum: Emerging 
New Norms in International Law?’, Polar Record (published online 31 
October 2011, doi:10.1017/S0032247411000404), pp. 1–15. 
Hasanat, Md Waliul., ‘Towards Model Arctic-Wide Environmental Cooperation 
Combating Climate Change’, 20 Yearbook of International Environmental 
Law (2009), pp. 122-157. 
Hillgenberg, Hartmut., ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’, 10:3 European Journal of 
International Law (1999), pp. 499-515. 
Huang, Peter H., ‘International Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice’, 
31 Journal of Legal Studies (2002), pp. 237-258. 
Hurwich,  Evelyn  M.,  ‘Arctic’,  5  Yearbook  of  International  Environmental  Law 
(1994), pp. 233-238. 
Hurwich,  Evelyn  M.,  ‘Arctic’,  6  Yearbook  of  International  Environmental  Law 
(1995), pp. 298-303. 
Jabour, Julia. and Weber, Melissa., ‘Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of Polar 
Sovereignty?’, 17 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (2008), pp. 27-40. 
Keohane, Robert O., ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, 36:2 International 
Organization (1982), pp. 325-355. 
Kerr, Richard A., ‘Climate Change: A worrying Trend of Less Ice, Higher Seas’, 
311:5768  Science (2006), pp. 1747-1750. 
Kingsbury, Benedict. Krisch, Nico. and Stewart, Richard B., ‘The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law’, 68:3-4 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005), pp. 
15-62. 
248  
Klabbers, Jan., ‘Informal Agreement in International Law: Towards a Theoretical 
Framework’, 5 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (1994), pp. 267-387. 
Klabbers, Jan., ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’, 65 Nordic Journal of International 
Law (1996), pp. 167-182. 
Klabbers, Jan., ‘The Undesirability of Soft Law’, 67:4 Nordic Journal of International 
Law (1998), pp. 381-391. 
Koivurova, Timo., ‘Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty - Evaluation and a New Proposal’, 
17:1 Review of European Community International & Environmental Law 
(2008), pp. 14-26. 
Koivurova, Timo., ‘Governance of Protected Areas in the Arctic’, 5 Utrecht Law 
Review (2009), pp. 44-60. 
Koivurova, Timo., ‘Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly 
Changing Scene of Arctic Governance’, 46:237 Polar Record (2010), pp. 
146-156. 
Koivurova, Timo., ‘The Status and Role of Indigenous Peoples in International 
Governance’, 3 The Yearbook of Polar Law (2011), pp. 169-192. 
Krasner, Stephen D., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables’, 36:2 International Organization (1982), pp. 185-205. 
Krisch, Nico. and Kingsbury, Benedict., ‘Symposium on Global Governance and 
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’, 17:1 European 
Journal of International Law (2006), pp. 1-13. 
Kuik,  Onno.  Aerts,  Jeroen.  Berkhout,  Frans.  Biermann,  Frank  .  Bruggink,  Jos. 
Gupta, Joyeeta.  and S J Tol, Richard., ‘Post-2012 climate policy dilemmas: 
a review of proposals’, 8:3 Climate Policy (2008), pp. 317-336. 
249  
Kunz, Josef L., ‘General International Law and the Law of International 
Organizations’, 47:3  American Journal of International  Law  (1953), pp. 
456-462. 
Lapidoth, Ruth., ‘Sovereignty in Transition’, 45:1 Journal of International Affairs 
(1992), pp. 325-346. 
Leary, David., ‘Bi-polar Disorder? Is Bioprospecting an Emerging Issue for the Arctic 
as well as for Antarctica?’, 17 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law (2008), pp.41-55. 
Lillich, Richard  B., ‘The Governing Importance of Customary International Human 
Rights Law’, 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 
(1995-96), pp. 1-30. 
Nychka, Doug., ‘Challenges in Understanding the Atmosphere’, 95:451 Journal of the 
American Statistical Association (2000), pp. 972-975. 
O’Flaherty, Michael.  and O’Brien, Claire., ‘Reform of UN Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies: A Critique of the Concept Paper on the High 
Commissioner's Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body’, 7:1  Human 
Rights Law Review (2007), pp. 141-172. 
Oppenheimer, Michael.  And  Alley, R B., ‘Ice Sheets, Global Warming, and Article 2 
of the UNFCCC: An editorial Essay’, 68 Climatic Change (2005), pp. 257- 
267. 
Oppenheimer, Michal.  And Petsonk, Annie., ‘Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical 
Origins, Recent Interpretations’, 73 Climate Change (2005), pp. 195-226. 
Orvik, Nils., ‘Nordic Cooperation and High Politics’, 28  International Organization 
(1974), pp. 61-88. 
250  
Raustiala, Kal., ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’, 99  American 
journal of International Law (2005), pp. 591-614. 
Regent, Sabrina., ‘The Open Method of Coordination: A New Supranational Form of 
Governance?’, 9 European Law Journal (2003), pp. 190-214. 
Robilant, Anna Di., ‘Genealogies of Soft-law’, 54:3 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law (2006), pp. 599-554. 
Rodhe, Henning. Charlson, Robert. and Crawford, Elisabeth., ‘Svante Arrhenius and 
the Greenhouse Effect’, 26:1 Ambio: a journal of the human environment 
(1997), pp. 2-5. 
Ronson, Alison., ‘Political Climate Change: The Evolving Role of the Arctic Council’, 
33 The Northern Review (2011), pp. 95-111. 
Sand, Peter H., ‘Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance’ 18:2 Boston 
College Environmental Affairs Law Review (1991), pp. 213–277. 
Schachter, Oscar., ‘The Twilight Existence of International Agreements’, 71:2 
American Journal of International Law (1977), pp. 296-304. 
Scheuerman, William E., ‘Economic Globalization and the Rule of Law’, 16:1 
Constellations (1999), pp. 3-25. 
Scott, James Brown., ‘The Institute of International Law’, 21:4 American Journal of 
International Law (1927), pp.716-736. 
Shaffer, Gregory.  and Pollack, Mark A., ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’, 94 Minnesota 
Law Review (2010), pp. 706-799. 
 
251  
Skjærseth, Jon Birger. Stokke, Olav Schram. and Wettestad, Jørgen., ‘Soft Law, Hard 
Law, and Effective Implementation of International Environmental Norms’, 
6  Global Environmental Politics (2006), pp. 104-120. 
Skjærseth, Jon Birger., ‘Exploring the Consequences of Soft Law and Hard Law: 
Implementing International Nutrient Commitments in Norwegian 
Agriculture’, 10:1 International Environmental Agreements: politics, law 
and economics (2010), pp. 1-14. 
Smith, Samantha., ‘Ministerial with Only Three Ministers’, 4 WWF Arctic Bulletins 
(2000), p. 4. 
Solow, Andrew R., ‘Statistics in Atmospheric Science’, 18:4 Statistical Science 
(2003), pp. 423-424. 
Sounders, Alan., ‘Pondering an Arctic Council’, 19:2 Northern Perspectives (1991), 
pp. 1-2. 
Spence, Chris. Kulovesi, Kati. Gutiérrez, María. and Muñoz, Miquel., ‘Great 
Expectation: Understanding Bali and the Climate Change Negotiation 
Process’, 17:2 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (2008), pp. 142-153. 
Stein, Arthur A., ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, 
36:2 International Organization (1982), pp. 299-324. 
Stokke,  Olav Schram., ‘A Legal Regime for the Arctic? Interplay with the Law of the 
Sea Convention’, 31  Marine Policy (2007), pp. 402-408. 
Stokke, Olav Schram., ‘Protecting the Arctic Environment: The Interplay of Global 
and Regional Regimes’, 1 The Yearbook of Polar Law (2009), pp. 349-370. 
 
252  
Timo Koivurova and David L VanderZwaag, ‘The Arctic Council at 10 Years: 
Retrospect and Prospect’, 40:1 University of British Columbia Law Review 
(2007), pp. 121-195. 
VanderZwaag, David L. Huebert, Rob. and Ferrara, Stacey., ‘The Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral 
Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering while the Arctic Marine Environment 
Totters’, 30:2 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (2002), pp. 
131-171. 
VanderZwaag, David L., ‘Arctic’ 11 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
(2000), pp. 261-267. 
VanderZwaag, David L., ‘The Arctic’, 9 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
(1998), pp. 266-273. 
Young, Oran R., ‘Can the Arctic Council and the Northern Forum Find Common 
Ground?’, 38:207 Polar Record (2002), pp. 289-296. 
Young, Oran R., ‘Governing the Arctic: From Cold War to Mosaic of Cooperation’ 11 
Global Governance (2005), pp. 9-15. 
Young, Oran R., ‘If an Arctic Ocean Treaty is not the Solution, What is the 
Alternative?’, 47:243  Polar Record (2011), pp. 327-334. 
Young, Oran R., ‘Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes’, 36:2 
International Organization (1982), pp. 277-297. 
Young, Oran R., ‘Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar 
North’,  45:232  Polar Record (2009), pp. 73-82. 
Young, Orang R., ‘Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives’, 
2 Global Governance (1996), pp.1-24. 
253  
Books 
Agarwal, Anil., and Narain, Sunita., Global Warming in an Unequal World: a case of 
environmental colonialism (Centre for Science and Environment: New Delhi, 
1991 (reprinted in 1996 and 2003)). 
Archer, David., Global Warming: understanding the forecast (Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd.: USA, UK and Australia, 2007). 
Armstrong, Terence E. Rogers, George William. and Rowley, Graham.,  The 
Circumpolar North (Methuen: London, 1978). 
Arnell, Nigel., Global Warming, River Flows and Water Resources (John Wiley & 
Sons: Chichester, UK, 1996). 
Aust, Anthony.,   Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2000). 
Birnie, Patricia W. and Boyle, Alan E., International Law and the Environment 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 2002). Baird, Patrick D., The 
Polar World (Longmans: London, 1964). 
Brownlie, Ian., Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press: New 
York, 1998). 
Chayes, Abram.,  and Chayes, Antonia Handler., The New Sovereignty: compliance 
with international regulatory agreements (Harvard University Press: Harvard, 
1998). 
Couiper-Johndton, Ross., El Niño: the weather phenomenon that changed the world 
(Hodder and Stoughton: London, 2000). 
 
254  
Cutler, A Claire,  Private Power and Global Authority: transnational merchant law 
in the global political economy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2003). 
D’Amato, Anthony.,  The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell 
University Press: London and Ithaca, 1971). 
Doelle, Meinhard., From Hot Air to Action?: climate change, compliance and the 
future of international environmental law (Thomson Canada Limited: Toronto, 
2005). 
Figdor, Emily. and Cassady, Alison., The Carbon Boom: national and state trends in 
global warming pollution since 1960 (Environment California Research & 
Policy Center: Los Angeles, 2006). Online: 
<http://www.environmentcalifornia.org/uploads/Jg/Pk/JgPkRMfUISU7lgncGa
A1bA/Carbon-Boom-CA-9.16.06.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
Heinämäki, Leena., The Right to be a Part of Nature: indigenous peoples and the 
environment (Lapland University Press: Rovaniemi, 2010). 
Henkin, Louis.,  How Nations Behave: law and foreign policy (Columbia University 
Press: New York, 1979). 
Hilpert, Katrin. Mannke, Franziska. and Schmidt-Thome, Philipp.,  Towards Climate 
Change Adaptation in the Baltic Sea Region (Geological Survey of Finland: 
Espoo, 2007). 
Houghton, John., Global Warming: the complete briefing (Cambridge University 
Press: New York, 2009). 
Ikenberry, John., After Victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of 
order after major wars (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2001). 
255  
Jackson, Robert H., Quasi-States: sovereignty, international relations, and the third 
world (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1990). 
Kalman, Bobbie., The Arctic Land (Crabtree Publishing Company: New York and 
Toronto, 1947 (reprinted in 1988)). 
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence (Longman Inc., 
2011). 
Keskitalo, E Carina H., Climate Change and Globalization in the Arctic: an 
integrated approach to vulnerability assessment (Earthscan Publications: 
London, 2008). 
Keskitalo, E Carina H., Negotiating the Arctic: the construction of an international 
region (Routledge: New York and London, 2004). 
Klabbers,  Jan.,  An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2002). 
Koivurova, Timo.,  Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic: a study of 
international legal norms (Ashgate Publishing Company: Hampshire and 
Burlington, 2002). 
Kvistad, John M., The Barents Spirit: the process of regionalization and Norwegian 
foreign policy in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (Oslo: University of Oslo 
Press, 1994). 
Migdal,  Joel S., Strong Societies and Weak States: state-society relations and state 
capabilities in the third world (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1988). 
 
256  
Nilsson, Annika E., A Changing Arctic Climate: science and policy in the arctic 
climate  impact  assessment  (Linköping        University  Press:  Linköping, 
Sweden 2007). 
Ostrom, Elinor.,  Governing the Commons: the evolution of institutions for collective 
actions (Cambridge university Press: Cambridge, the UK, (first published in 
1990; reprinted 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 (twice), 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). 
Rosenne, Shabtai.,  Development in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1989). 
Rothwell, Donald   R.,   The Polar Regions and the Development of International 
Law ( Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996). 
Sale, Richard., The Arctic: a complete story (Frances Lincoln Limited: London, 
2008). 
Sands,  Philippe.,  Principles  of  International  Environmental  Law  (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2003). 
Sands, Philippe.,  Lawless World: America and the making and breaking of global 
rules (Penguin Books Ltd: London, 2005). 
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa.,  Toward a New Legal Common Sense: law, 
globalization and emancipation (Butterworths: London, 2002), pp. 94-96. 
Schermers, Henry G. and M Blokker, Niels.,  International Institutional Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden, 2004). 
Stein, Arthur A., Why Nations Cooperate: circumstance and choice in international 
relations (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1990). 
257  
Sugden, David.,  Arctic and Antarctic: a modern geophysical synthesis (Basil 
Blackwell: Oxford, 1982). 
Tennberg, Monica., The Arctic Council: a study in governmentality (Lapland 
University Press: Rovaniemi, 1998) [an edited version of the book reprinted 
later as  Tennberg, Monica.,  Arctic Environmental Cooperation: a study in 
governmentality (Ashgate Publishing Company: Hants and Burlington, 
Canada, 2000)]. 
Yamin, Farhana. and Depledge, Joanna., The International Climate Change Regime: a 
guide to rules, institutions and procedures (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2004). 
 
Edited Books 
 
Aldy, Joseph E. and Stavins, Robert N. (eds.),  Post-Kyoto International Climate 
Policy: implementing architectures for agreement (Cambridge University 
Press: New York, 2009). 
Bernhardt, Rudolf. (ed.),  Encyclopedia of Public International Law: Regional 
Cooperation, Organizations and Problems (North-Holland Publishing 
Company: Amsterdam, 1983). 
Biermann, Frank. Pattberg, Philipp. and Zelli, Fariborz. (eds.), Global Climate 
Governance Beyond 2012: architecture, agency and adaptation (Cambridge 
University Press: New York, USA, 2010). 
 
 
258  
Cassese, S. Carotti, B.  Casini, L.  Macchia, M.  MacDonald, E.  and Savino, M.(eds.), 
Global Administrative Law: cases, materials, issues (New York University 
School of Law, 2008); Online: 
<http://www.iilj.org/gal/documents/GALCasebook2008.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
Nuttall, Mark.  and Callaghan, Terry V.(eds.), The Arctic: environment, people, policy 
(Harwood Academic Publishers: Amsterdam, 2000). 
 
 
 
Book References without an Author 
 
 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment [ACIA Scientific Report] (Cambridge University 
Press: New York, 2005). Online: 
<http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_Science_Chapters_Final/ACIA_Cover 
s_Final.pdf> (accessed 8 November 2011). 
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis – Contribution of Working Group I 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York, 2007). Online: 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assess 
ment_report_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (North-Holland Publishing Company: New 
York, 2000). 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (North-Holland Publishing Company: 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 1983). 
 
259  
Finnish Barents Group Oy and others, Barents: The Barents Euro Arctic Council 
(Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Helsinki, 1996). 
Impacts of a Warming Arctic- Arctic Climate Impact Assessment [ACIA Synthesis 
Report] (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2004). Online: 
<http://amap.no/acia/> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, New York, 1987). 
 
 
 
Book Chapters 
 
 
Archer, Clive. and Serivener, David., ‘International Cooperation in the Arctic 
Environment’, in Nuttall, Mark.  and Callaghan, Terry V. (eds.),  The Arctic: 
environment, people, policy (Harwood Academic Publishers: Amsterdam, 
2000), pp. 601-619. 
Bernhardt, Rudolf., ‘Treaties’ in Bernhardt, Rudolf. (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
International Law (Elsevier Science Publishers BV: Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands, 1984), pp. 459-464. 
Bernstein, Steven.  and Cashore, Benjamin., ‘Non-state Global Governance: In Forest 
Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention’ in 
Kirton, John J.  and Trebilcock, Michael J. (eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: 
voluntary standards in global trade, environment and social governance, 
(Ashgate Publishing Limited: England, USA, 2004), pp. 33-63. 
Beveridge, Fiona. and Nott, Sue., ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’, in Craig, Paul. and 
Harlow, Carol. (eds.), Law Making in the European Union (Kluwer Law 
International: London, 1998), pp. 285-309. 
260  
Birnie, Patricia.,‘International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and 
Future Needs’, in Hurrell, Andrew.  and  Kingsbury, Benedict. (eds.), The 
International Politics of the Environment: actors, interests and institutions 
(Oxford University Press: New York, 1992), pp. 51-84. 
Blackett, Adelle., ‘Code of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Regulatory State in 
Developing Countries’, in Kirton, John J.  and Trebilcock, Michael J. (eds.), 
Hard Choices, Soft Law: voluntary standards in global trade, environment and 
social governance ( Ashgate Publishing Limited: England, USA, 2004), pp. 
121-133. 
Chinkin, Christine., ‘Normative Development in the International Legal System’, in 
Shelton, Dinah. (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: the role of non-binding 
norms in the international legal system (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2000), pp. 21-42. 
Conca, Ken., ‘Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate’, in Conca, Ken.  and 
Dabelko, Geoffrey D.(eds.), Green Planet Blues: environmental politics from 
Stockholm to Johannesburg (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 2004), pp. 
71-81. 
Engstad, Nils A., ‘Developing the Barents Sea Region: Opportunities and Risks’, in 
Dellenbrant, Jan Å. and Olsson, Mats. (eds.), The Barents Region: security 
and economic development in the European north (CERUM: Umeå, Sweden, 
1994), pp. 18-26. 
Francioni,  Francesco., ‘International ‘Soft Law’: A Contemporary Assessment’, in 
Lowe, Vaughan.  and Fitzmaurice,  M.  (eds.), Fifty Years of the International 
Court of Justice: essays in honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1996), pp. 167-178. 
 
261  
Holst, Johan Jorgen., ‘The Barents Region: Institutions, Cooperation and Prospects’, in 
Stokke, Olav Schram. and Tunander,  Ola. (eds.), The Barents Region: 
cooperation in Arctic Europe (SAGE Publications Ltd: London, 1994), pp. 11-
24. 
Hønneland,  Geir. and Stokke,  Olav Schram., ‘ Introduction’, in Stokke, Olav Schram. 
and Hønneland, Geir. (eds.), International Cooperation and Arctic 
Governance: regime, effectiveness and northern region building (Routledge: 
London, 2007), pp. 6-8. 
Hønneland, Geir., ‘World’s Further Apart? Identity Formation in the Barents Euro- 
Arctic Region’, in Flikke, Geir. (ed.), The Barents Region Revisited 
(Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo, 1998), pp. 79-92. 
Jacobson, Harold K. and Weiss, Edith Brown., ‘Assessing the Record and Designing 
Strategies to Engage Countries’, in  Jacobson, Harold K.  and Weiss, Edith 
Brown.  (eds.), Engaging Countries: strengthening compliance with 
international environmental accords (MIT Press: USA, 1998), pp. 511-554. 
Joenniemi, Pertti., ‘The Barents, Baltic and Nordic Projects: A Comparative Analysis’, 
in Flikke, Geir. (ed.), The Barents Region Revisited (Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs: Oslo, 1998), pp. 9-23. 
Keskitalo, E Carina H., ‘New Governance in the Arctic and   Its Role for Supporting 
Climate Change Adaptation’, in Koivurova, Timo.  Keskitalo, E Carina H. and 
Bankes, Nigel. (eds.), Climate Governance in the Arctic (Springer- Verlag: 
Berlin, 2009), pp. 97-116. 
 
 
262  
Kirton, John J.  and Trebilcock, Michael J., ‘Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law 
in Sustainable Global Governance’, in Kirton, John J.  and Trebilcock, 
Michael J. (eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: voluntary standards in global 
trade, environment and social governance (Ashgate Publishing Limited: 
England, USA, 2004), pp. 3-30. 
Koivurova, Timo.  and Hasanat, Md Waliul., ‘Climate Policy of the Arctic Council’, in 
Koivurova, Timo. Keskitalo, E Carina H. and Bankes, Nigel. (eds.), Climate 
Governance in the Arctic (Springer-Verlag: Berlin, 2009), pp. 51-75. 
Kozyrev, Andrei., ‘Visions of the Authors of the Barents Euro Arctic Region 
Cooperation – Past and Future’, in  Heininen, Lassi.  and Langlais, Richard. 
(eds.), Europe’s Northern Dimension: the BEAR meets the south (University 
of Lapalnd Press: Rovaniemi, Finland, 1997), pp. 45-51. 
Lamy, Steven L., ‘Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism’, in Baylis, John. and Smith, 
Steve. (eds.),  The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2001), pp. 124-141. 
Lemke, Peter ., ‘Dimensions and Mechanisms of Global Climate Change’, in Winter, 
Gerd. (ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: 
perspectives from science, sociology and the law (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2006), pp. 37-66. 
Levy, Mark A.  Keohane, Robert O.  and Haas, Peter M., ‘Improving the Effectiveness 
of International Environmental Institutions’, in Hass, Peter M. Keohane, 
Robert O. and Levy, Marc A. (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: sources of 
effective international environmental protection (MIT Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1993), pp. 397-426. 
 
263  
Maupain, Francis., ‘International Labour Organisation: Recommendations and Similar 
Instruments’, in Shelton, Dinah. (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: the role 
of non-binding norms in the international legal system (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2000), pp. 372-393. 
McDougal, Myres S. and Reisman, W Michael.,‘The Prescribing Function in the 
World Constitutive Process: How International Law Is Made’, in McDougal, 
Myres S. and Reisman, W Michael. (eds.),  International Law Essays: a 
supplement to international law in contemporary perspective (Foundation 
Press: New York, 1981), pp. 355-377. 
Möller, Frank.  and Pehkonen, Samu.,  ‘Discursive Landscapes of the European 
North’, in Möller, Frank.  and Pehkonen, Samu.  (eds.), Encountering the 
North:Cultural Geography, International Relations and Northern Landscapes. 
(Ashgate: Aldershot, 2003), pp. 1-30. 
Oberthur, Sebastian.,  ‘The Climate Change Regime: Interaction with ICAO, IMO, and 
the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement’, in Oberthur, Sebastian.  and Gehring, 
Thomas. (eds.), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental 
Governance: synergy and conflict among international and EU policies (The 
MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2006), pp. 53-77. 
Richardson, Elliot L., ‘Climate Change: Problems of Law-Making’ in Hurrell, 
Andrew. and Kingsbury, Benedict.  (eds.), The International Politics of the 
Environment: actors, interests and institutions (Oxford University Press: New 
York, 1992), pp. 166-179. 
Sergounin,  Alexander A ., ‘The Barents Regional Cooperation and the Russian 
Security Discourse’, in Flikke, Geir. (ed.), The Barents Region Revisited. 
(Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo, 1998), pp. 25-52. 
 
264  
Shelton, Dinah., ‘Law, Non-Law and the Problem of Soft-Law’ in Shelton, Dinah. 
(ed.), Commitment and Compliance: the role of non-binding norms in the 
international legal system (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000). 
Sreejith, S G., ‘Subjective Environmentalism: The Barents Euro - Arctic Council and 
Its Climate Policy’, in Koivurova, Timo.  Keskitalo, E Carina H. and Bankes, 
Nigel. (eds.), Climate Governance in the Arctic ( Springer-Verlag: Berlin, 
2009), pp. 383-402. 
Stripple, Johannes., ‘Governing the Climate Bordering the World’ in Lundqvist, 
Lennart J.  and Biel, Anders. (eds.), From Kyoto to the Town Hall: making 
international climate policy work at the local level (Earthscan: The UK and 
USA, 2007), pp. 140-141. 
Tollefson, Chris., ‘ Indigenous Rights and Forest Certification in British Columbia’ in 
Kirton, John J.  and Trebilcock, Michael J. (eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: 
voluntary standards in global trade, environment and social governance 
(Ashgate Publishing Limited: England, USA, 2004), pp. 93-118. 
Ulfstein, Geir . Marauhn, Thilo.  and Zimmermann, Andreas.,  ‘Introduction’, in 
Ulfstein, Geir.  Marauhn, Thilo.  and Zimmermann, Andreas.  (eds.), Making 
Treaties Work: human rights, environment and arms control (Cambridge 
University Press: UK, 2007), pp. 3-12. 
Watt-Cloutier, Sheila. Fenge, Terry. and Crowley, Paul., ‘Responding to Global 
Climate Change: The Perspective of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference on the 
Arctic climate Impact Assessment’ in  Rosentrater, Lynn. (ed.),  Evidence and 
Implications of Dangerous Climate Change in the Arctic (WWF International 
Arctic Programme: Oslo, 2005), pp. 57–68. 
 
265  
Wiberg, Ulf., ‘Cooperation in the Barents Region’, in Dellenbrant, Jan Å and Olsson, 
Mats. (eds.), The Barents Region: security and economic development in the 
European north (CERUM: Umeå, Sweden, 1994), pp. 27-39. 
Zelli, Fariborz. Biermann, Frank. Pattberg, Philipp. And Asselt, Harro van., ‘The 
Consequences of a Fragmented Governance Architecture: a policy appraisal’, 
in Biermann,  Frank. Pattberg, Philipp.  and Zelli, Fariborz. (eds.), Global 
Climate Governance Beyond 2012: architecture, agency and adaptation 
(Cambridge University Press: New York, USA, 2010), pp. 25-34. 
 
 
 
Treaties and International Instruments 
 
Agenda 21 Adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  14  June  1992;  31  International  Legal 
Materials                                      (1992):874.                                      Online: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.h 
t> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Antarctic Treaty, Washington DC, USA, 1 December 1959, in force on 23 June 
1961; 402 United Nations Treaty Series 71; reprinted in 54:2 American Journal of 
International Law (1960), pp. 447-483.    Online: 
<http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 5 June 1992, in force 29 
December  1993;  31  International  Legal  Materials  (1992):818.  Online: 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
 
266  
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic, Paris, France, 22 September 1992, in force 25 March 1998; 
32 International Legal Materials (1993):1069.Online: 
<http://www.ospar.org/welcome.asp?menu=0> (accessed 11 November 
2011). 
 
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
(the EIA Convention), Espoo, Finland, 25 February 1991, in force 1997;   
30   International   Legal   Materials   (1991):802.   Online   
:<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/conven
tiontextenglish.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  adopted  at  1496th   Plenary 
Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI) of 
16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976; 6 International Legal Materials 
(1967):368 . Online: < http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm > 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted at 1496
th 
Plenary  Meeting  of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution 
2200A(XXI) of 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976; 6 International 
Legal                      Materials                      (1967):360.                      Online: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm>   (accessed   11   November 
2011). 
 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
adopted in the Third Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC, Kyoto, Japan 
1997,  in  force  16  February  2005;  37  International  Legal  Materials 
(1998):22. Online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
267  
Marrakesh Accords and Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration adopted by the Conference 
of Parties to the UNFCCC at  its Seventh session, Marrakesh, Morocco, 29 
October-10 November 2001, UNDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13  (21 January 2002). 
Online: <http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011). Official versions of the document released in three different 
documents:  Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties - 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh session held at 
Marrakesh 29 October – 10 November 2001, 
UNDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (21 January 2002). Online: 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf> (accessed 9 November 
2011); Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties - Report of 
the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh session held at Marrakesh 29 
October – 10 November 2001, UNDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (21 January 
2002). Online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011); and Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties - Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh session held at 
Marrakesh 29 October – 10 November 2001, 
UNDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3, (21 January 2002). Online: < 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a03.pdf> (accessed 9 November 
2011). 
 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, Canada, 
16 September 1987, in force 1 January 1989 (adjusted and/or amended in 
London 1990, Copenhagen 1992, Vienna 1995, Montreal 1997 and Beijing 
1999); 26 International Legal Materials (1987):1550; 1552 United Nations 
Treaty Series 3. Online: <www.unep.org/OZONE/pdfs/Montreal- 
Protocol2000.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
 
 
268  
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Adopted by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 
1992. UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I); 31 International Legal Materials 
(1992):874. 
 
The Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United 
States of America and Iran, Tehran, 15 August 1955, in force 16 June 1957; 
8 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements  899. 
 
Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, New York , 19 
December 1966, opened for signature 27 January 1967, in force 10 October 
1967; 610 United Nations Treaty Series 205. Online: 
              <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/tos/tos.html > (accessed 11
 November 2011). 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 
December  1982,  in  force  16  November  1994; 21  International  
Legal Materials (1982):1261. 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 
1992, in force 21 March 1994; 31 International Legal Materials 
(1992):849.   Online:   <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  between  States  and  
InternationalOrganizations or between International Organizations 1986, 
Vienna, Austria 21  March  1986,  not  yet  in  force;  25  International  
Legal  Materials (1986):543. 
 
 
269  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, 22 May 1969, in force 
27 January 1980; 1155 United Nations Treaty Series 331; 8 International 
Legal Materials (1969):679. 
 
Vienna Conventions on Consular Relations, Vienna, Austria, 24 April 1963, in force 
19   March   1967;   596   United   Nations   Treaty   Series   262.   Online   
:<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.p 
df> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations, Vienna, Austria, 18 April 1961, in 
force  24  April  1964;  500  United  Nations  Treaty  Series  95.  Online:< 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pd 
f> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
 
 
United Nations Documents 
 
Charter of the United Nations Adopted by the General Assembly on the Occasion of 
the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 
the USA, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945. Online: < 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space Adopted at 1280th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 1962(XVIII) of 13 December 1963, UN 
Doc.A/Res/1962 (XVIII). Online:  <http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/186/37/IMG/NR018637.pdf?Open 
Element> (accessed  11 November 2011). 
270  
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction Adopted at 1933rd Plenary 
Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749(XXV) of 
17 December 1970, UN Doc.A/Res/2749 (XXV); 10 International Legal 
Materials (1971): 220.Online: < http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/350/14/IMG/NR035014.pdf?Open 
Element> (accessed  11 November 2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 1721/XVI of 20 December 1961 on International Cooperation in 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at 1085th Plenary Meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly, UNDoc.A/Res/1721/XVI.Online: 
<http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_16_1721.h
t ml> (accessed  11 November 2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 1884/XVIII of 17 October 1963 on Question of General and 
Complete Disarmament at 1244th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations 
General Assembly, UNDoc.A/Res/18/1884. Online: < http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/185/59/IMG/NR018559.pdf?Open 
Element> (accessed  11 November 2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 38/161 of 19 December 1983 on Process of Preparation of the 
Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond at 102nd Plenary 
Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, UNDoc.A/Res/38/161. 
Online: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/38/a38r161.htm> (accessed  
11 November 2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 42/184 of 11 December 1987 on International Co-operation in the 
Field of Environment at 96th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly, UNDoc.A/RES/42/184. Online: <http://www.un.org/documents/ 
ga/res/42/a42 r184.htm> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
271  
UNGA  Resolution  42/187  of  11  December  1987  on  Report  of  the  World 
Commission on Environment and Development at 96th     Plenary Meeting of 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly,  UNDoc.A/Res/42/187.  Online: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 43/53 of 6 December 1988 on Protection of Global Climate for 
Present and Future Generations of Mankind at 70th Plenary Meeting of the 
United Nations General Assembly, UNDoc.A/RES/43/53. Online: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 44/206 of 22 December 1989 on Possible Adverse Effects of Sea-
level Rise on Islands and Coastal Areas, Particularly Low-lying Coastal Areas 
at 85th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly,UNDoc.A/RES/44/206. Online: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r206.htm> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 44/207 of 22 December 1989 on Protection of Global Climate for 
Present and Future Generations of Mankind at 85th Plenary Meeting of the 
United Nations General Assembly, UNDoc.A/RES/44/207. Online: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r207.htm> (accessed 9 November 
2011). 
 
UNGA Resolution 45/212 of 21 December 1990 on Protection of Global Climate for 
Present and Future Generations of Mankind at 71st Plenary Meeting of the 
United Nations General Assembly,UNDoc.A/RES/45/212. Online: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm> (accessed 9 November 
2011). 
272  
 
UNGA Resolution 59/174 of 20 December 2004 on Second International Decade of 
the World’s Indigenous People at 74th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations 
General Assembly, UNDoc.A/Res/59/174 ( 24 February 2005). Online:  < 
http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/486/70/PDF/N0448670.pdf?OpenElement
> (accessed  11 November 2011). 
 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Adopted at 61st 
session of 107th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 61/295 of 13 September 2007, UNDoc.A/Res/61/295.Online: < 
http://www.un-documents.net/a61r295.htm> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Adopted at 183rd Plenary Meeting of the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217(III) of 10 December 948, 
UN Doc.A/810 at 71(1948). Online: < http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388.pdf?Open 
Element> (accessed  11 November 2011). 
 
 
 
Arctic Council Documents 
 
ACAP Work Plan for 2009-2011 for approval by the SAOs- Arctic Contaminants 
Action Programme. Online : < http://www.ac-
acap.org/files/acap%20org/Work%20Plan%202009-2011.pdf > (accessed 
11November 2011). 
 
 
 
 
273  
Action Plan for Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 2009-2012 
adopted by the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro- 
Arctic Region (WGIP), Tromsø, Norway 21 January 2009. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/WGIP_Action_Plan_2009- 
2012_ENG.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
The AEPS Nuuk Report Adopted along with the Nuuk Declaration on Environment 
and Development in the Arctic, Nuuk, Greenland, 16 September 1993, the 
part: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP). On file with 
the author. 
 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic, Nuuk, Greenland, 12 May 2011. Online: <http://arctic- 
council.org/filearchive/nuuk_declaration_2011_signed_copy-1.pdf> 
(accessed 8 November 2011). 
 
The Alta Declaration on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Alta, 
Norway, 13 June 1997. Online: < 
http://ac.npolar.no/filearchive/The%20Alta%20Declaration.pdf> (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
 
AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues - Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, 1998, which was presented 
to the first Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in 1998. 
Online:<http://amap.no/documents/index.cfm?dirsub=/AMAP%20Assessme 
nt%20Report%20-%20Arctic%20Pollution%20Issues> (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
 
AMAP  Strategic  Plan  2004+  (AMAP  Report  2004:5)-Arctic  Monitoring  and 
Assessment  Programme.  Online:  <  http://www.amap.no/>  (accessed  11 
November 2011). 
274  
 
AMAP Work plan for 2009 – 2011 and tentative list of deliverables 2009 – 2013 - 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. Online: 
<http://www.amap.no/> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
AMAP/CAFF Workshop on Climate Change, Rovaniemi, 24-25 March 1998- 
Summary Report (CAFF Technical Report No. 5; AMAP Report 3:98). 
Online: 
<http://web.arcticportal.org/uploads/cZ/OF/cZOFRHC20Kw10hYvl7uy
cQ/C AFF-Tec.no.5---AMAP.CAFFWorkshop.pdf> (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
 
An Assessment of Consequences of Climate Variability and Change and the Effects 
of Increased UV in the Arctic Region -Prepared by the Assessment Steering 
Committee (Implementation Plan Version 3.7), 2000. Online: 
<http://www.amap.no/documents/search.cfm?category=13> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
An Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Options for Black Carbon for the 
Arctic Council- Technical Report of the Arctic Council Task Force on Short- 
Lived Climate Forcers, May 2011. Online: 
<http://library.arcticportal.org/1210/1/ACTF_Report_22July2011.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic (ACAP), Barrow, 13 
October 2000. Online: < http://www.ac- 
acap.org/files/acap%20org/ACAP_overall_strategy_Oct_2000.pdf > (accessed 
11 November 2011). 
 
 
275  
Arctic Council Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (PAME International Secretariat: 
Akureyri, Iceland, 2004). Online: 
<http://www.pame.is/images/stories/AMSP_files/AMSP-Nov-2004.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011).  
 
 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document Issued by the Fourth Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik, 24 November 2004; reprinted ‘The 
Arctic Council Policy Document on Global Warming’, 99 American Journal 
of International Law (2005), pp. 256-57. Online: 
<http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_Policy_Document.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
Arctic Council Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines - Protection of Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME) Working Group of the Arctic Council, Akureyri, 
Iceland, 29 April 2009. Online: 
<http://www.pame.is/images/stories/FrontPage/Arctic-Guidelines-2009- 
13th-Mar2009.pdf > (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
The Arctic Council Meeting of the Senior Arctic Officials, Svartsengi, Iceland 23-24 
October, 2003. 
 
Arctic Council Rules of Procedure Adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meeting,  Iqaluit, Canada 17-18 September, 1998 (SAO 
REPORT, Iqaluit: ANNEX 1). Online < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/4-founding-documents 
> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
 
 
276  
Arctic Council Senior Arctic Official (SAO) Report to Ministers, Tromsø, Norway, 
April 2009. Online: 
<http://ac.npolar.no/workarea/agenda_tromso_meeting_april_2009/filearchiv 
e/final_sao_report_to_ministers_april_2009.pdf> (accessed 9 November, 
2011). 
 
Arctic Council Status on Implementation of the [Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment] AMSA 2009 Report Recommendations – Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), May 2011. Online: 
<http://www.pame.is/images/stories/AMSA_Status_on_Implementation_of_t 
he_AMSA_2009_Report_Recomendations-May_2011.pdf> (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
 
Arctic Human Development Report (Stefansson Arctic Institute: Akureyri, Iceland, 
2004). Online: 
<http://www.svs.is/ahdr/AHDR%20chapters/English%20version/AHDR_firs 
t%2012pages.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines- Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment Working Group, 10 October 2002. Online: 
<http://www.pame.is/images/stories/PDF_Files/Doc_lib/OffshoreOilandGas 
_/ArcticGuidelines.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Arctic Pollution 2002: Persistent Organic Pollutants, Heavy Metals, Radioactivity, 
Human Health, Changing Pathways – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, 2002. 
Online:<http://www.amap.no/documents/index.cfm?dirsub=/Arctic%20Po
llution%202002> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
 
277  
Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report- Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, 1997. 
Online:<http://www.amap.no/documents/index.cfm?dirsub=/Arctic%20
Pollution%20Issues%20-
%20A%20State%20of%20the%20Arctic%20Environment%20Report> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Barrow Declaration on the Occasion of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the 
Arctic Council, Barrow, Alaska, 13 October 2000. Online: < 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/34- 
2nd-ministerial-meeting-in-barrow-united-states-2000> (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
 
CAFF Work Plan 2009-2011 Ministerial Period - Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna, April 2009. Online: 
<http://library.arcticportal.org/460/1/CAFF_Work_Plan_2009-2011.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Circumpolar Protected Area Network (CPAN): Strategy and Action Plan 1996 – 
Conservation of the Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF). Online: 
<http://www.caff.is/about-cpan>  (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – Contribution of Working Groups I, II and 
III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2007); or Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – An 
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Online: 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf > (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
278  
Climate Change and POPs: Predicting the Impacts – Report of the UNEP/AMAP 
Expert Group (UNEP/Stockholm Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland, 2011). 
Online: 
<http://amap.no/documents/index.cfm?action=getfile&dirsub=&filename=A 
P2011_LR.pdf&sort=default> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada, 19 
September 1996. Joint Communiqué of the Governments of the Arctic 
Countries; 35 International Legal Materials (1996): 1382. 
 
Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment 1991 and the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy, 14 January 1991, Rovaniemi, Finland 
[The AEPS]; 30 International Legal Materials (1991):1624. 
 
EPPR Working Group Report on 2006 – 2009 Activities- Emergency, Preparedness, 
Prevention, Response (Revised) 2 April 2009 Prepared for the 6th Ministerial 
Meeting of the Arctic Council, Tromsø, Norway, 29 April 2009. Online: 
<http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/56- 
working-group-progress-reports-2006-2009> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
The Greenland Ice Sheet in a Changing Climate (GRIS): Snow, Water, Ice, and 
Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) Summary 2009 - Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, 2009. Online: 
<http://www.amap.no/swipa/GRIS_Layman_English_Secure.pdf> (accessed 
9 November 2011). 
 
Inari Declaration on the Occasion of the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council, Inari, Finland, 10 October 2002. Online: 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/inari_Declaration- 
en.pdf> (accessed 8 November 2011). 
279  
 
Iqaluit Declaration on the Occasion of the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting , 
Iqaluit, Canada, 17-18 September 1998.  Online: <http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5-declarations > 
(accessed 8 November 2011). 
 
International Conference ‘The Arctic as a Messenger for Global Processes – Climate 
Change and Pollution’, Copenhagen, 3‐6 May, 2011. Online: 
<http://amap.no/Conferences/Conf2011/statement.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
The Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development 
in the Arctic, 21 March, 1996, Inuvik, Canada, the preamble. Online: 
<http://ac.npolar.no/filearchive/The%20Inuvik%20Declaration.pdf > 
(accessed 8 November 2011). 
 
‘List of Approved Activities and Proposals for Future Activities’- Arctic Council 
Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution in the Arctic (ACAP), June 2001. 
 
Meeting of Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, 12-13 November 2009. Online: < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/40-sao-meeting- 
copenhagen-november-2009> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials FINAL Report, Svolvær, Norway, 23-24 April 
2008. Online: < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/43-sao-meeting- 
svolvaer-april-2008> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
 
280  
Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials of the Arctic Council, FINAL Report, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, 12-13 November 2009. Online: < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/40-sao-meeting- 
copenhagen-november-2009 > (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Minutes of Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, 6-7 
April 2005. On file with the author. 
 
Norwegian, Danish, Swedish Common Objectives for their Arctic Council 
Chairmanships 2006-2012. Online: < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, Barrow, Alaska, 
USA 12-13 October 2000, the part: Ministerial Roundtable Discussions. 
Online: <http://ac.npolar.no/filearchive/barrow_notes.pdf > (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, 16 
September 1993. Online: 
<http://ac.npolar.no/filearchive/The%20Nuuk%20Declaration.pdf> (accessed 
11 November 2011). 
 
Nuuk Declaration on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council, Nuuk, Greenland, 12 May 2011, Nuuk, Greenland. Online: 
<http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5- 
declarations> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
PAME Work Plan 2009-2011- Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment. Online: 
<www.pame.is/images/stories/PAME_Work_Plan_2009-2011/PAME.b_work   
plan_2009-2011.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
281  
 
Regular Meeting of the Sustainable Development Working Group of the Arctic 
Council, Copenhagen, Denmark, 10-11 November 2009. 
 
Report of ACAP Working Group Meeting on PSI Status, Ottawa, Canada, 16-18 
September 2009. Online: <www.ac-acap.org/files/WGM%202009.09.16- 
18%20Ottawa/4_Presentations/Status%20PSI- 
Criteria%20and%20Process%202009.ppt#256,1,PSI Status> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Ministers at the Fifth Arctic Council Ministerial 
Meeting, Salekhard, Russian Federation, 26 October 2006. 
Online:<http://library.arcticportal.org/287/1/SAO- 
REPORTTO_MINISTERS.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Ministers at the Fourth Arctic Council 
Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik, Iceland, 24 November 2004. On file with 
the author. 
 
Report of the Arctic Council Focal Point (FP) for ACIA Follow-up Activities 
Presented to Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) of the Arctic Council, 
Salekhard, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Russian Federation, 23 
October 2006. Online: 
<http://amap.no/documents/index.cfm?action=getfile&dirsub=&filename=AP 
2011_LR.pdf&sort=default> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
282  
Reykjavik Declaration on the Occasion of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the 
Arctic Council, 24 November 2004, Reykjavik, Iceland,  2004. Online: 
<http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/32- 
4th-ministerial-meeting-in-reykjavik-iceland-2004> (accessed 9 November 
2011). 
 
Salekhard Declaration on the Occasion of the tenth Anniversary of the Arctic 
Council at the Fifth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Salekhard, Russia, 
26 October 2006, the part: Other. Online: < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5-declarations> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
SDWG Work Plan for 2009-2011- Sustainable Development Working Group of the 
Arctic Council. Online: < http://portal.sdwg.org/media.php?mid=913> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Senior Arctic Official Report to Ministers on the Review of the Arctic Council 
Structures, 15 May 15, 2002. Online: <http://arctic- 
council.npolar.no/index.html/Meetings/SAO/2002%20Ou/8_0_review.pdf> 
(accessed 1 November 2011). 
 
Statement on Climate Change in the Arctic Region Prepared by Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of 
America with France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the COP 11 and 
COP/MOP 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Montreal, Canada, 9 December 2005. Online: < 
http://www.arcticathabaskancouncil.com/aac/files/climate_change/UNFCCC 
COP11.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
283  
Strategic Plan for the Conservation of Arctic Biological Diversity- Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), September 1998. Online: 
<http://web.arcticportal.org/uploads/hw/Kd/hwKdRxnTLfzt5cewJeEtjg/Strat
e gic-Plan-for-hte-Conservation-of-Arctic-Biological-Diversity.pdf > 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Summary of AMAP Climate Expert Group Meeting, Oslo, Norway, 15–16 
February, 2006 (Final Version 20 March 2006). Online: 
<http://www.amap.no/documents/index.cfm?action=getfile...CEG-Meeting... 
> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
SWIPA 2011 Executive Summary: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic- 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway, 
2011. <http://amap.no/swipa/SWIPA2011ExecutiveSummaryV2.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
The Terms of Reference for a Sustainable Development Programme Adopted by the 
Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Iqaluit, 
Canada, 17-18 September 1997. Online: < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/4-founding-documents 
> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Tromsø Declaration on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council, Tromsø, Norway, 29 April, 2009, the part: Climate Change in the 
Arctic. Online: < http://www.arctic- 
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/15-6th-ministerial- 
meeting-in-tromso-norway> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
 
 
284  
Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern: Observations, Short-lived Climate 
Forcers, Arctic Carbon Cycle Predictive Capability- Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme, (AMAP, Oslo, Norway 2009). Online: 
<http://www.amap.no/> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic (VACCA): An 
Analysis of the Scoping Study Data - A Report Prepared for the Sustainable 
Development Working Group of the Arctic Council, Oslo, Norway, October 
2008. Online: < http://portal.sdwg.org/media.php?mid=815> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Workshop Report In Support of the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, Reykjavik, 
Iceland, 20-22 October, 2003. Online: < 
http://www.pame.is/images/stories/AMSP_files/Workshop-Report.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
 
 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Council and Barents Regional Council Documents 
 
 
Action Plan for Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 2009-2012 
Adopted by the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro- 
Arctic Region (WGIP), Tromsø, Norway, 21 January 2009. 
Online:<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/WGIP_Action_Plan_2009- 
2012_ENG.pdf (accessed December 28, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
285  
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland, the Government of 
the Kingdom of Norway, the Government of Russia and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden on the Establishment of an International Barents 
Secretariat for the Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, 15 
November 2007. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/IBS_Agr_signed.pdf> (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
 
Agreement between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on 
Cooperation within the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response, Moscow, 11December 2008. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Agreement_Emergency_Prevention_Pr 
eparedness_and_Response_English.pdf > (accessed 8 November 2011). 
 
Barents Euro-Arctic 10 Year Anniversary Declaration, Kirkenes, Norway, 11 
January 2003. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/462_doc_BarentsSummitDeclaration.p 
df> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Barents Euro-Arctic Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth Policy, 
Murmansk, 23-24 September 2009. Online: < 
http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Conclusions-Youth-Minister- 
Conference2009.pdf > (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Barents Region - Cooperation and Dialogue towards Sustainable Development. 
Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Parliamentary_BEAC_info_Eng.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
 
286  
BEAC Working Groups and Task Forces: Annual Reports 2006 (Committee of 
Senior Official Information Document, Doc.BEAC.CSO.2007.2, 2 February 
2007). Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/CSO2007.2+WG+annualreports2006.p 
df> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Conference on Development of the transport infrastructure in the BEATA region, 
Murmansk, Russia, 24 April 2008. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/8022008BEATA_conf_ENG.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Cooperation Programme on Health and Related Social Issues in the Barents Euro- 
Arctic Region 2008-2011, BEAC Working Group on Health and Related 
Social Issues. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/JWGHS+Program+2008-2011.pdf> 
(accessed December 30, 2009). 
 
Declaration Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Conference of Foreign 
Ministers Adopted on the Occasion of the First and Founding Session of the 
Barents Euro Arctic Council, Kirkenes, Norway, 11 January 1993 [Kirkenes 
Dclaration]. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/459_doc_KirkenesDeclaration.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Financial and Staff Rules of the International Barents Secretariat Adopted by the 
Committee of Senior Officials of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council on 16 
September 2008. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/IBS_Financial+Staff_Rules_16_Septe 
mber_2008_final.pdf > (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
287  
Host Country Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and 
the International Barents Secretariat for the Cooperation in the Barents Euro- 
Arctic Region on the Legal Status of the Secretariat and the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Secretariat and its Permanent Staff Members, Rovaniemi, 
Finland, 15 November 2007. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/IBS_Host_Country_Final_Eng.pdf> 
(accessed 8 November 2011). 
 
Joint Communiqué of the 11th session of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 
Rovaniemi 14-15 November 2007. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/JointCommunique11thBEACSession1 
51107.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Joint Statement of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in the Second Session of the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Tromsø, Norway, 14-15 September 1994. 
Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/499_doc_Tromsocommunique_1994_e 
.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Protocol Agreement from the Statutory Meeting of the Regional Council of the 
Barents Region (the Euro-Arctic Region) Adopted by the Regional Council 
of the Barents Region, Kirkenes, 11 January 1993. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/501_doc_StatutoryMeetingRegionalCo 
uncil.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Regional Working Group on Environment Action Programme 2007-2010, The 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/RWGE_Action_Program2007- 
2010.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
288  
Report from the Regional Working Group on Environment to the Environment 
Ministers of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Lulea, Sweden, 28 August 
2003. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/RWGE_report_Lulea_20030828.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Resolution from the 1st Barents Indigenous Peoples’ Congress, Kirkenes, Norway, 
4-5 February 2010. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Adopted_resolution_BIPC_Feb2010.p 
df> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Resolution of the Fourth Parliamentary Barents Conference, Syktyvkar, 27 May 
2009. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/BARENTS_RESOLUTION_FINAL_2 
5-27052009-ENG.pdf > (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Terms of Reference for an International Barents Secretariat for the Cooperation in 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Adopted by the Barents Regional Council 
Tromsø, Norway, 6 September 2007,  and by the Committee of Senior 
Officials of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council Helsinki, Finland, 9 October 
2007. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Terms_of_Referens_051107_FINAL.p 
df > (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Terms of Reference for the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Adopted by 
the Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, Kirkenes, Norway, 11 January 1993.  Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs_tmp/460_doc_AnnextotheKirkenesDe 
claration.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
289  
Terms of Reference for the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples in the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/11934_doc_IPActionPlan2005- 
2008_English.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Terms of Reference of the Working Group on Education and Research Approved by 
the BEAC/CSO and the Barents Regional Committee, 10 June 2004 
(Committee of Senior Officials Information Document Doc. 
BEAC.CSO.2004.27, 22 June 2004). Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs_tmp/5198_doc_CSO.2004.27ToRWG 
ER.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Towards More Effective Regional Barents Cooperation Report prepared by the Ad- 
Hoc Group on Organisational Changes, 14 May 2007. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Ad-Hoc_Group_Report_ENG.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
The Twelfth Session of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Murmansk, 15 October 
2009. Online: 
<http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/All_Documents_of_the_XII_Session_ 
of_BEAC.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
 
 
Northern Forum Documents 
 
Alberta Declaration on the Occasion of the Fifth General Assembly of the Northern 
Forum, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada 29 October 2001). Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=87> (accessed 11 November 
2011). 
 
290  
Bylaws of the Northern Forum (as drafted March 2008 including recommendations 
from General Assembly 2007) Approved 17 November 2008 by Resolution 
No. 132, and thereafter 3 September 2009 by Resolution No. 137. On file 
with the author. 
 
Charter of the Northern Forum Adopted at the Initial Gathering of Northern Forum 
Members (acting as the General Assembly), Anchorage, Alaska, 8 November 
1991, preamble. On file with the author. 
 
Conference Proceedings of the Northern Forum Meeting (among the Governors, 
Premiers and Designated Representatives), Anchorage, Alaska, 30-31 May 
1991. On file with the author. 
 
Harbin Declaration on the Occasion of the Seventh General Assembly of the 
Northern  Forum,  Harbin,  Heilongjiang  Province,  People’s  Republic  of 
China,                    19                    June                    2005.                    Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=1904> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Hokkaido Declaration on the Occasion of the Second General Assembly of the 
Northern Forum, Sapporo, Japan, 14 September 1995. Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=120> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
International Conference on Infectious Diseases, Morozovka Estate, Moscow, 
Russia, 24-26 April 2008. Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=2861> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
 
 
291  
Khanty-Mansiysk Declaration on the Occasion of the Eighth General Assembly of 
the Northern Forum, Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug – Ugra, Russia, 
28 September 2007. Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=2664> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Lapland Declaration on the Occasion of the Fourth General Assembly of the 
Northern Forum, Rovaniemi, Lapland, 1 June 1999. Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=129> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Letter of Agreement between the Northern Forum, United Nations Development 
Programme and the Forum of Global Associations of Region Singed on 12 
September 2007. 
Online:<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=2911>  (accessed  11 
November 2011). 
 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Development 
Programme and the Northern Forum Signed on 12 September 2007.Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=2910> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Northern Forum Agreement among the Governors, Premiers and Designated 
Representatives Adopted at the Northern Forum Meeting, Anchorage, 
Alaska, 30-31 May 1991. On file with the author. 
 
Northern Forum Articles of Incorporation Adopted (and registered  before the 
Notary Public in and for Alaska, Third Judicial District, State of Alaska), 
Alaska, 8 November 1991. On file with the author. 
 
 
292  
The Northern Forum Founding Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 6-8 November 
1991. On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 11 Concerning  Amendment to The Northern 
Forum's, Articles of Incorporation to Declare Nonprofit Status Approved at 
Tromsø, Norway on 3 October 1993. On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 12 Concerning Development of Two Additional 
Membership Classifications Approved at Tromsø, Norway, 03 October 1993. 
On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 17 Concerning Creation of a Northern Forum 
Flag, Rovaniemi, Finland, 16 September 1994. On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 41 Concerning Clarifications in the 
Entitlements and Acceptance of Membership III Adopted by the Board of 
Directors, Khanty-Mansiysk, Russia, 1996. On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 42 Concerning Clarifications in the Definition, 
Entitlements and Acceptance of Membership IV Adopted by the Board of 
Directors Khanty-Mansiysk, Russia, 1996 . On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 84 Concerning the Membership of a 
Municipality in the Republic of Iceland Approved at Moscow, the Russian 
Federation on 27 March 2001. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 90 Concerning  Northern Forum Advisory 
Panel Approved at Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 29 October 2001. On file 
with the author. 
 
293  
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 95 Concerning Change of Name and Structures 
of Committees Approved at Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 29 October 2001. 
On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No.102 Concerning New Regional Members of the 
Northern Forum Approved at Oulu, Finland, 17 May 2002. On file with the 
author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No .106 Concerning Approving Revisions to the 
Northern Forum Bylaws Approved at Oulu, Finland, 17 May 2002. On file 
with the author. 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 107 Concerning the Status Membership 
Approved Saint Petersburg, Russia, 25 April 2003. On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 134 Concerning Approval of the Members of 
the Board of Governors Approved at Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada, 3 
September 2009. On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Resolution No. 137 Concerning Changes to Bylaws and Rules 
of Procedure Approved at Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada, 3 September 2009. 
On file with the author. 
 
The Northern Forum Rules of Procedure (as drafted March 2008 and approved on 
17 November 2008 by Resolution no.132, Vologda, Russia, and 3 September 
2009 by Resolution no. 137, Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada). On file with the 
author. 
 
Report from the Third Northern Regional Conference on Cooperation in a 
Changing World-International Business Forum, Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 
16-20 September 1990. On file with the author. 
294  
Rovaniemi Code of Conducts – Principles related to the Conduct of Business 
Operations in the Circumpolar North endorsed by the Board of Directors of 
the Northern Forum, Rovaniemi, Finland, 16 September 1994. Online: 
<http://www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=235 > (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
Saint Petersburg Declaration on the Occasion of Sixth General Assembly of the 
Northern Forum, St. Petersburg, Russia, 25 April 2003. Online: 
<http://www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=172> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
Statement of Intent among the Governors, Premiers, Ministers and Chairs of 
northern regions Adopted at the Third Northern Regions Conference, 
Governors’ Summit on Regional Cooperation, Anchorage, Alaska, 16–20 
September, 1990. On file with the author. 
 
Tromsø Declaration on the Occasion of the First General Assembly of the Northern 
Forum, Tromsø, Norway, 3 October 
1993. Online:<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=452> (accessed 
11  November 2011). 
 
Whitehorse Declaration on the Occasion of Ninth General Assembly of the Northern 
Forum, Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada, 3 September 2009. Online: 
<http://www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=3146> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Yakutsk Declaration on the Occasion of the Third General Assembly of the Northern 
Forum, Yakutsk, the Sakha Republic, Russia, 10-13 August 1997. Online: 
<www.northernforum.org/servlet/download?id=193> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
295  
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Documents 
 
Agreement  on  South  Asian  Free  Trade  Area  (SAFTA),  Islamabad,  Pakistan,  6 
January  2004,  in  force  1  January  2006.  Online:  <  http://www.saarc- 
sec.org/userfiles/saftaagreement.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (the SAARC 
Summit Charter), Dhaka, Bangladesh, 8 December 1985; 26 Indian Journal 
of International Law (1986), pp. 323-326. Online: <http://www.saarc- 
sec.org/SAARC-Charter/5/> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Islamabad Declaration on the Occasion of the Twelfth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, 
Pakistan, 6 January 2004.  The SAFTA was agreed upon among the SAARC 
members and came into force on 1 January 2006. Online: < 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Summit%20Declarations/12%20- 
%20Islamabad%20-12th%20SAARC%20Summit,%204- 
6%20January%202004.pdf > (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
SAARC Social Charter Adopted at the Twelfth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, 
Pakistan, 4 January 2004.Online:< http://www.saarc- 
sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=7 > (accessed 13 May 
2007). 
 
 
 
Cases, Guidelines, Reports and Documents 
 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports [1978] P.3, (Greece v. 
Turkey). Online: <http://prawo.uni.wroc.pl/pliki/3201> 11november 2011). 
 
 
296  
Alaska Nonprofit Corporation Act, Alaska Statutes (Chapter 10.20, legal situation as 
of 2009). Online: 
<http://touchngo.com/lglcntr/akstats/Statutes/Title10/Chapter20.htm> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Annual European Community Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2000 and Inventory 
Report 2002 – Submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat (Technical report 
No.75/2002).Online:<http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/technical_repor 
t_2002_75/Technical_report_75_final_for_print.pdf> (accessed 9 November 
2011). 
 
Appeal relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, ICJ Reports 1972, p. 46 
(India v. Pakistan). Online: < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/54/5665.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Arctic Climate Impact Science: An Update Since ACIA- World Wide Fund for 
Nature International Arctic Programme (WWF), ( WWF International Arctic 
Programme: Oslo, Norway 2008). 
Online:<http://www.worldwildlife.org/climate/WWFBinaryitem8705.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Arctic Co-operation Organisations: A Status Report Prepared for the Standing 
Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Canada (2000). Online: 
<www.arcticparl.org/resource/images/conf4_langlais.pdf> (accessed 7 May 
2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
297  
Arctic Report Card: Update for 2010 Tracing Recent Environmental Changes – 
Issued by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA),  19 October 2010. Online: 
<http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/ArcticReportCard_full_report.pdf> 
(accessed 4 July, 2011). 
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - 
the European Union and the Arctic Region- Commission of the European 
Communities, Doc.COM/763(2008) final, 20 November 2008. Online: 
<http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0763:FIN:EN:PD 
F> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Conference Statement of Ninth Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium, 13-15 September 2010. 
Online: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/arcticparl/Conference%20statement,%20Fin 
al%20draft%20as%20adopted.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Copenhagen Accord Noted at the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC, Copenhagen, Denmark, 18 December 2009, 
Doc.FCCC/CP/2009/L.7. Online: 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
298  
Developing a Mandatory Polar Code– Progress and Gaps Presented at the Thirty 
four Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 20 
June – 1 July, 2011. Online: 
<http://asoc.org/storage/documents/Meetings/ATCM/XXXIV/Developing_a 
_Mandatory_Polar_Code  Progress_and_Gaps.pdf> (accessed 8 November 
2011). 
 
Development of a Joint Environmental Monitoring Programme in the Norwegian 
Finnish and Russian Border Area- Cooperation Project between the 
Environmental Authorities and Researchers in the Three Countries (2003- 
2006). Online: <http://www.pasvikmonitoring.org/english/index_en.html> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge A Alvarez, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case [1952] ICJ 
Reports, 93 (United Kingdom v. Iran), pp.124-135. Online: <http://www.icj- 
cij.org/docket/files/16/2003.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case [1952] ICJ Reports, 
93 (United Kingdom v. Iran), pp. 142-150. Online: < http://www.icj- 
cij.org/docket/files/16/2007.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Draft Arctic Treaty: An Arctic Region Council Proposal Prepared for the Canadian 
Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa, Canada, 1991. Online: 
<http://www.carc.org/pubs/v19no2/5.htm> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
‘Draft Convention Relating to the Legal Position of International Associations’ 
(Institut de droit international, 1923); 1 International Association Statute 
Series (1988). 
 
 
299  
European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance. Online: 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&refere 
nce=P6-TA-2008-0474> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Guidelines of Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters, International Maritime 
Organization, IMO Doc.MSC/Circ. 1056, MEPC/Circ. 399, 23 December 
2002. Online: <http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_1056-MEPC- 
Circ399.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Guidelines on Capacity Building Strategies in Public Weather Services, World 
Meteorological Organization (PWS-15, WMO/TD No. 1385, 2007). Online : 
<http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/amp/pwsp/documents/TD-1385.pdf > 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
The Ilulissat Declaration Adopted at Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 
27-29 May 2008. Online: 
<http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council- A Discussion 
Paper Prepared by the Arctic Athabaskan Council, March 2007. Online: 
<http://ac.npolar.no/filearchive/AAC_Arctic_Council_Future_Dec_2006.pdf 
> (11 November 2011). 
 
The International Court of Justice Practice Direction Adopted 1 October 2001 (as 
amended on 20 January 2009). Online: < http://www.icj- 
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0> (accessed 11 November 
2011). 
 
 
300  
International Governance and Regulation of the Marine Arctic: A Proposal for a 
Legally Binding Instrument – A Report prepared for the WWF International 
Arctic Programme, Oslo, Norway, January 2010. Online: 
<http://img9.custompublish.com/getfile.php/1092819.1529.wdyyvtwvst/Prop 
osal+for+a+Legally+BindingInstrument+for+Printing.pdf?return=arcticgove 
rnance.custompublish.com> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
The Law of the Sea Convention and the Idea of a Binding Regime for the Arctic 
Marine Environment- Paper prepared for the Seventh Conference of 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Kiruna, Sweden, 2–4 August 2006. 
Online: 
<www.arcticparl.org/_res/site/File/images/Underlagsrapport%20eng- 
rysk3.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1994 (Qatar v. 
Bahrain case). Online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/11059.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
The New Basel Capital Accord: Consultative Document – Issued by Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, January 2001, Online: < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca03.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, Judgement, ICJ Report 1969, P.3 (Federal 
Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v 
Netherlands); 63 American Journal of International Law (1969), pp. 591- 
636. 
 
The Oil Platforms Case, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 
803 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). 
301  
 
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties - Report of the Conference 
of the Parties on its Seventh session held at Marrakesh 29 October – 10 
November 2001, UNDoc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (21 January 2002). 
Online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties - Report of the Conference 
of the Parties on its Seventh session held  at Marrakesh 29 October -10 
November 2001, UNDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (21 January 2002). 
Online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties - Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Seventh session held  at Marrakesh 29 
October – 10 November 2001, UNDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3, (21 
January 2002). Online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a03.pdf> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey (Final 
Report), Submitted to the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and the 
Canada Centre for Global Security Studies at the Munk School of Global 
Affairs, January 2011. Online: 
<http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/24-05- 
2011%20Rethinking%20the%20Top%20of%20the%20World%20(3)%20(3) 
_0.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
302  
Scientific Assessments of Ozone Depletion: 2010 Pursuant to Article 6 of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer- World 
Meteorological Organization ( Global Ozone Research and Monitoring 
Project – Report No. 52). Online: 
<http://ozone.unep.org/Assessment_Panels/SAP/Scientific_Assessment_201 
0/01-Contents_Preface.pdf> (accessed 8 November 2011). 
 
The third part of the sixteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 16) 
and the third part of the fourteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 14), 
Panama City, Panama, 1-7 October 2011. Online: 
<http://unfccc.int/2860.php> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Towards an Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty, Statement issued by Inuit 
Leaders at the Inuit Leaders’ Summit on Arctic Sovereignty, Kuujjuaq, 
Quebec, November 6-7, 2008.      Online: 
<http://www.sikunews.com/News/International/Arctic- Sovereignty-
Begins-with-Inuit-5567> (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
United States Internal Revenue Code enacted by Congress in Title 26 of the United 
States Code (26 USC), 22 October, 1986 (with further amendments). Online: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/usc_sup_01_26.html> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
303  
Other Publications 
 
Battini, Stefano., ‘International Organizations and Private Subjects: A Move Toward 
a Global Administrative Law ?’, (International Law and Justice Working 
Papers 2005/3) ( Global Administrative Law Series). Online: < 
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2005.3Battini.pdf> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
 
Borlase, Harry.,  ‘Consistencies and Inconsistencies in the National Strategies of the 
Arctic Littoral States’, (Master’s thesis, University of Akureyri, Iceland, 
2010). Online: 
<http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/5645/16724/1/Harry_Final.pdf> 
(accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
Eriksson, Johan., ‘Security in the Barents Region: Interpretations and Implications 
of the Norwegian Barents Initiative’, (Working Paper No. 5) (CERUM: 
Umeå, 1995). 
 
Monsma, Mark., ‘Winds of Change within the Barents Organization: An 
Institutional Analysis of Transnational Regionalization in the 
North’, (Working Paper No. 10,) (CERUM: Umeå, Sweden, 1995). 
 
Nowlan, Linda.,  ‘Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection’, ( IUCN 
Environmental Policy and Law Paper no.44), (2001). Online: 
<http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/EPLP-044.pdf> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Robinson, David A ., ‘Northern Hemisphere Continental Snow Cover Extent: A 2007 
Update’. Online: 
<http://climate.rutgers.edu/snowcover/files/snowdata2007.doc> (accessed 9 
November 2011). 
304  
Personal Communications 
 
Email communications made among several members of the IUCN Commission on 
Environmental Law (CEL) during 22-30 December 2009. On the file with 
the author). 
 
Email communications in 2010 exchanged with Hannu Viranto, the former Lapland 
representative to the Northern Forum, who took part in many Northern-
Forum’s activities during the last thirteen years. On the file with the author. 
 
Email received from Natalie Novik, the Programme Director, the Northern Forum 
Secretariat, 19 January 2011. 
 
Interview with Alexander Ignatiev, Head of the International Barents Secretariat at 
International Barents Secretariat, Kirkenes, Norway, 4 October 2011. 
 
Interview with Hannu Viranto, the former Lapland representative to the Northern 
Forum, who took part in many Northern-Forum’s activity during the last 
thirteen years (21 February 2011). 
 
Interview with Stein Paul Rosenberg, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Section for the High North, Resources and Russia), Norway (11 
November 2009 Copenhagen). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
305  
Web References 
 
The Arctic Council. Online: <http://www.arctic-council.org> (accessed 11 
November 2011). 
 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Online: < http://www.beac.st> (accessed 9 November 
2011). 
 
‘Down to Earth: Territorial Approach to Climate Change (TACC)’.Online: 
<www.undp.org/geneva/down_to_earth.html> (accessed 12 May 2011). 
 
‘The IPCC Overview’. Online: 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_1990 
_and_1992_Assessments/English/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pd f> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
The Northern Forum. Online: <www.northernforum.org> (accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
‘Solar Radiation’.  Online:   <http://nsidc.org/arcticmet/factors/radiation.html> 
(accessed 9 November 2011). 
 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Online: < www.icj- 
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 > (accessed 11 
November2011). 
 
The University of the Arctic. Online: <http://www.uarctic.org> (accessed 9 November 
2011). 
